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USSR Report

PROBLEMS OF THE FAR EAST

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USSR REPORT

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No. 1, 1981

Translation of the Russian-language journal PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA published quarterly in Moscow by the Far East Institute, USSR Academy of Sciences.

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PROGRAM OF CONSTRUCTION AND PEACE

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[Text] The 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union cogently demonstrated the unity of Soviet domestic and foreign policy, the focal point of which is the working individual and his vital interests. The preparation for the CPSU Congress, the congress itself, and the nationwide discussion of party documents proved that a domestic policy aimed at the construction of a communist society corresponds exactly to the foreign policy line of the Soviet Union, safeguarding a beneficial and peaceful international atmosphere in which the constructive potential of the Soviet society is revealed to the maximum.

The organic unity of the Soviet Union's domestic and foreign policy is reflected in the interest with which Soviet people discuss specific aspects of their participation in carrying out the decisions of the party congress and the assignments of the current 11th Five-Year Plan. "Our struggle to consolidate peace and to deepen international detente," General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L. I. Brezhnev said at the 26th party congress, "is primarily a struggle to guarantee the Soviet people the necessary external conditions for the accomplishment of the construction work that lies ahead."¹

Climbing the ladder of five-year plans, developing multisectorial industry and agriculture, transportation and communications, construction, science and technology, culture and education and improving the life of the working public, the nation of soviets is helping to further augment the strength of world socialism and reinforce the prestige and influence of the great front of fighters for peace and for the social progress of mankind.

The 26th CPSU Congress directed that the 11th Five-Year Plan must become a new and sizable step in the development of productive forces and the growth of public prosperity. In the 1980's, the "Basic Guidelines for the Economic and Social Development of the USSR During 1981-1985 and During the Period up to 1990," a document discussed at the 26th CPSU Congress, stresses, the Communist Party will continue to implement its economic strategy, the supreme goal of which is a constant rise in the material and cultural standard of living of the population and the creation of better conditions for the thorough development of the individual by means of the continued enhancement of the effectiveness of all social production, the augmentation of labor productivity and the stimulation of the Soviet people's social and labor activity.

In the resolution of domestic policy issues--economic and social--and in its foreign policy activity, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union attaches great significance to the nation's eastern regions and the consolidation of peace in Asia and the Far East, which accounts for much of the territory, production potential and population of the USSR. Siberia and Far East constitute 59.1 percent of all Soviet territory, and the inhabitants of these regions represent more than one-tenth of the entire Soviet population. More than 88 percent of all of the nation's potential energy resources and around 15 percent of its fixed productive assets are concentrated here.

The rich natural potential of the eastern regions and the need to quickly include them in the economic turnover of the Soviet Union were the reasons for the accelerated development of Siberia and the Far East in past years. For example, in just the decade from 1966 through 1975 the volume of industrial production increased 2.3-fold in West Siberia, 2.4-fold in East Siberia and 2.1-fold in the Far East.

During the interval between the prewar year of 1940 and 1976 the total industrial product increased 23-fold in East Siberia and 31-fold in West Siberia although the average indicator for the Soviet Union was 17-fold.

The rapid development of the eastern regions continued throughout the last decade as well. For example, while the net product of the entire Soviet Union displayed a growth rate of 157 percent between 1971 and 1980, it almost doubled in the Yakutskaya ASSR and in Krasnoyarskiy and Khabarovskiy krays and it increased 3.5-fold in Tyumenskaya Oblast. In general, the eastern regions of the USSR have turned into industrially developed areas and are playing a significant role in unionwide division of labor.

In terms of some aspects of industrial development, the eastern regions have even served as the vanguard of technical progress and have provided an example of intensive production. For example, labor productivity in the eastern regions exceeds the union average by more than 35 percent.²

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress about the accelerated development of the nation's eastern regions and many other fundamental aspects of the economic and social development of the USSR are a continuation of the line worked out by the Central Committee of the Communist Party and adopted at its 24th and 25th congresses.

The basic guidelines for the economic and social development of the USSR during 1981-1985 and during the period up to 1990 call for the quicker augmentation of the economic potential of eastern regions. Large-scale measures will be taken to develop their natural resources and fuel and raw material bases. The construction of production units with high energy requirements will be concentrated here. This will be accompanied by the intensive development of a construction base, residential, consumer and cultural construction, agriculture and the production of machines and equipment for the leading industries of these regions, on the basis of which their development should become more comprehensive and their manpower supply should be improved.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress state specifically that the construction of new enterprises in the 11th Five-Year Plan should be carried out primarily in branches and production areas responsible for progressive advances in the structure

of social production and the inclusion of the fuel and crude mineral resources of the nation's eastern and northern regions in economic turnover. What is more, there will be limits on the construction of new production facilities in the European part of the nation.

The increasing emphasis on civil construction in the almost inaccessible Siberian and Far Eastern regions with a harsh climate attest to the Soviet Union's long-range peaceful plans and to its desire to continue striving for the augmentation of national production potential and a corresponding rise in the public standard of living. Modern construction projects in the east are quite capital-intensive because they involve the development of remote regions with no developed network of roads, airports and communication lines. At times there are no big cities, or even small settlements. Besides this, it is necessary to build massive facilities and immediately develop huge territories because only large-scale enterprises are capable of ensuring highly efficient production. This puts a great strain on the state plan and budget.

There is also another important factor: The gigantic construction projects in the USSR's eastern regions are massive in spatial terms and in terms of their duration. Many of them have taken up at least two five-year plans from start to finish. For example, hydroelectric power stations are erected, new ports are created, large deposits of minerals are worked, railroads are built, pipelines are laid, power transmission lines are installed and metallurgical, chemical and woodworking combines are built.

When the nation begins construction projects which will only produce a profit in perhaps 5 to 7 years, or even 10, and if the nation invests sums in these construction projects measuring in the billions, this means that it firmly hopes for the constant preservation of peaceful international conditions. Moreover, it hopes to use international contacts to supply these construction projects with the latest equipment.

The gigantic construction projects in Siberia make up a unique system of direct and reciprocal ties with the guarantee of lasting peace in the world in general and in the Far East in particular. On the one hand, their successful completion is directly connected with the possibility of guaranteeing the security of Soviet borders and the uninterrupted peaceful labor of tens of millions of people. On the other hand, the completion of construction projects and the inclusion of certain eastern resources in national circulation lead to the proportional expansion of national export potential, and this demands that international relations based on mutual trust be maintained over the long range.

This is how the theoretical premises of Marxist-Leninist doctrine on the indissoluble connection between domestic and foreign policy, that foreign policy can be nothing other than an extension of domestic policy, is put in action.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress envisage the better distribution of productive forces for more efficient social production on the basis of further specialization and the proportional economic development of union republics and regions within the unified national economic complex.

An analysis of the Communist Party Congress documents shows that the fuel and mineral resource base will develop continuously on a broad scale in the 11th Five-Year Plan and up to the end of the 1980's in Siberia and the Far East. The documents specify not only the basic guidelines of this development, but also the specific projects that will be started or completed in the near future.

The previous scales of work will be maintained in the construction of massive electric power stations of the two categories most suitable for eastern regions--hydraulic stations using the energy of the largest rivers in Asia, and thermal stations operating on coal and gas. In addition, atomic power stations will be built to cover the energy needs of the European part of the USSR.

The operating giants in Siberia and the Far East--the Bratskaya, Ust'-Il'mskaya, Krasnoyarskaya and Zeyskaya GES's--will be joined by the Sayano-Shushenskaya GES, where most of the construction work should be completed. The first sections of the Bureyskaya GES will also begin operating. This station is being erected on one of the tributaries of the Amur River, distinguished by a particularly capricious nature. The dam of this GES will considerably reduce the danger of floods along the Amur. The construction of GES-1 on the northern Kolyma River will also be completed. The simple fact that this power station was designated with a number during the course of its construction testifies that it will be the first in an entire series of stations which will lay a solid energy foundation in this bleak gold-mining area.

The particular interest in Siberian and Far Eastern hydraulic resources is connected with the high economic effect of the construction of GES's here. The rivers of this region are deep and are distinguished by a more or less steady and uniform current. In all, they carry an incredible quantity of water to the ocean--3,000 cubic kilometers. Convenient topographical features will make it possible to obtain around 2 trillion kilowatt-hours of electric power a year from the eastern rivers. The installation of high-power turbines will make the electric energy of Siberian GES's the cheapest in the Soviet Union and will require little manpower for their operation. The production of 1 kilowatt-hour of electric energy in the most massive Siberian GES's costs .06 kopecks. This is much lower than the national average.

The second component of Siberian and Far Eastern electric power engineering--thermal power stations--will also be developed more quickly, particularly in regions with substantial reserves of cheap coal and gas extracted from the earth during the process of oil production. Just a list of the largest construction projects of this type will attest to the scope of this work.

During the 5 years construction work will be completed on the Primorskaya GRES and Gusinozerskaya GRES, connecting the power system of East Siberia with the Mongolian power system. Plans call for the start-up of the first sections of the Berezovskaya GRES-1, the Kharanorskaya GRES and the Yakutskaya GRES-2 and the incorporation of new capacities at the heat and electric power stations in Surgut.

This will ensure the uniform distribution of electric power stations near coal or gas deposits to exclude the possibility of excessive shipping costs.

The extraction of such valuable raw materials and energy sources as oil and gas will be developed even more quickly than electric power engineering in Siberia. In the last 10 years West Siberia has become the principal center of oil production in the USSR. It will retain this status throughout the new decade. The following comparison of oil production indicators in the nation in general and in Siberia in particular is interesting in this connection: In 1980 315 million of the 603 million tons of oil and gas condensate produced in the USSR came from Siberia. In 1985 the Siberian share of the union figure of 620-645 million tons will be 385-395 million.

In this way, Siberian oil will not only augment the output of this resource but will also compensate for the natural reduction of output in other, older regions.

With a view to the general line of production intensification, as specified in 26th CPSU Congress decisions, the accelerated incorporation of new deposits in the petroleum industry will be accompanied by the expanded use of new production methods and the augmentation of extraction volumes on this basis. In this way the improvement of qualitative indicators will have a direct effect on the petroleum output.

We also have one other extremely important task to perform: We must reduce the amount of labor needed to maintain each well. This indicator should be 15-18 percent lower by the end of the five-year plan. This is extremely important in Siberia, firstly because there is an acute manpower shortage here, and secondly because manpower costs in oil fields are high. Scientists have estimated that in many regions of the Siberian north it costs 18,000-20,000 rubles to settle one person. This means that just the settlement of one collective with, for instance, 50 members will cost approximately a million rubles in the north.

This is why the intensive exploitation of known deposits is quite important, and this is the approach that party congress decisions advised Siberian oil workers to take.

In addition to oil production, gas production will also increase considerably in eastern regions in the current five-year plan. Here we can also take a look at some comparative indicators for the 5 years. Of the 435 billion cubic meters of gas extracted in the USSR in 1980, 163 billion came from Siberia. In 1985 Siberia will account for 330-370 billion cubic meters of the 600-640 billion extracted in the nation. Siberia's share of the national gas balance will rise from 37 percent to 55 percent or more. But even this high percentage will not correspond completely to Siberian potential because gas deposits here represent two-thirds of all industrial gas reserves in the USSR and are distinguished by particularly high quality.

It should also be borne in mind that the gas industry of the Eastern USSR has much greater reserves than many other extractive branches, including the petroleum industry. Many deposits have been discovered in the north of Tyumenskaya Oblast, and some of them are still not being worked or have just begun to be exploited. The speed of the development of gas production will depend on the speed with which new pipelines carry this raw material out of the area.

Stressing the importance of Siberian gas resources, L. I. Brezhnev said the following at the October (1980) CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "The rapid augmentation of the natural gas output is acquiring particular importance. Reserves are tremendous, especially in West Siberia. These reserves will simplify the resolution of the fuel and energy problem and accelerate the development of the chemical industry and several other branches. The expansion of gas deliveries could aid in the fuller satisfaction of the needs of countries of the socialist community."³

A large-scale program for the intensive development of the West Siberian oil and gas industry is being drafted with a view to these objectives. It will become an important link of the 11th Five-Year Plan and of the next one, the 12th.

Our description of advances in the distribution of industries in the east and the development of the Siberian and Far Eastern fuel and energy base would be far from complete if we did not include another major component--the growth of coal production. This branch has developed somewhat more slowly than the oil and gas industry.

In the 11th Five-Year Plan, however, it would be the turn of Siberian coal deposits. After all, approximately 80 percent of all coal reserves in the nation are located in the east.

Above all, there will be the accelerated development of the mining of energy-producing coal in the Kansk-Achinsk basin, where reserves measure trillions of tons.

The more economical open-pit method of coal mining will supply fuel to a group of gigantic heat and electric power stations, the first one of which--the Berezhovskaya GRES-1--is already being built. It will have a capacity of 6.4 million kilowatts--that is, the same capacity as the world's largest GES, the Sayano-Shushenskaya.

In addition to the output of fuel coal, the output of coking coal in Siberia will also increase. The importance of this area of coal mining will grow considerably when the Donetsk basin's share of unionwide fuel production for blast furnaces decreases. The Kuznetsk basin, located in the center of Siberia, would be the main supplier of this type of coal. The South Yakut coal basin will also become a more important source of coking coal, particularly the mine in Neryungri.

The considerable economic effect of Siberian coal mining, particularly in the Kansk-Achinsk coalfields, is noteworthy. Here the average monthly output per worker could be raised to 300,000 tons of coal and overhead costs could be 70-90 kopecks a ton. Soviet scientists have estimated that increasing the output of Kansk-Achinsk coal by 100 million tons would reduce coal production costs in the nation by at least 10 percent.

We have known about the rich Kansk-Achinsk coal reserves for many years, but it was not possible to use them efficiently in the past. It is not convenient to transport fuel coal over 3,000 or 4,000 kilometers. A solution to the problem of transmitting electric energy over distances of this kind was just recently provided by technological progress. And the national economy was not capable of using all of this energy locally.

Now the situation has changed. The Soviet society has accumulated enough resources to start one of the largest Siberian projects of the end of the 20th century--the establishment of the Kansk-Achinsk fuel and energy complex. The decision regarding

this project was made in the Tenth Five-Year Plan. The documents of the 26th CPSU Congress call for the accelerated erection of complex facilities, including the first sections of Berezovskiy Coal Mine No 1 and the Krasnoyarsk Heavy Excavator Plant.

When the Kansk-Achinsk coalfields were discovered, it was the same situation as if a solitary prospector had found a gold nugget weighing 100 tons in the remote taiga--a treasure of inestimable worth, but impossible to fit into a satchel and carried to the city.

The Soviet society approached this treasure carefully. It saved it until it had established the necessary conditions for the local processing of the treasure and its subsequent delivery in processed form--in the form of energy and the products of energy-intensive production units--to the consumer, thereby contributing substantially to the reinforcement of the entire nation's economic potential.

The scales of Siberian and Far Eastern natural resources are tremendous. They can eliminate the need to import many major products from other countries within the foreseeable future. This is particularly important in the case of coal, gas and oil--the major types of fuel under the conditions of the world energy crisis and the rising world crises on all types of fuel.

Upholding the line of the accelerated development of productive forces in eastern regions, the 26th CPSU Congress called for considerable production growth in all other spheres of industry in addition to the extractive branches, as well as in agriculture and transportation in Siberia and the Far East.

Congress directives specifically list the objectives of the incorporation of production facilities at the new Tobol'sk Petrochemical Combine and the Tomsk Chemical Plant. These enterprises began to be built during the 9th Five-Year Plan, yielded their first trial products at the end of the 10th, and will begin to recoup invested funds in the 11th.

The construction projects in Tobol'sk and Tomsk, where essentially new cities have grown up around the future plants, illustrate the high effectiveness of the latest production methods, taking in all of the achievements of science and technology in the area of petroleum refining. These enterprises prove that Siberia, with its vast expanses and natural resources, personifies the combination of scientific achievements with the most progressive production methods. The basic production method here was just recently the result of successful laboratory tests. From here the achievements of science and technology will move to plants in other parts of the nation and will win recognition abroad.

This has been the case in the Siberian construction projects of past five-year plans--the Zapsib, Bratsk aluminum, Noril'sk and other plants. As a product of the most progressive thinking, they have become genuine generators of technical progress and are performing the completely unforeseen function of exporting technical ideas in the form of patents and licenses.

The 26th CPSU Congress decisions mentioned, in addition to the enterprises listed above, the need for continued work on the Abakanskiy Railroad Car Plant and the Sayanskiy Aluminum Plant, where new production capacities will be incorporated,

the continuation of the construction of a group of electrical engineering enterprises in Minusinsk, preparatory work for the exploitation of the Ozernoye polymetallic deposit and the completion of plans for the Udokanskoye copper mine, located on the BAM line.

In addition, construction work will be completed on the Ust'-Ilimsk lumber industry complex, which will include one of the largest international projects of the fraternal socialist countries--a pulp and paper plant. The plant in Ust'-Ilimsk, which is being erected in accordance with the Comprehensive Program of Socialist Economic Integration, will send approximately 200,000 tons of pulp a year to Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Poland and Romania, which are participating in its construction, for many years into the future. At the end of the Tenth Five-Year Plan the plant began to produce crude cellulose, and it will not be long before this enterprise yields the product of its complete processing cycle--bleached sulfate cellulose.

These enterprises could be called the leaders of Siberian industry, but they do not represent all branches. The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress mention virtually all of the plants, factories, oilfields and mines in this vast area. The congress demands to heighten production efficiency, mobilize internal reserves more vigorously and concentrate on increasing the output of consumer goods are being discussed in all production collectives--from gigantic plants to small workshops serving the public.

As part of the national agroindustrial complex, agriculture in Siberia and the Far East will be further developed to correspond to industry. The congress ordered workers in this important sphere to considerably heighten the efficiency of land use. The farmland of the eastern regions covers a huge area of 32 million hectares, or 14 percent of all farmland in the nation.

As specified in the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and the USSR Council of Ministers on the results of L. I. Brezhnev's tour of Siberia and the Far East in spring 1978, it is important to fully satisfy the population's demand for meat, milk and vegetables through local production on the basis of intensive interoblast specialization and cooperation.⁴

The 26th CPSU Congress set, in addition to overall objectives for national agriculture, some specific aims with a view to the climatic, natural and historical peculiarities of Siberia and the Far East. For example, this will be an area of intensive soybean farming. The soybeans will play an important role in solving the fodder protein problem and, consequently, in augmenting the output of meat, milk and other valuable animal husbandry products.

The intensive development of such traditional Siberian branches as reindeer and horse breeding and the fur trade was specifically discussed at length in congress decisions.

Congress materials point out the need for the expansion of hothouse farming, particularly with the use of the heat emitted by industrial enterprises and thermal springs. A great deal of experience in this area has been accumulated in Siberia and the Far East. Many hothouse farms provide cities with a year-round supply of

fresh vegetables. Sovkhozes of this type are located in Kamchatka, near Noril'sk and on some oilfields in Tyumenskaya Oblast and are now being founded along the BAM line. Congress decisions will provide opportunities for the further development of this important field of work.

For the better use of land, the congress specified large-scale reclamation work. The establishment of irrigation systems will be continued, particularly in the Kulundinskaya Steppe in Altayskiy Kray.

The congress instructions regarding the continuation of scientific inquiries into the transfer of Siberian river water to Central Asia and Khazakhstan could also be quite promising. The canals that would divert these rivers would raise farming standards in Siberia as well.

The Communist Party Congress approached the problem of agricultural development comprehensively. Siberia and the Far East have been assigned a prominent part in this work. The contribution of these regions to the augmentation of agricultural output will constantly increase.

Among the national economic objectives of the 11th Five-Year Plan, the accelerated development of the transportation network will be of considerable importance. Eastern regions hold a special place in this sphere as well, because the flow of heavy freight traffic from Siberia and the Far East will continue to grow. What is more, the flow of traffic will grow in both longitudinal and latitudinal directions. Shipments of oil, gas, coal and metal from Siberia to the European center, the south and the ports of the Far East and the arctic north will increase.

In this connection, the party congress mentioned the need to develop all types of transport, particularly railroad, pipeline, river and sea transport. The same kind of objective was set in the last five-year plan. Much has been done in past years, and this is what made the development of northern and eastern industry possible. There is a need, however, for the further intensification of transport and construction work.

The speed with which the transportation network of the eastern regions could grow can certainly be best judged from the example of the Baykal-Amur trunk line construction project. This is no longer simply an idea as it once was, about 10 years ago. It is no longer just the first kilometers of a route through the taiga, as it was on the eve of the 25th CPSU Congress. Now the BAM represents 1,600 kilometers of railroad and it is already being traveled by trains. In all, 2,700 kilometers of main, station and secondary lines have been installed along the route.

The decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress specifically directed that the entire BAM be open to train traffic in the 11th Five-Year Plan. We have no doubt that the congress directive will be implemented. The trunk line will serve the Soviet national economy and the Soviet people and it will aid in the development of co-operation by our country with all countries interested in mutually beneficial economic relations.

The Soviet people took great interest in the work of the 26th CPSU Congress and its decisions and are now striving to contribute as much as possible to the implementation of party plans in their own fields. Their high sense of awareness and

creative approach to work reflect a profound understanding of the importance of each individual's contribution to the enhancement of production efficiency and the achievement of excellent final national economic results.

The Soviet people believe that the successful fulfillment of the 11th Five-Year Plan will guarantee the further growth of national economic potential, the enhancement of public well-being, the maintenance of the Soviet State's defensive might on the necessary level, a rise in this state's international prestige, the consolidation of the world socialist system and the unification of forces fighting for peace and social progress.

The peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union, which was clearly and precisely set forth in the decisions of the 26th CPSU Congress, is a completely appropriate policy for the completion of all construction work.

The Communist Party of the Soviet Union has firmly adhered to the line defined by previous party congresses and set forth in the Program of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, for the Freedom and Independence of Peoples. Constantly strengthening the unity of the fraternal socialist states and developing their comprehensive cooperation in the construction of a new society, the Soviet Union is striving to increase this collective contribution to the consolidation of peace. Along with the other socialist countries, the Soviet Union is trying to stop the growing and dangerous arms race and to reach agreements on questions of disarmament.

The peaceful policy of the Soviet Union and its friendship, cooperation and interaction with the fraternal socialist states of Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea represent a major factor of stability in Asia. On this continent, just as throughout the world, two basic currents in international policy come into conflict. There is, as L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, a political struggle between forces advocating peace, respect for public rights and detente and the forces of oppression, militarism and aggression.⁵

Reactionary forces are trying to stop the process of revolutionary renewal in Afghanistan and interfere in the internal affairs of this country. It is clear that these attempts are destined to fail. The Afghan people and their conquests in the struggle for independence are being guarded by the support and solidarity of the Soviet Union, other socialist states and progressive forces throughout the world.

The intensification and development of the Soviet Union's friendly relations with India will be of great significance for peace in Asia. The agreement on a joint space flight in the near future by Soviet and Indian astronauts has become a symbol of these friendly relations.

Soviet-Japanese relations are benefiting both countries and are important from the standpoint of international life. The Soviet Union has unequivocally announced its willingness to continue developing these relations. The extent of this development, L. I. Brezhnev remarked, will depend on the Japanese side. It will depend on the Japanese leadership's ability to retain the independent and realistic course in its policy without giving in to outside pressure, which is pushing Japan onto the dangerous path of militarization and actions hostile to the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union has also adhered firmly to a principled line in relations with China. The accuracy of this line has been tested by actual events. Although the Soviet Union has waged an uncompromising struggle against Maoism and has opposed Beijing policy hostile to the cause of peace, it has displayed a constant willingness to normalize relations with China on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence.

The 26th CPSU Congress reaffirmed the Soviet Union's desire to eradicate all remaining seats of war, settle conflicts peacefully, and completely eliminate all traces of the system of colonial oppression and seats of colonialism and racism. The Soviet Union has consistently tried to safeguard security in Asia through the concerted efforts of the states of this continent.

Scientific communism has armed the Communist Party of the Soviet Union with indestructible optimism and the conviction that the vital interests of people will not allow anyone to push the world into the abyss of global conflicts.

The Soviet Union calls upon other countries to join the search for avenues leading to detente. Eastern wisdom tells us that it is impossible to applaud with one hand; it takes two. In the same way, it takes at least two willing sides to continue peaceful dialogue in each specific case.

The CPSU's desire to strengthen peaceful relations between all states, which was clearly announced by the 26th CPSU Congress, is supported by the entire multimillion-strong Soviet population, for whom the joy of labor and the happiness of a peaceful life are inseparable. This support represents the principal guarantee of our policy's success. This policy serves the vital interests of all people. This policy is the policy of the future!

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 24 February 1981.
2. For a description of the levels achieved in Siberian and Far Eastern development in the Tenth Five-Year Plan, see PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA, 1980, No 3.
3. PRAVDA, 22 October 1980.
4. See "Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev's Tour of Siberia and the Far East in March-April 1978," Moscow, 1978, p 53.
5. PRAVDA, 30 August 1980.

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TREATY OF FRATERNITY AND FRIENDSHIP

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 13-18

[Article by Dahyn Gotov, extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador of the MPR to the USSR]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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BEIJING'S PRO-IMPERIALIST POLICY

Moscow PROBLEM DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 19-25

[Text] The establishment of the people's democratic order in China in 1949 was the result of a years-long liberation struggle by the Chinese people against imperialism and internal reaction. In this struggle, the Soviet Union, the international communist and workers movement and progressive forces throughout the world took the side of the Chinese revolution and supported it to the maximum. When the Soviet Army defeated the Japanese intervention troops and drove them out of Manchuria, democratic forces in China, led by communists, were able to establish a strong revolutionary base here with the aid of the Soviet Union. It was from here that the Chinese people's Liberation Army launched a powerful offensive that led to the collapse of the Kuomintang Government.

The Soviet people, the people of the socialist countries and communists and progressive people throughout the world were overjoyed by the Chinese people's success in the construction of a new life. The Soviet Union and other countries of the world socialist system gave China a great deal of selfless assistance in all areas. Thousands of experienced specialists from the USSR and specialists from other socialist countries took an active part in the construction of plants, railroads and bridges and in the founding of cultural and scientific establishments. This was a display of socialist internationalism.

There were different feelings about this internationalist assistance in the CCP and in Chinese society. Whereas the overwhelming majority of party members and working people saw this as the key to the socialist reorganization of Chinese society, the nationalist forces headed by Mao Zedong hoped to use the progress connected with the PRC's development along the socialist path in an alliance with the USSR and other fraternal countries to carry out their own chauvinistic plans.

Later, from the end of the 1950's on, the nationalist tendencies in the policy of the Chinese leaders became increasingly apparent. By that time, there had already been a noticeable shift in policy, made easier by the multitude of petty bourgeois elements in the country and in the CCP and by the illiteracy of many party members. In addition, the Maoists expertly took advantage of the long-popular ideas of Sino-centrism and the exaggerated view of China's role in the world.

At first the Maoists tried to impose their ideological platform and leadership on the socialist community and the international communist and national liberation movement in camouflaged forms and in devious ways. This was accompanied by an

attempt to replace Marxist-Leninist doctrine and the collective experience of the socialist countries with the "Thought of Mao Zedong," which was a vulgarization and revision of Marxism-Leninism from a position of petty bourgeois nationalism and adventurism. When this plan failed, the Maoists openly challenged the socialist world. From the early 1970's on, the social-chauvinistic regime in China made serious attempts to collaborate with imperialism on an anti-Soviet basis.

Contemporary Chinese social-chauvinism is similar to the opportunistic and nationalistic currents that have always accompanied the revolutionary movement of the working class. When V. I. Lenin revealed the essence of social-chauvinism, he said that its basic idea "is an alliance or rapprochement (sometimes an agreement, a bloc and so forth) between the bourgeoisie and its opposite."¹ The international communist movement's experience in struggle against these currents allowed it, by the early 1960's, to predict that ultra-leftist Maoism could degenerate into overt counterrevolution with a pro-imperialist policy. In particular, M. A. Suslov made the following remark in his report at the February (1964) CPSU Central Committee Plenum: "While the Chinese leaders are progressing along their incorrect, anti-Leninist path, we hope they will not go so far as an actual alliance with the reactionary, belligerent elements of imperialism."²

By the end of the 1970's, Chinese social-chauvinism had evolved from ultra-leftist to extreme rightist positions and had matured for long-range partnership with imperialism, with its more belligerent circles.

Of all the past and present opportunistic currents hostile to scientific socialism, the Maoist, social-chauvinist current in China probably has the most unconcealed passion for settling political matters by militaristic means. For imperialism it is particularly important that this extremely belligerent antisocialist militarism arose in a large country with definite opportunities to exert pressure on developments in the vast Asian and Pacific zone and the rest of the world. For imperialism it is also important that its own strategy of exerting pressure on the socialist community, which could result in a global catastrophe, agrees with the strategy of the PRC leadership, which tries to pass its counterrevolutionary, pro-imperialist line off as a proletarian, socialist line.

The combined efforts of imperialist strategists and CCP leaders to convince the people of the allegedly objective inevitability of a third world war are helping the Western military-industrial complex to weaken the influence of antiwar forces, including the working class in the capitalist countries, in the struggle against arms race escalation and against expanded preparations for war. Therefore, it was precisely the militaristic extremism of imperialist reaction and contemporary Chinese social-chauvinism that predetermined the development of Beijing's military and political partnership with imperialism.

Besides this, according to the calculations of imperialist circles, especially the United States, present-day China could become imperialism's ally for the following reasons:

1. The current Chinese leadership has taken an intransigent stand on relations with the USSR and other countries of the socialist fraternity, in addition to which its policy within the nation, conducted to the tune of pseudosocialist slogans, is discrediting the system of collectivized production--the economic basis of socialism.

2. The PRC economy is still weak and the country is not a serious competitor for imperialist states in the world market, and the Chinese opposition to economic relations between socialist and developing countries is helping imperialist monopolies to dominate world markets.

3. The great-Han policy of the PRC toward the Asian countries, including India and the Indochinese countries, is creating political instability in this region and allowing imperialist states to take advantage of conflicts in the region.

At the same time, the great-Han PRC leadership expects to receive certain benefits from rapprochement with the imperialist countries, including an opportunity to use imperialism's military and economic potential and its financial support.

On the basis of their mutual interests, China's convergence with the United States, the chief imperialist power, has entered a new stage, marked by the vigorous development of their military and political contacts and the danger of a new anti-socialist, anti-Soviet alliance. This is attested to by Beijing's growing interaction with Washington in the international arena, the coordination of parallel actions, especially in Asia, the establishment of constant contact between the PRC and U.S. military establishments, and the organization and expansion of forms of military cooperation--from the exchange of information and mutual reports of "defense plans" to the elaboration of plans for military aid to China.

American foreign policy concepts envisage the use of Beijing's great-power nationalist line, its hostile, subversive actions against the socialist community and its negative approach to current global issues to turn China into a striking force against the socialist world and gradually rechannel China's development in the capitalist direction.

Washington also has high hopes for China in American imperialism's efforts to undermine socialism's influence in Asia. This is the main reason for its encouragement of Beijing's aggression in Indochina--Beijing's diplomatic isolation, economic boycott and military provocations against Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos have been fully supported by the United States. Washington has gone further than his allies, Japan and the Western European countries, in promoting Chinese expansion in Indochina because it is more interested in aggravating Soviet-Chinese relations and stimulating the chauvinist ambitions of PRC leaders.

The United States is expecting Beijing to help in the preservation and reinforcement of American imperialism's influence in the Far East and in parts of the Near and Middle East. The Chinese leadership, in turn, has an interest in the preservation of the American-Japanese alliance, the continuation of the American occupation of South Korea and the transformation of Pakistan into an imperialist bridgehead for more extensive subversive activity against the USSR, Afghanistan and India.

This community of interests is serving as the basis for U.S. plans to form a military alliance with China and establish some kind of "eastern NATO" consisting of the United States, the PRC, Japan, Australia and other countries associated with them.

The Sino-American alliance might not even become an official military and political union. It could take the form of a purely practical military bloc which would operate in crisis situation and would depend on political conditions.

It would be wrong, however, to believe that China's place in imperialist global strategy would simply mean that the current PRC regime would act as the West's junior partner in its confrontation with forces for progress and peace on various continents. Beijing's dangerous influence on international affairs stems largely from the fact that the social-chauvinist leadership of the PRC took on the functions of a catalyst of international tension and an instigator of extremist forces long ago in an attempt to bring conflicts in the world to the boiling point.

The provocative stand of Chinese social-chauvinism became particularly dangerous when Beijing made the move to rapprochement and coordinated interaction with imperialism, which has always been the main source of war.

By agreeing to take on the role of imperialism's military and political partner, the Beijing hegemonists, firstly, filled Western ruling circles with the hope that imperialist aggressive forces would be strengthened and, consequently, made the foreign policy adventurism characteristic of these circles even more dangerous and, secondly, secured direct channels of influence on imperialist global strategy and, in this way, created more favorable conditions for the implementation of their own policy line, aimed at the provocation of international tension and regional and global conflicts.

The position of Beijing hegemonism and the purpose of its foreign policy strategy have made further and closer interaction by China with imperialism on a broad range of aspects of confrontation with the socialist community completely probable, as well as its interaction with other anti-imperialists, antiwar forces. While they are striving to attain their hegemonistic goals, the Beijing social-chauvinists will certainly continue to concentrate this interaction precisely around ways and means of eradicating all signs of detente from international life, as well as detente itself, as a trend in peaceful development.

Maoist social-chauvinism, which declared its hostility to the cause of peace long ago, is now the most cynical and energetic instigator of war in the international arena, striving to make its militaristic extremism the standard or norm of political behavior. These features of Beijing's hegemonism are the main reason for the present Chinese Government's place in imperialist global strategy. All of this gives us grounds to regard Beijing's hegemonism as one of the main sources of military danger today.

One sign of Beijing's alliance with the imperialist world is the reinforcement of rightist tendencies in the domestic policy of the present Chinese leadership, particularly the policy of rewarding private enterprise and involving foreign capital in the Chinese economy on a broad scale.

The post-Mao Chinese leadership announced the "program of four modernizations" as its basic domestic policy line. The program is actually a mixture of various contradictory and inconsistent "rescue measures" which could have negative social results. Among these measures, an important place is occupied by the offer of the most tempting terms to foreign capital for its involvement in the Chinese economy.

But the widely publicized "modernization" could not solve fundamental socioeconomic problems because its underlying basis and political and ideological platform are not a socialist economic orientation, but, above all, a headlong rush to the right in the adoption of "socialist market models" and the direct use of capitalist

methods of economic management. The danger of the revival of economic elements hostile to socialism in the PRC is quite great in view of China's unstable and fragile social and economic structure. The present economic policy of the Chinese leadership, which is a reaction to the "leftist" Maoist strategy of the time of the "Great Leap Forward" and "Cultural Revolution," is taking in more and more rightist, revisionist and reformist guidelines for societal development. The real objectives of scientific, technical and cultural progress in China and the elevation of the standard of living of the Chinese working population have been put off until the next century. Even the leadership does not believe that these objectives are attainable. This is the reason for the petty material bribes like the "sequential salary raises," "higher purchase prices on agricultural products," "greater independence for the enterprises of people's communes," "the resolution of the urban housing problem by means of public funds" and others. No manipulation of China's slender means of existence, no redistribution of the limited accumulation fund, actually affects the Chinese State's huge military budget. The buildup of the military-industrial complex at any cost and as quickly as possible is the invariable purpose of all Chinese State policy.

The current development of Chinese domestic policy, reflecting the overall socio-economic situation, is complex and contradictory. The new ruling coalition in China is still conducting Mao Zedong's strategic line of creating a strong military-industrial power, capable of dominating first the region and then the world. Without rejecting the Maoist banner, the current Chinese leaders have gradually revised several of the political and ideological premises of Maoism but have left intact its chauvinistic nucleus, which is most clearly reflected in anti-Sovietism. Chauvinism and anti-Sovietism, along with the ambitious plans of the builders of a "great China," represent the common platform of all factions of the Chinese leadership.

The present Chinese ruling elite has not been able to stabilize the domestic political situation as a whole due to the presence of contradictions in the Chinese society which cannot be solved on the basis of Maoism (even a modified version). The main contradiction is that between the economic basis, resting on collectively owned means of production, and the policy of the PRC ruling elite, which is anti-socialist in nature.

This elite is continuously engaging in extensive social and political maneuvers but is also relying more on political-administrative methods of controlling society. In contrast to the similar methods used in Mao Zedong's lifetime, the present coercive measures are given, as far as possible, legal form with the use of formal procedures. Besides this, although political-administrative methods prevail, some attention is now being given to the use of economic leverage, some reasonable goals and foreign experience in administrative practices.

The military-bureaucratic dictatorship is still being retained behind the changed governmental facade and the ultimate aim of the measures now being taken in the Chinese political system is the reinforcement of this dictatorship. This is the purpose of the measures to heighten the efficiency of the nation's political mechanism, particularly its security organs, courts and procuracy (these organs, according to official Chinese doctrine, represent, along with the army, the "people's machinery of state").

The Beijing leadership apparently believes that the machinery of administration and coercion, created with the use of earlier organizational forms (from the 1950's and early 1960's), will provide for more effective domestic political control and will put an end to various demonstrations by opposition forces. The current system for the continuity of supreme authority is aimed at insuring that the policy line worked out by the Chinese leadership in recent years is maintained for a relatively long period of time.

During the course of its domestic political maneuvers, the Chinese ruling elite changes the social basis of its authority. It plays up to the national bourgeoisie, which has been transformed into the "socialist working public," and the intelligentsia, which has been declared "part of the proletariat." In the leadership's policy toward the working class and the peasantry, there is also an obvious reorientation toward the more secure strata of these classes (skilled workers and well-to-do--by Chinese standards--peasants), which were just recently the target of attacks by Maoist "radicals."

The Chinese ruling elite is no longer aiming its policy at the masses of urban and rural poor, as it did in the recent past. These masses cannot provide momentum for the "four modernizations." They are, however, explosive human material and have proved this repeatedly. Due to China's huge expenditures on weapons, there is no possibility that intensive "modernization" will improve their status. Consequently, the reasons for the pauperized masses' dissatisfaction with their status still exist and are even multiplying. This dissatisfaction can no longer be restrained by equalizing tendencies working from the top down. These masses still represent a nutritive medium for extremist Maoism and a constant destabilizing factor in the domestic political situation. In the future, when a new generation of Chinese leaders takes over, these masses could support persons who moved up to high-level positions in the political and administrative leadership at the time of the "Cultural Revolution." Now this stratum of Chinese cadres is being attacked, but it could play a definite role in the future on the strength of its large size and its age makeup.

One of the characteristic features of the ideological situation in China is the fight over Mao Zedong's legacy. This fight reflects the deep-seated ideological and theoretical crisis in Maoism, which is unable to give the Chinese society a scientifically sound program of socioeconomic and political development. When the present Chinese leaders encountered the working population's widespread dissatisfaction with Mao Zedong's policy, they had to resort to political and ideological maneuvers to find a way out of the blind alley into which China had been led by Maoism. The Chinese leadership is searching for this way out by adjusting and revising some extremely significant Maoist premises. This revision is being accompanied by criticism of its most odious aspects, which are essentially being blamed on Lin Biao and the "gang of four." In addition, the criticism has included direct statements about errors committed by Mao Zedong. Official propaganda is now suggesting that the "Thought of Mao" should be "reverified" by the contemporary practice of the "four modernizations." The modification of the ideological basis of Chinese policy is taking place in an atmosphere of struggle between various segments of the party and state leadership. The "prime motive" of Maoism--great-Han chauvinism in ideology and hegemonism in politics--has, however, been retained. The "Thought" of Mao is now being amplified in Beijing as grounds for direct military and political alliance with world imperialism. The militaristic and anti-Soviet features of the Chinese leadership's policy have been preserved in their entirety.

By moving from concerted action with imperialism to undermine the influence of international forces for progress to a direct military and political partnership with them and by turning the Chinese State into a link of the capitalist system in terms of the class content of its foreign policy,³ the Beijing social-chauvinists are overtly aiding in the reinforcement of world reaction and urging it to take a tougher stand in relations with anti-imperialist forces, particularly with regard to the socialist community.

At the same time, although imperialism's military and political partnership with Beijing has somewhat reinforced the influence of forces for reaction and war, it has not brought about any profound changes in the existing military-strategic balance between the two opposing world camps. Western ruling circles and Beijing hegemonists have good reason to escalate the arms race, as they hope to considerably surpass the socialist community in terms of the scales and quality of military strength. In this connection, however, it is significant that world socialism was able to catch up with the West and achieve military-strategic parity with the capitalist world at a time when the latter was not in any sense standing still, but was constantly and rapidly building up its weapon strength. It is much easier to maintain an existing balance. The preservation of the collective defensive capability of the fraternal countries of the socialist community on the necessary level is a factor which nullifies the efforts of Western militaristic forces and Beijing hegemonists and essentially makes their military and political partnership a hopeless venture.

In the broad historical context, the socialist world and the entire anti-imperialist front have an indisputable advantage over the camp of imperialist and nationalist reaction, and the future of peace will depend largely on the degree to which this advantage is used in the tense atmosphere of our day and the degree to which anti-war forces are able to prevent the opponents of detente from forming their own "united front."

The militaristic extremism of imperialist reaction and contemporary Chinese social-chauvinism predetermine the development of Beijing's military and political partnership with the West. This partnership also contains, however, certain contradictions that can frustrate the attempts of Beijing social-chauvinism and imperialist reaction to form a "united front." These contradictions include the ultimate incompatibility of the global hegemonistic interests of imperialism and Beijing. This is the main contradiction between Beijing's social-chauvinism and imperialism, but there is also a general contradiction between Chinese society and imperialism--the contradiction between the socialist tendencies in China's development and the Western policy opposing these tendencies. In the future these contradictions could weaken Beijing's military and political partnership with the West, but today this partnership is only gaining strenght, stimulated by the foreign policy line of social-chauvinist forces in the PRC.

For this reason, we cannot ignore the fact that the combination of imperialist and social-chauvinist sources of war is posing an extraordinary threat to the security of people and to peace on earth. In light of this, mankind has no duty more important than the duty to mobilize forces and means to subvert the conspiracy of Western militaristic circles and Beijing hegemonists against peace.

FOOTNOTES

1. V. I. Lenin, "Polnoye sobraniye sochineniy" [Complete Collected Works], vol 26, p 151.
2. M. A. Suslov, "Na putyakh stroitel'stva kommunizma. Rech'i i stat'i" [On the Road of Communist Construction. Speeches and Articles], vol 1, Moscow, 1977, p 472.
3. PRAVDA, 23 July 1980.

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SOCIOECONOMIC CONTRADICTIONS IN CHINA

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[Article by Ye. A. Konovalov, doctor of economic sciences, and S. A. Manezhev, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] It has been more than three decades since the time the PRC was founded. These decades have been filled with social reforms of colossal dimensions and with endless "nationwide campaigns" and shakeups in all leadership echelons. Whereas during the first years we could definitely report China's consistent, although labored, climb from a backward pre-capitalist society to socialism and its entry into the transition period of the construction of a material and technical base for socialism with the selfless and substantial assistance of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, in the last quarter-century the Beijing leaders first covertly and then overtly, demonstrated their peculiar domestic and foreign policy line. This line, which has been forced on the Chinese people and is directly hostile to Marxism-Leninism, signifies a departure from the basic principles of scientific socialism and proletarian internationalism and has resulted in an open alliance between nationalist forces in the CCP leadership and the most reactionary imperialist forces. This policy of the Chinese state has posed a serious threat to the important gains of socialism and the considerable benefits of the socialist order in general. As a result, the social objectives and goals set by the communist party during the initial period of the PRC's existence have not been attained. The socialist potential that became part of the economic basis after the confiscation of Kuomintang property and the institution of agrarian reform and elementary agricultural cooperation, as well as the use of various forms of state capitalism, was not realized as a result of the unsubstantiated, adventuristic "great leaps" and social experiments that began at the end of the 1950's.

At present, basic relations in the PRC are distinguished by the existence of formal collectivization, and forms of ownership are acquiring a content hostile to the public interest. The supreme goal of state production seems to be the derivation of maximum surplus product for the sake of militarization and hegemonism. The fundamental material and spiritual needs of the working public are ignored. The Chinese leadership employs and adapts socialist forms to conduct an antisocialist policy, is striving to derive maximum benefit from state ownership for the centralization of authority and the accumulation of budget funds and is strengthening all of the controls of the political and economic dictatorship behind the screen of the Chinese model of "democracy." Under these conditions the natural tendencies of socialism cannot manifest themselves, the advantages of large-scale collectivized production are nullified and the very purpose of revolutionary reforms is adulterated. The subjective factor is turning into extreme subjectivism and voluntarism.

It is not surprising that this kind of domestic policy either prevents the resolution of major socioeconomic problems, offers palliatives as solutions or postpones their resolution indefinitely. The only impressive results of the PRC's development in more than 30 years are the facts that the Chinese population has almost doubled and is close to 1 billion, that the PLA is the largest army in the world and that intercontinental ballistic missiles with a mass of 2,000 kilograms and a range of 10,000 kilometers are being launched. As for per capita national income, the PRC ranks 120th among the countries of the world, there are more than 20 million unemployed literate young people in the Chinese cities and 100 million people without jobs in rural areas, expenditures on education are only half as high as in Egypt, and China ranks last in the world in terms of teachers' salaries.

Since the time the PRC was founded, national five-year plans, with the exception of the first (1953-1957), have either not been drafted or have not been ratified and published before the end of the plan period. Annual plans have been repeatedly revised in one direction or another, and plan assignments for enterprises specified indicators that did not coincide with statewide directives. Local government agencies, ministries and departments have disregarded the interests and capabilities of enterprises and collectives and have fallen prey to regionalism and bureaucratism, arbitrarily overstating assignments, exaggerating the scales of capital construction and attempting, in accordance with the concept of "self-reliance," to create self-contained and self-sufficient complexes on the provincial, regional, municipal and district levels. At first the central authorities were pleased with this emphasis on self-sufficiency because it gave them an opportunity to confiscate funds from local units without giving them any substantial financial, material or technical assistance. However, as this line grew into the absolute and the "spirit of Daqing" and "spirit of Dazhai" spread through the nation, plan discipline was violated and the system of centralized, balanced planning was disrupted. The construction of major facilities of statewide importance was delayed, while tens of thousands of unplanned small enterprises in urban and rural regions grew like "bamboo after a spring rain." The total number of industrial enterprises in the country has risen from 160,000 to 350,000 just since the 1960's, and small and miniscule enterprises now account for 99.7 percent of all industrial facilities. Under these conditions, the leadership has had to admit that the country has been in a "semi-planned, semi-anarchic" state for a long time.

The policy line of the "four modernizations" was proposed as an alternative in 1975, and in 1978 a 10-year plan for development was set forth, for the 1976-1985 period. From the moment this plan was published, however, it became apparent that it was not economically sound: It lacked financial and material guarantees. At best, it could be regarded as the latest appeal for heightened activity on the part of the working public and, what is most important, as a request for Western help in any form in the accomplishment of the "four modernizations." Now the leadership has admitted the bankruptcy of this plan, and at the third session of the Fifth NPC (September 1980) it acknowledged the inexpediency of revising and adjusting it for the remaining years. In this way the failure to accomplish modernization according to the "Chinese model" was officially corroborated. In place of this, the leadership expressed its desire to quickly begin working on a long-range program of economic development, with the aid of which China could overcome the general crisis in the national economy, correct its colossal disparities, change its sectorial structure and liquidate the huge budget deficit. It was alleged that the "improvement of public life" and "compliance with objective laws" would be the point of departure for the compilation of this program.

The modification of the entire strategy that is now aimed at the creation of a "strong and prospering" China on a militaristic basis will necessitate changes in fundamental approaches to economic growth, changes in the social goals of development and the disruption of existing reproduction patterns. People in China are now trying to comprehend all of the complexity and diversity of unsolved problems but, because they still do not have a sound development strategy, they have to pretend that emergency measures are a new economic policy, that the reduction of production and consumption scales in key branches is an improvement in proportions, and that the revival of non-socialist forms of ownership is an "expansion of freedom" and the expedient and necessary use of methods of market regulation as a supplement to plan regulation.

The practicability of the new long-range program will depend largely on the optimal ratio of accumulation to consumption in national income. Judging by the experience of the first five-year plan and subsequent years, this optimal ratio is now 25:75. But this proportion was only maintained in the first years after the PRC was founded. In 1958 it began climbing to 40 percent and stayed on an exceptional high level for 3 years, after which the nation suffered a severe crisis, necessitating a sharp decline in the investment cycle (in 1962 the accumulation norm dropped to 10 percent). Since the time of the "Cultural Revolution" and the accelerated implementation of the nuclear re-arming program, the accumulation norm has once again risen above the permissible level. Even after Mao Zedong's death, despite the leaders' constant assurances of their desire to "concern themselves with the life of the people," the accumulation norm rose to 36.5 percent in 1978 and only began to drop gradually in 1979 through the sharp reduction of capital construction: In 1979 and 1980 it was equivalent to 33.6 percent and 30 percent respectively.¹ The main reason for this high accumulation norm was the massive quantity of capital construction.

In accordance with past experience and objective conditions in the PRC, the optimal proportion of capital construction expenditures to budget expenditures is 35 percent (it was 30 percent on the average during 1953-1957), but the figure jumped to 50 percent during the years of the "Great Leap Forward," and it exceeded 40-45 percent in subsequent years. Even now the Chinese are trying to stop the construction of some facilities, but other, unplanned facilities are still being built. The construction of small enterprises has been stopped, but more costly construction projects (like the Baoshan Metallurgical Plant) are still underway, requiring tens of billions of yuan. The maximum limit of 50 billion yuan on capital investments for 3 years (1979-1981) will necessitate the disruption of sectorial proportions, the refusal to develop key branches and production fields (in particular, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, electrical power engineering, heavy and transport machine building and transport construction and modernization), and so forth.

The sectorial structure of production units is being rebuilt, without any regard for objective needs, in line with their capital and power requirements and their potential to use huge quantities of semiskilled manual labor. In essence, it has been alleged that the "ideal" sectorial structure for the PRC is one in which the branches of group "B" will considerably outnumber the branches of group "A." What is more, the criterion of branch priority is energy resource consumption (branches of group "A" use 5 times as much, on the average, as those in group "B") and the much more intense saturation of these branches with live labor (branches in group "B" can employ 5-10 times as many workers as those in group "A" on 1 million yuan in capital investments). For this reason, there have been cuts in the production of metal, machines and machine tools used in the manufacture of products for civilian purposes.

The only solution is heightened production efficiency. To date, however, there has been no sign of a departure from the policy line of national militarization, and the resolution of the problem of production efficiency has been postponed for many years.

In his report at the third NPC Session, the PRC Minister of Finance remarked that state budget revenues collected from state industrial enterprises per 100 yuan of sold product totaled 25 yuan in 1979, as against 30 yuan in 1965, and that industrial enterprises were operating at a loss, calculated at 1.4 billion yuan, in the first half of 1980.² In accordance with the new economic policy line, enterprises will be closed if their expenditures of crude resources, materials and electric power considerably exceed the norm (for example, this applies to small metallurgical plants with coking coal expenditures exceeding 800 kilograms per ton of cast iron, nitrogen fertilizer enterprises with fuel expenditures exceeding 2,800 kilograms and electric power expenditures exceeding 1,600 kilowatt hours per ton of product, and so forth).³

If this economic policy line is maintained throughout the nation, tens of thousands of enterprises would have to be closed and millions of workers will have no livelihood.

The search for solutions to economic problems in China is complicated by a group of unfavorable conditions, which come into conflict with one another if they are isolated. For example, the reorganization of the national economic structure, replacing a capital-intensive structure with a labor-intensive one, will partially solve the employment problem but it will simultaneously give rise to many other problems. Labor-intensive branches of industry require more objects of labor--crude resources, materials, semimanufactured products and others--in processing. They require the considerable acceleration of capital turnover. This is why a change in sectorial proportions in favor of light industry and the textile and food industries will lead to an immediate rise in the demand for crude resources and materials, which, in turn, are 70-percent dependent on the state of agriculture and the scales of its commercial product. But the state of Chinese agriculture is still critical, it is still specializing primarily in grain farming, and agriculture as a whole is completely unprepared to supply branches of group "B" with the most essential crude resources. The new trend in economic development will lead to the underutilization of existing capacities in heavy industry (there are 260,000 industrial enterprises of group "A" in the nation), and the new light industry enterprises, filled with substandard equipment, will have a seasonal type of production due to chronic shortages of crude resources and materials. The placement of millions of unemployed individuals in jobs at new enterprises will simply signify their formal inclusion in the huge army of labor that is still distinguished by low levels of education, professional training and labor productivity.

From the strategic standpoint this planned sectorial reorganization could have the ruinous effect of increasing China's relative lag behind other countries in the technical respect because it will sharply reduce the growth of modern capacities for the smelting of metal, the extraction of energy resources and the production of machines and equipment.

From the standpoint of reproduction, the proposed sectorial structure with an emphasis on labor-intensive branches will lead to a situation in which an increasingly large share of the funds allocated for the development of industry and public

services will have to be used to pay for live labor and to cover the wages of surplus personnel. Just the placement of 2 million new urban workers and employees in jobs will cost a minimum of 18 billion yuan. In the 1980's jobs will have to be found for 15 million persons of working age each year, with 3 million of them in cities. Therefore, half of all current capital investments and other government funds will be "absorbed" by the creation of new primitive jobs. This will sentence the Chinese economy to lower rates of reproduction, efficiency and labor productivity. From this we can conclude that the PRC lacks the necessary conditions for the elaboration of an integral, scientifically sound economic strategy.

National economic management is a major problem in the PRC. Its urgency is quite evident because the present system of economic administration, as the Chinese leaders have admitted, is too centralized and bureaucratic, is based on arbitrary administrative methods of decision-making and does not meet the requirements of economic laws. The Beijing leadership has tried to explain this by asserting that the system of administration was modeled on the Soviet Union's system at the time when the PRC was founded and does not correspond at all to the objective conditions of China. But who but the Maoists are to blame for the distortion of the socialist model of administration and for the abandonment of its creative approach, in the form of the use of flexible methods and procedures and the timely transfer from one form of planning to another? The present system of economic management in the PRC is distinguished by the absence of democratic centralism and reciprocal communication in relations between enterprises and the center, and the substitution of bureaucratic methods for the creative use of the advantages of planning combined with commodity and money relations.

The Chinese press has much to say about experiments in the expansion of the economic independence of enterprises and about the so-called Sichuan experiment. But the transfer of enterprises to actual economic accountability, to self-funding and a democratic system of administration requires many preliminary conditions: a well-organized system of relations between enterprises and the state, price and tax reforms and the establishment of direct ties between enterprises in the area of product sales and supply operations. The "Sichuan experiment," which is being conducted on a limited scale and takes in only a few thousand large facilities, does not contain the most significant elements of reform and lacks objective criteria for the measurement of the actual contribution of collectives to production results against formal successes in meeting or surpassing quantitative plan indicators. The range of different wholesale prices is massive, and tax rates are so economically inexpedient that some branches, which are operating at a loss due to low prices, have been paying high taxes for dozens of years (the coal industry and others) while some profitable branches (for example, the petroleum and chemical industries) have been taxed at the minimum rate.

The "Sichuan experiment" also specifies that enterprises will determine their own assortment of products manufactured over and above the plan, find sales markets for these products, set the prices for these products and determine their own manpower and wage fund requirements. This is a completely unrealistic plan for China because the nation is suffering from a growing shortage of precisely the commodities that are unprofitable for enterprises to manufacture and, conversely, warehouse stocks of unsaleable products have an estimated worth of tens of billions of yuan but the enterprises continue to manufacture these products in increasing quantities. While the "experimental enterprises" are being asked to find

their own sales markets for part of their final product, dozens of small and medium-sized enterprises manufacturing similar products are competing with one another in the worst sense of the term by selling goods at below cost. For this reason, many enterprises do not have enough funds to even pay wages, they coerce their workers and employees into buying their products (for example, watches, household fans and so forth) at low prices and they withhold part of their wages for several months. Enterprises of local jurisdiction (especially in rural regions) arbitrarily raise the prices of agricultural products and sell them directly to people's communes, essentially robbing the peasantry and justifying their existence by means of non-equivalent exchange.

A statewide worker and employee hiring system has been operating in China for almost 20 years. Enterprises and establishments have no opportunity to reduce the size of excessive staffs or to hire the specialists and highly skilled workers they need. Labor agencies force plants and factories to accept the quantity of workers and the structure of specialists or untrained manpower that are dictated by the existence of an unemployment problem, and not by the needs of production. There is no redistribution of manpower among enterprises, and this is why an absolutely inefficient staff structure takes shape over the years and cannot be changed quickly.

A system of replacing retiring workers with their children has been used for several years in China. This is why more than half of the young people entering the work force "inherit" the jobs of their parents with no regard for their education, training, specialty, personal inclinations and gender. This had led to a paradoxical and ruinous production situation in which new manpower does not meet the actual needs of production at all. For example, at the Chongqing Special Steel Plant this "replacement" policy has increased the proportion of women from 14.7 percent of all personnel in 1966 to 26.6 percent in 1979, and at the Second Textile Factory in Chongqing the proportion of men jumped from 35.7 percent to 45.7 percent in the same years.⁴ In the Fuzhou schools the "replacement" of teachers with their children has brought young people with a general secondary education or a partially secondary education to these schools as new teachers. The retirees are experienced teachers, and 40 percent of them leave before they reach retirement age simply to spare their children the pain of oppressive unemployment. In some schools completely untrained and semiliterate children are placed in auxiliary jobs in the cleaning and maintenance of school buildings. As a result the ratio of teachers to administrative personnel has changed from 3:1 to 1:1.⁵ This system of "compulsory replacement" is also used in scientific research institutes--for example, in the Academy of Forestry in Northeast China. The economic and moral harm of keeping a person in one job throughout his career is tremendous. It is something like slavery. From this we can conclude that the planned economic reform will be impracticable within the framework of the existing type of economy.

The most pressing problem in China is the need for educational reform. The urgency of this need to improve the system of education and vocational training is attested to by the fact that 30 percent of the 800 million peasants are illiterate and 40 percent have an elementary education. Less than half of the number of people entering elementary schools in cities graduate from secondary schools. The quality of education is quite low, and there are not enough teachers, school buildings, equipment, supplies, paper, teaching aids and even chalk. All of this is the result of the general policy in the sphere of education in the last

15 years. After the "Cultural Revolution" the government essentially began to "economize" on education, and budget expenditures per student fell to one-fifth or one-sixth of their previous level. This not only lowered the quality of education but also gave rise to a new illiteracy "boom." Tuition-funded schools were opened in rural regions at the end of the 1960's, which put an additional burden on the peasant families with their slender budgets. This has had a particularly ruinous effect on education in remote rural regions, where parents have preferred to not send their children to school at all or to send them only for the first few years. The children who received their education during the decade after the "Cultural Revolution" (during which time 160 million students passed through the schools) are regarded as a "lost generation." But it is precisely this age group that will determine the quality of the labor army in the 1980's. Even in Shanghai, the nation's largest industrial center, with the most highly skilled working class, 50 percent of the 2 million young workers have an elementary education and 40 percent have a partial secondary education.⁶

The low educational and professional level of workers inflicts colossal damages each year on the development of productive forces because it is responsible for the low level of labor productivity, huge production outlays and poor quality of products. It has been estimated that a rise of one school year in the average educational level would augment labor productivity by 2 percent and the elevation of worker qualifications by a single grade would reduce production costs by 5 percent. If we consider that the average qualification level in PRC industry is grade 3, we can imagine how many tens of billions of yuan in industrial products the nation loses each year as a result of its "economization" on education.

The personnel structure in industry is also far from perfect: The percentage of engineering and technical personnel is quite low, and this has a direct effect on all qualitative production indicators. When two textile enterprises with the same capacity, equipment and conditions for raw material supply and product sales operations in Shanghai and Wuxi (Jiangsu Province) were compared, it turned out that the difference in the percentage of engineering and technical personnel (3.4 percent in Shanghai and 1.1 percent in Wuxi) was reflected in production volumes (a difference of 50 percent) and profit volumes (more than double). The situation with regard to engineering and technical personnel is even worse in the service sphere. Specialists with a higher education represent 0.3 percent of the 5 million workers and employees in trade, workers with a secondary specialized education represent 8 percent, and illiterate workers represent 7 percent. The ratio of engineering and technical personnel in trade to trade workers is 1.5:1,000. In the last 2 years more than 2 million young workers without any special training have been hired to replace retiring trade personnel, and the average professional level has dropped to grade 2.5 as a result of this.⁷

The limited state budget expenditures on education have seriously complicated the expansion and improvement of the network of higher academic institutions. The number of specialists with a secondary specialized or higher education has been estimated at 1.2 million, or 0.12 percent of the total population. Student enrollments in higher academic institutions are quite limited: In the last 3 years they have ranged from 270,000 to 300,000 and cannot be increased due to the shortage of dormitories, academic buildings and funds for higher education. Enrollments are particularly limited in the "base" technical institutions because teaching costs here are much higher than in liberal arts institutions. In 1979, for example, only 31 people were admitted to the Beijing Medical Institute and 56 were

admitted to the Beijing University School of Physics.⁸ Only 4 percent of all secondary school graduates can enter higher academic institutions, and even in Beijing the figure does not exceed 6 percent. The rest of the graduates must look for work or enter secondary specialized institutions, but most of them join the huge army of "youth waiting for jobs."

Under these conditions, the Chinese Government's plan to bring the number of scientific personnel up to 800,000 by 1985 (there are now 120,000) seems absolutely impracticable. Emergency measures have been taken for the further economization of expenditures on the development of higher education: The network of institutions specializing primarily in liberal arts is being broadened, the system of correspondence and night classes is being developed, television courses are being publicized and private colleges and universities are being opened. Tuition must be paid in all of these cases and costs per student are relatively high. The structure of higher education is still an unsolved problem. The majority of the 600 higher academic institutions in the nation are poorly specialized--they are either universities which train specialists in a broad group of subjects or comprehensive institutions (polytechnical, medical, pedagogical and others) which are distributed one to each province with a population of 10 million. The poor specialization means that these institutions train people in dozens of specialties and have small student bodies with a low student-low instructor ratio. At present there are only three students for each instructor in all of the nation's "base" institutes (in other countries the ratio reaches 20:1). In some Chinese universities the ratio is even lower--2.5:1. Prior to liberation the ratio of students to instructors was 9.1:1, and even before the "Cultural Revolution" it was 6.6:1.⁹

The entire system of higher education in China must be radically reorganized and all universities and colleges must be enlarged and specialized, which will involve considerable difficulties.

Much is being written in the nation about the need for a sharp increase in the number of administrative personnel because "many persons in managerial positions know nothing about economics, do not know the laws of economics and do not understand modern production." In a number of provinces only 20 percent of the managers in industry, transportation and financial agencies are knowledgeable in these fields. There is one specialist in the fields of planning and finance with a special secondary or higher education for each ten people's communes. The total number of students in financial-economic institutes and schools in the nation is 21,000. This means that the training of administrative personnel for the accomplishment of the "four modernizations" would take many decades.

The main reason for all of the difficulties in the expansion of the school and institute network, the augmentation of the number of instructors and students and the improvement of the quality of teaching is the government's disregard for this exceedingly important matter. Budget allocations for education totaling 3-4 billion yuan a year are obviously not enough, and no reorganization or economization measures can be productive in a society distinguished by the chronic illiteracy of hundreds of millions of people and a constant shortage of specialists and scientific personnel.

The expansion of foreign economic ties has been assigned a special role in the resolution of important socioeconomic problems in China. The declaration of the ambitious course of "four modernizations" radically changed the role of external

factors in national economic developments. Since 1978 the basic indicators of plans for the economic development of the PRC have been set in the expectation of considerable additional financial, material and technical resources from abroad and broader and deeper economic relations with the developed capitalist countries. In the near future China's socioeconomic development will depend largely on the scales and nature of its economic ties with the capitalist world. Long-range commercial and economic agreements, offering the PRC most-favored-nation terms, have been concluded with virtually all of the leading capitalist countries, and scientific and technical cooperation is being developed. The rapid growth of Chinese foreign trade turnover (at an average rate of 30 percent a year in 1978 and 1979), stimulated by purchases of unprecedented size of technological equipment from the West,¹⁰ has clearly revealed the weakness of the PRC's economic potential, especially its export potential, and its inconsistency with the ambitious plans for economic development and, in particular, the nation's import requirements. Whereas in 1977 the deficit in the PRC balance of trade was 100 million dollars, in 1978 it climbed to 1.2 billion, and in 1979 it exceeded 2 billion.¹¹

What are the actual scales of foreign capital participation in the PRC economy and how can relations with the West affect China's socioeconomic development? In 1978 the Chinese leadership expressed its willingness to attract foreign capital in loan form by obtaining bank credit from the Western countries. In the past Chinese foreign trade organizations had only made use of credit extended by individual firms in relatively small amounts (an average of 0.3 billion dollars a year between 1972 and 1977). Now China needs at least 20-22 billion dollars in the form of medium-term and long-term credit just to purchase the means of production it needs during the period up to 1985. This amount cannot be borrowed from individual firms. In 1978-1980 China signed credit agreements with developed capitalist countries for 30.2 billion dollars, including 24.2 billion in the form of medium- and long-term credit. Almost two-thirds of the total consists of government-guaranteed credit restricted to export purposes, one-third consists of unrestricted market credit, and around 5 percent consists of government loans on preferential terms. The list of China's main creditors is headed by Japan (11.4 billion dollars), France (6.8 billion) and Great Britain (5.7 billion).

The implementation of these credit agreements, however, is being delayed by Beijing. In his report at the third NPC Session, PRC Minister of Finance Wang Bingqian said that only 2.2 billion dollars had been used in 1979, and the figure should be the same in 1980.¹² Just a simple calculation indicates that if the foreign loans are used at this rate, the PRC will implement no more than two-thirds of the credit agreements by 1985.¹³ What is the reason for this?

There is no doubt that the active use of foreign credit is being restricted by the present policy of "regulating" the Chinese economy. The limited scales of capital construction, lower accumulation norms and modified investment policy will indisputably reduce the PRC economy's need for loans within the framework of this "regulation."

The low economic effect of Western credit, however, is a more important and long-range factor inhibiting the rate of loan acquisition. The terms of this credit are quite rigid: On the average the credit obtained by the PRC must be paid back within just 7 years with interest of around 10 percent per annum.¹⁴

Even if China should make full use of the 30.2 billion dollars specified in the credit agreements, more than four-fifths of the sum will have to be used for principal and interest payments until 1985. This means that the actual increase in Chinese import potential will be equivalent to only 5.5 billion dollars. In reality the loans are even less advantageous because the interest on market credit has the tendency to rise quickly (from 10.5 percent in the beginning of 1979 to 14.75 percent in the middle of 1980) and the relative cost of guaranteed credit extended in the national currencies of creditor nations rises each year as a result of the depreciation of the American dollar.

In view of the fact that the borrowed funds are designated primarily for the purchase of machines and equipment, their effectiveness and recoupment will depend directly on how quickly China can obtain the necessary return on this capital. However, the effective incorporation of modern technological equipment in the backward PRC economy would be seriously complicated by the absence of a developed infrastructure in the nation, its weak power engineering base and its shortage of qualified specialists. Under these conditions, the expensive new equipment often stands idle for much or all of the time. One characteristic example is the rolling mill built in 1978 with the assistance of the FRG and Japan at the Wuhan Metallurgical Combine. Due to the shortage of energy resources and absence of qualified personnel, this mill is still not operating at full capacity.

At the same time, the gap between the technical standards of China and the Western countries has given rise to considerable above-norm expenditures on the installation and adjustment of purchased equipment. The materials of the third NPC Session testify that unforeseen expenditures on the incorporation of much of the imported equipment in 1979 were equal to the expenditures on its acquisition.¹⁵ These extra expenditures were one of the major reasons for the unprecedented budget deficit in 1979, amounting to a two-thirds overexpenditure of state allocations for capital construction. This gives rise to a paradoxical situation in which the loan capital that is supposed to strengthen national investment potential tends to deplete internal economic resources.

Speeches presented by deputies at the third NPC Session cited many examples of unsuccessful projects "which inflicted considerable damage on the state." These included the purchase of equipment for the PRC's largest power station, the Gezhouba GES, the equipping of the Baoshan Metallurgical Combine, the acquisition of a number of large oil refineries and petrochemical plants, and many others. The price paid by the Chinese economy for the erection of these facilities was much too high in comparison to the advantages of buying them on credit.

As a result, the PRC is already faced by the acute problem of repaying foreign loans. An attempt to completely implement all credit agreements in a short time would have a disastrous effect on China's solvency. According to our calculations, the Chinese "debt service ratio" (the relationship of payments on foreign debts to total foreign currency revenues from exports) will already exceed 20 percent in 1982, and this is regarded as a critical level in the international practice of evaluating a country's solvency. Even the present lower rate of foreign loan implementation will lead China right up to this level in the mid-1980's. As a result, any unforeseen decline in export development (for example, in the event of a bad harvest) would compel the PRC to request its creditors for new loans, and on worse terms, to repay previous debt. This prospect became particularly

threatening in 1980 when it was discovered that China would not be able to fully carry out its earlier plans for massive exports of petroleum to Japan and other capitalist countries before the end of the current decade. For this reason, the obligations Beijing is taking upon itself by acquiring more and more new loans from the imperialist powers are an extremely heavy burden for the Chinese economy and pose a real threat to its economic independence.

In this connection, as the speeches of several deputies at the last NPC Session testify, people in China are naturally remembering the economic support of unique scales and effectiveness they received from the USSR and other socialist countries in the 1950's. The long-term credit extended to China by the Soviet Union during the years of the First Five-Year Plan covered around 15 percent of all capital construction in Chinese industry, and the highest interest rate on these loans was no more than 2 percent per annum. The rapid incorporation of equipment purchased from the USSR was guaranteed by the energetic assistance of more than 10,000 Soviet technical and other specialists. The resulting constructing of 156,000 large industrial enterprises in China between 1953 and 1957 in close economic cooperation with the USSR laid a foundation for a modern multisectorial industrial complex and considerably accelerated the nation's economic development. All of this clearly indicates the great damages inflicted on the Chinese economy by the PRC leadership's refusal to engage in broad-scale economic cooperation with the socialist countries.

Given the present orientation of PRC foreign economic ties toward the world capitalist market, the attraction of commercial investments from abroad is considered to be an effective means of easing the burden of the nation's foreign debt and heightening the impact of the use of this external factor. The high economic effectiveness of establishing joint enterprises in the PRC with the participation of foreign capital is being discussed in China. The essence of these discussions is that the establishment of joint enterprises would not require any kind of currency expenditures from China but it will ensure the extensive and quick inclusion of progressive technology in the Chinese economic structure and promote the rapid growth of foreign currency revenues when the products manufactured here are shipped to foreign markets.¹⁶

The ratification of the act on joint enterprises at the second NPC Session on 1 July 1979 served as the point of departure in the direct involvement of foreign capital in the PRC economy. This act announced, in the most general terms, the possibility that enterprises could be established in China with the aid of foreign investments in the amount of at least 25 percent of the capital stock. The act does not exclude the possibility of full ownership of companies by a foreign investor.

Western businessmen have long displayed considerable interest in China as a huge market with extremely cheap labor. According to available estimates, possible quantities of foreign investments in China during the period up to 1985 could range from 10 to 15 billion dollars, or 3-5 percent of all capital investments in the national economy.¹⁷ But the actual amount of foreign capital involved in the Chinese economy is still quite modest. The establishment of approximately 150 enterprises in China is now being negotiated with companies in Hong Kong, Japan, the FRG, the United States and other capitalist countries. By fall 1980 the commission in charge of foreign investments had officially sanctioned the establishment of only six companies.¹⁸ Foreign participation in these enterprises is

equivalent to around 80 million dollars, or less than 0.2 percent of state allocations for capital construction.

The vigorous flow of commercial investments from abroad is being inhibited primarily by the inadequate legal basis for the functioning of foreign capital in the PRC. In an attempt to dispel the doubts of foreign investors, the Chinese leadership is taking active steps to create a "favorable investment climate" in the nation.

In fall 1980 a law was adopted at the third NPC Session to regulate the taxation of all types of joint enterprises with the exception of those engaged in the extraction of petroleum, gas and other natural resources. A general tax rate of 33 percent was set, which is somewhat lower than the rates in the majority of the developing countries. In addition, the law envisages the kind of privileges that are traditionally granted in such cases--in the form of so-called "tax credit"--the full or partial exemption of new enterprises from the payment of taxes during the first 3 years of profitable activity, and even longer in the case of particularly lengthy incorporation terms. Besides this, in comparison to the majority of countries attracting investments from abroad, the PRC is granting much greater privileges to foreign partners who plan to reinvest their profits in the PRC economy or to keep them in Chinese banks. In the first case, according to the law, the foreign investor will be refunded 40 percent of the tax paid on the reinvested sum, and in the second case he will not have to pay the additional 10 percent collected when profits leave the PRC.¹⁹

There are additional data which testify to Beijing's far-reaching plans regarding the creation of a "favorable climate" for foreign capital. The depreciation norm proposed for joint enterprises is disproportionately high--25 percent, as against 5 percent for ordinary state enterprises.²⁰ This means that a large share of profits will not be subject to taxation and will be written off as part of the enterprise's depreciated capital. The combination of all this makes the system of foreign capital taxation in the PRC much more appealing than the system in other countries using foreign commercial investments. According to the plans of the Beijing leadership, this is supposed to compensate the foreign investor for some of the PRC's negative features as an object of private capital application, particularly the higher degree of government control and economic centralization than in most of the other developing countries.

It is obvious that this could lead to the further erosion of elements of the socialist basis in China. The creation of so-called "special export zones" in the PRC--regions where the operations of foreign capital will be virtually unrestricted--is significant in this connection. Since the beginning of 1979 work has been conducted for the establishment of five such zones in Guangdong Province, two in Fujian Province and other zones in Beijing and Shanghai.²¹ In August 1980 the NPC Standing Committee adopted the "Statute on the Creation of Special Economic Regions in Guangdong Province," marking the beginning of the judicial definition of their activity.

The conditions in these export zones will be much more beneficial than those envisaged in the laws on joint enterprises and taxation. In particular, the tax rate here will be 10-15 percent and the "tax credit" term will be lengthened to 2-5 years.²² Imported raw materials and equipment entering the special zones and

finished products exported from these zones to foreign markets will be duty-free. There will be a customs barrier, however, between these zones and the rest of the PRC.

State control over the entry and functioning of foreign capital has been considerably relaxed in the export zones. In contrast to other parts of China, these zones will contain companies completely owned by foreign investors, and investments of up to 2 million dollars will not require special authorization from provincial authorities or Beijing. What is more, foreign companies have taken an active part in building up some of these zones from the very beginning. The zone on Langki Island, for example, is being established by Fujian Province authorities in conjunction with the Bechtel (United States) and Miehles Holdings (Hong Kong) firms.²³ Wages in these zones will be approximately 25 percent lower than in Hong Kong.²⁴ It is not surprising that PRC officials have had to admit that the exploitation of Chinese workers by foreign capital will be permitted "to some degree" in the "special export zones."

In view of all this, we can regard the creation of the "special export zones" in the PRC as an attempt by the Chinese authorities to experiment on a limited scale with the "open door" policy in order to learn the optimal proportions and methods of utilizing foreign capital on the national economic scale. China's first steps in this direction, however, gave rise to a number of serious problems. Whereas the Chinese side is primarily interested in the creation of joint enterprises because it will bring modern equipment and technology into the country, the capitalist firms are concerned above all with earning maximum profits in the PRC through the exploitation of live labor and the rapid recoupment of invested capital. The foreign investors' attitude is limiting the amount of modern equipment entering China through the channels of the joint enterprises. As a result, the majority of these enterprises are assembly plants or enterprises serving foreign trade and the tourist industry.²⁵

The tendency to move only the final stages of diverse technological processes from the developed capitalist countries to China is preventing the creation of more or less integral industrial complexes in the export zones and is attaching their production potential to the economies of investor states. Therefore, without guaranteeing the actual development of China's own productive forces, foreign capital investments of this nature are deforming the Chinese economic structure in the interest of capitalist investors and are making the Chinese economy more dependent on imperialism.

Cooperation with foreign capital entails not only a partnership, but also a struggle to secure the strategic interests of the socialist state in the use of foreign experience and capital to accelerate national economic growth. Under these conditions, the creation of an extremely beneficial atmosphere for foreign capital will considerably weaken the Chinese side's position when joint enterprises are formed and will cast doubts on its ability to effectively limit and direct the activities of the foreign investor in the interests of economic modernization in the PRC.

On the whole, it is already apparent that Beijing's excessive reliance on the development of economic contacts with the capitalist world will not only keep it from solving pressing economic problems and will not be economically sound, but will also pose the threat of serious social conflicts and endanger the socialist

conquests of the Chinese people. Nevertheless, in its desire to ensure the rapid development of China's military economy at any cost, the Beijing leadership is continuously pulling the nation into close financial-credit and commercial-investment relations with the capitalist world. This policy will attach the Chinese economy firmly to the world capitalist economy and will put China in a position of perceptible economic and political dependence on the imperialist power.

FOOTNOTES

1. RENMIN RIBAO, 23 October 1980.
2. Ibid., 30 August 1980.
3. Ibid., 1 November 1980
4. Ibid., 31 October 1980.
5. GUANGMING RIBAO, 8 November 1980.
6. ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN, 1980, No 8, p 27.
7. GUANGMING RIBAO, 20 August 1980.
8. RENMIN RIBAO, 21 September 1979.
9. GUANGMING RIBAO, 14 November 1980.
10. The PRC signed contracts for the purchase of machines and equipment for a total of 5.5 billion dollars between 1970 and 1976. China's foreign exchange earnings from exports of machinery cost an average of 600 million dollars a year (see "China's Economy Post Mao," Washington, 1978, p 738).
11. RENMIN RIBAO, 19 April 1980, June 1980.
12. Ibid., 13 September 1980; recalculated according to the official exchange rate.
13. Not counting Japanese credit in the amount of 6 billion dollars for the short-term financing of regular commercial operations.
14. This calculation is based on the assumption that each foreign loan would be fully used in accordance with the terms of the corresponding credit agreement. Guaranteed credit would have to be repaid within 5 to 10 years with interest of 7.25-7.5 percent per annum. Market credit would have to be repaid within 0.5 to 5 years with interest of around 15 percent. The Japanese Government loan was extended for 30 years and the interest rate is 3 percent.
15. According to PRC state budget data, foreign loan income totaled 3.53 billion yuan in 1979, and expenditures on capital construction connected with the use of these loans reached 7.09 billion yuan--RENMIN RIBAO, 13 September 1980.

16. JINGJI GUANLI, 1979, No 4.
17. CHINA TRADE REPORT, October 1979, p 4.
18. CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, July-August 1980, p 32.
19. RENMIN RIBAO, 16 September 1980.
20. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 21 March 1980, p 99.
21. CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, March-April 1980, pp 18, 32-35; FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 12 September 1980, pp 56-59.
22. CHINA BUSINESS REVIEW, March-April 1980, pp 32-35.
23. Ibid., p 35.
24. FAR EASTERN ECONOMIC REVIEW, 21 March 1980, p 99.
25. NANFANG RIBAO, 14 June 1980.

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SIXTH CONGRESS OF KOREAN WORKERS' PARTY: DPRK DEVELOPMENT PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 40-49

[Article by V. I. Moiseyev and N. M. Shubnikov]

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MILITARIZATION OF JAPAN--THREAT TO PEACE IN ASIA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 50-64

[Article by Professor D. V. Petrov, doctor of historical sciences]

[Text] One of the characteristic features of Japan's foreign policy line at the turn of the decade was the obvious discrepancy between officially declared doctrines upholding the cause of peace and the actual buildup of military potential according to plan and with increasing speed.

This line is particularly dangerous because it is fully supported and encouraged by the imperialist NATO powers and the Beijing leadership. When President Carter spoke with Japanese Prime Minister M. Ohira in Washington on 1 May 1980, he expressed the hope that Japan "will constantly and significantly increase its military spending."¹ Chinese Premier Hua Guofeng of the State Council also mentioned the "need for Japan to increase its military strength."²

The question of Japanese militarization has therefore acquired international significance going far beyond the bounds of the nation's domestic policy. The buildup of Japanese military strength is obviously inconsistent with the need to relax international tension, it is undermining the existing balance of power in Asia and has therefore become a serious destabilizing factor in this region.

The Military Policy Concepts of Japanese Ruling Circles

All of the prominent figures in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in top positions in the cabinets of ministers have repeatedly stressed that Japan is a "unique nation" in which economic strength is not accompanied by the buildup of military strength. They have announced their intention to adhere strictly to the constitution and attain foreign policy goals exclusively by peaceful means.

"I am certain that the spirit of the Japanese Constitution, which proclaims Japanese loyalty to the cause of peace as a national doctrine, is an object of pride to Japan as an example to all mankind," Minister of Foreign Affairs Sunao Sonoda stressed in his policy speech in parliament on 25 January 1979. "Japan's mission, I am certain, consists in proudly adhering to the spirit of the constitution and, proceeding from the profound belief that the peace and prosperity of Japan can only be secured in an atmosphere of peace and prosperity for all mankind, making every effort to further consolidate the peace and prosperity of the entire international community."³

In reality, however, Japanese ruling circles have been building up Japan's military potential more and more vigorously since the second half of the 1970's and have been preparing the public mind for the possible use of military force in some form in the future as a means of attaining foreign policy goals. This was reflected in the rapid rise in military expenditures and the acquisition of the latest combat equipment, as well as in the satisfaction of the Pentagon's demands regarding the considerable expansion of the commitments of the revived Japanese Army--the "Self-Defense Forces"--within the framework of the American strategic system in Asia. Persistent attempts were simultaneously made to give the constitution an arbitrary interpretation--to the point of proving that Japan could have its own nuclear weapons--and to push certain legislative acts through parliament that would elevate the status of the military command and expand its rights and powers.

In their military policy concepts, Japanese ruling circles proceed primarily from the fact that Japanese military potential is an integral part of the strength of the entire imperialist world in opposition to socialist forces. For this reason, they completely exclude the possibility of a policy of unarmed neutrality, which is what democratic forces in the nation want, and believe it is their duty to take an active part in the struggle between the two systems by preserving and consolidating the influence of the imperialist world.

This policy line was recently reflected in the frank declarations of Japanese Government leaders that, on the global level, Japanese armed strength is directed primarily against the Soviet Union. Military experts and the more farsighted politicians in the country are fully aware that the Soviet Union has no intention of attacking Japan and is sincerely striving, in its own national interest, to develop friendly, neighborly relations with Japan. Nonetheless, under the pressure of reactionary forces within the country and of the United States and Beijing, government leaders are spreading different versions of the rumor about the so-called Soviet "threat" with the obvious aim of justifying their plans for the broad-scale militarization of the country.

In the official "White Book on Defense" for 1978, the Soviet Union was openly called a hypothetical enemy of Japan for the first time. When Z. Suzuki, the new prime minister, formed his cabinet in the middle of July 1980, he announced his complete agreement with the policy of his predecessors. The latest Japanese almanac on foreign policy issues, approved by the government and published on 19 August 1980 by the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stresses, citing Japanese press reports, the "potential Soviet threat" and "takes a stand of confrontation with the USSR."⁴

The second major element of Japanese military policy concepts is the combination of the buildup of military strength with the preservation and reinforcement of the military alliance with the United States. Proceeding from the assumption that Japan is now, and will continue to be in the near future, incapable of independently solving strategic problems and conducting large-scale offensive operations, Japanese military doctrine envisages the use of the American "nuclear umbrella" and the all-round assistance of the armed forces of the United States and its Asian allies.

In his policy speech in parliament on 4 October 1980, Prime Minister Z. Suzuki stressed that "relations with the United States are the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy" and that Japan must, backed up by its military alliance with the United States, "make an effort to establish moderate but high-quality defensive strength."⁵

Finally, Japanese ruling circles build their military policy concepts with a view to the profound changes in the global strategic situation connected with the PRC leadership's betrayal of the cause of world socialism and China's transformation into an actual ally of the imperialist forces. Displaying a certain degree of caution in connection with the instability of the domestic political situation in the PRC, they are nonetheless relying on the consolidation of China's antisocialist, anti-Soviet position and on rapprochement with Beijing in the most diverse fields, including contacts between military agencies.

The implementation of these military policy concepts has resulted in the rapid buildup of Japanese military potential and the elevation of Japan's status in the imperialist strategic system in Asia.

Basic Trends in Militarization

Japanese ruling circles are trying to justify their policy of militarization with the aid of a painstakingly engineered system of arguments. On the one hand, they assert that the United States is striving to avoid excessively deep and dangerous involvement in Asian affairs and is refocusing its attention on Western Europe and the Middle East. This means, the supporters of militarization declare, that it is impossible to rely completely on the United States, and that Japan must rely more on its own strength and build up its "defensive capability"--that is, its military potential. Taking advantage of the patriotic feelings of the population, they depict militarization as an essential element of a stronger position for Japan within the alliance with the United States and of an independent Japanese policy.

On the other hand, government spokesmen are constantly saying that Japan, as a member of a military alliance with the United States, must make an increasing contribution to "collective defense" and that it must refute the accusations that it is "getting a free ride on the Security Treaty" by using the American "nuclear umbrella" but not giving U.S. armed forces enough support in Asia.

The most distinctive feature of the campaign to re-arm Japan, which began developing with extraordinary precision in the second half of the 1970's, is its well-organized character. It is expected to last a long time and to attain far-reaching goals. Plans have been made for the gradual creation of the necessary material, organizational, legal, moral and psychological conditions for the rapid deployment of a strong army, whenever necessary, armed with modern weapons and fully prepared for nuclear war.

After Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda openly called for a "thorough constructive discussion" of defense matters for the first time in postwar Japan in his policy speech in parliament on 21 January 1978,⁶ prominent members of ruling circles took turns announcing the need for stronger defense potential" and a corresponding increase in military spending. Speaking in Sapporo on 12 April 1980, Prime Minister M. Ohira stressed that "we must work conscientiously and energetically on the improvement of the armed forces."⁷

The program of militarization is being carried out in the most diverse areas. Above all considerable effort is being made to establish a legal basis for re-arming by means of the revision or arbitrary and extremely broad interpretation of Article 9 of the Constitution, which declares Japan's permanent renunciation "of war as the sovereign right of the nation, and of threats or the use of military force as a means of settling international disputes."⁸

The campaign to amend the constitution became much more lively after the Suzuki Government took power. Its ranks include not only the top leaders of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, but also prominent members of the government. Minister of Justice S. Okuno, for example, frankly announced in parliament on 9 October 1980 that he believes the revision of the constitution and the removal of Article 9 are necessary.⁹ But because the Conservatives cannot amend the constitution without the necessary two-thirds of the vote in parliament, they have decided to combine their preparations for constitutional revision with the covert buildup of military potential, attempting to conceal this departure from the constitution with its arbitrary interpretation and the drafting of new laws which do not formally violate the constitution but actually pave the way for the militarization of the country.

This line was most clearly reflected in the government's attempts to avoid the imposition of any kind of rigid limitations on types and quantities of weapons in line with the right of "self-defense" envisaged in the UN Charter.

When Prime Minister Z. Suzuki addressed the Japanese Press Club in Tokyo on 18 August 1980, he declared his intention to work toward the qualitative improvement of the armed forces "in accordance with needs."¹⁰ This kind of vague statement allows ruling circles in the nation to organize the virtually unlimited buildup of the combat potential of the "Self-Defense Forces" because no one has ever specified the "proper level."

In official statements and parliamentary debates, government spokesmen have stubbornly refused to clearly specify which types of weapons are "defensive," and permissible, in their opinion, from the constitutional standpoint, and which are "offensive," which Japan certainly has no right to acquire.

The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) has declared that, in general, "the limits of defensive strength are relative because they change in line with the development of international affairs, progress in military technology and various other factors."¹¹ This approach establishes the possibility of using virtually any type of weapon on the pretext of "changing conditions."

In an official statement published on 14 February 1978, the JDA specified that "the weapons we cannot have under any circumstances are weapons used exclusively to strike an annihilating blow at another state." In the course of parliamentary debates it was explained that these weapons are atomic and hydrogen bombs, land- and submarine-based ballistic missiles and strategic bombers.¹²

This interpretation of Japan's "right" to possess modern weapons allows Japan to own bombers of every type but strategic, submarines, aircraft carriers and many other weapons that are clearly offensive.

What is more, on 23 February 1978 the government expressed its "unanimous opinion" that Japan "has the right to possess tactical nuclear weapons if they are defensive in nature."¹³ It is true that it was also announced that Japan would not develop its own atomic weapon, but not because it does not have the right to do this, but simply because of its goodwill and intention to adhere strictly to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which it signed and the "three principles of nuclear weapon rejection" (to not produce, not possess and not import these weapons).

This position is obviously supposed to guarantee Japanese ruling circles a free hand in the future. In view of the fact that Japan has the right to withdraw from the non-proliferation at any time, and the fact that the "three non-nuclear principles" are only a government declaration and have never been ratified in legislative form, the government can act on its own interpretation of the constitution and, in principle, can allow tactical atomic weapons to be produced in the country or imported at its own discretion, without the consent of parliament.

Government spokesmen have also expressed their opinion that Japan has the right to possess cruise missiles, if they are used for purposes of defense, and even neutron bombs. "We cannot definitely say that the possession of cruise missiles and neutron bombs would absolutely violate the constitution,"¹⁴ JDA Director M. Ito said, for example, in parliament on 18 February 1978.

An important element of the policy of remilitarization is the attempt to sharply elevate the status of the armed forces and the military command in the Japanese social structure and to expand the functions of the top brass, now limited by the practice of appointing civilian personnel to top-level positions in the Japan Defense Agency. The drafting of special legislation for a so-called "state of emergency"--that is, state of war--which was begun in spring 1978 by Takeo Fukuda's Government, was supposed to authorize the military command to make strategic decisions independently, without the approval of the civilian JDA leadership.

An integral part of the program of militarization is the well-organized and persistent redirection of public thinking to ensure support for government policy and create a favorable psychological climate for the buildup of military potential. As USSR Minister of Defense D. Ustinov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, pointed out, "revanchiste forces are trying to make people forget the tragic lessons of the last war and convince them to support the idea of Japan's rebirth as a 'strong military power.' This not only endangers Japan's neighbors, but also and primarily the Japanese people themselves, for whom the militarism of the recent past created innumerable troubles and led Japan to a national catastrophe."¹⁵

An important symptom of the intention to re-arm is the uninterrupted increase in military expenditures. The long-range plan for armed service construction approved by the government on 29 October 1976 stipulated that the nation's military expenditures should not exceed 1 percent of the gross national product in the foreseeable future. This limit has not been exceeded as yet: In 1979 allocations for military needs in Japan were equivalent to 0.9 percent of the GNP, while the figure was 5 percent in the United States and 3.5 percent on the average in the Western European NATO countries.¹⁶

When we assess the nature and significance of Japanese military expenditures, however, we must remember, firstly, that even though their share of the GNP did not change, their absolute increase was much more pronounced than in the other imperialist countries. In 1979, for example, military expenditures were 2.4 times as great as in 1960 in the United States, 8.1 times as great in the FRG, 4.9 times in France, 3.8 times in England and 13.1 times in Japan.¹⁷ This high rate of increase in military appropriations was characteristic of subsequent years as well: in 1979 the increase was 10.2 percent, and in 1980 it was 6.5 percent.¹⁸

In the second place, given the gigantic scales of the Japanese economy, even military expenditures which represent a slender percentage of the GNP actually amount to a large sum. The approved figure for 1980 was 2.23 trillion yen, or 9.45 billion dollars (according to the exchange rate for 15 January 1980). Although Japan uses only 5.2 percent of its budget expenditures on military needs, it has nonetheless gone beyond such NATO countries as Italy and France in terms of expenditures per serviceman, and has caught up with the FRG.

What is more, Japan camouflages part of its military spending by entering expenditures in other budget columns. If we employ the method of calculation used in the NATO countries and include benefits paid to the families of deceased war veterans and pensions for retired servicemen, actual military expenditures, as Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Okita said, climb to 1.5 percent of the GNP.¹⁹ This would bring total military appropriations in 1980 up to the enormous figure of 3.72 trillion yen, or 15.7 billion dollars, which is only 2 or 3 billion dollars less than the military spending figures of nuclear powers--England or France.

For a full realization of the meaning of this high level of military spending, we must remember that we are speaking of countries with fundamentally different military doctrines. In contrast to the NATO countries, Japan has proclaimed peaceful development as the basis of its government policy and, consequently, its military appropriations should not even come close to theirs.

But even these huge military expenditures are already considered to be insufficient. In an attempt to increase Japan's contribution to the American strategic system in Asia, Washington has persistently demanded that these expenditures rise to at least 1 percent of the GNP. In a report to Congress in January 1980, U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown frankly admitted that he "insisted in regular meetings with Japanese leaders on the expansion" of the program for the buildup of Japanese military potential.²⁰

An important step in this direction was the Ministry of Finance's consent to satisfy JDA demands and allow a 7.6-percent increase in the military budget in fiscal year 1981, approving total spending of 2.4 trillion yen. According to reports in the Japanese press, the JDA intends to increase military spending by 15 percent each year, so that it will rise to 1 percent of the GNP by 1983,²¹ and would then find a way to exceed this limit.

The primary purpose of the annual increase in military expenditures is the qualitative improvement of the "Self-Defense Forces" by means of the acquisition of the latest types of weapons and the institution of the appropriate combat training.

In this area, a decision has been made to combine purchases of combat equipment and patents for its production from the United States with the development of Japanese weapon systems and the growth of defense industry capacities.

In terms of fire power, mobility and other basic indicators, the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces" already rank, according to the estimates of American experts, approximately sixth or seventh among the armies of the capitalist countries. In 1980 the personnel of the "Self-Defense Forces" officially numbered 268,000, or only 16 percent more than in 1960. But expenditures on the purchase of combat equipment rose 11.6-fold during the same period. The Japanese armed forces have

840 tanks, 520 self-propelled mounts, 600 armored personnel carriers, 3,880 cannons and mortars, 192 Hawk missile launchers, 144 Nike missile launchers, 40 mine layers and mine sweepers, 13 submarines, 47 destroyers and 1,261 airplanes of various types, including 379 fighter planes.²² On 28 December 1977 the National Defense Council decided to buy 100 F-15 fighter planes and 45 R-36 antisubmarine defense planes from the United States in the next 10 years. Besides this, Japan ordered E-2C early warning planes and the latest air defense equipment from the United States.

The purchases from the United States have been accompanied by consistent attempts to develop and produce new weapons in Japan. Special projects include the development of laser-guided missiles, guided torpedoes and various types of ultra-modern electronic military equipment, the manufacture of domestic models of light weight fighter planes and a medium-sized tank and the construction of four aircraft carriers of 10,000-15,000 tons, carrying up to five vertically lift aircraft each. If we consider the fact that the largest naval destroyers now have a water displacement of 3,000-5,000 tons, the construction of these aircraft carriers will signify a qualitative change in the structure of Japanese naval forces, "which will become a strong offensive force."²³

The increased output of military products is augmenting the role and significance of concerns engaged in military production, is giving them more opportunity to exert pressure on government circles and will ultimately establish a basis for the formation of a military-industrial complex in Japan. Around 37.2 percent of all orders placed by the JDA in 1979 for various types of weapons and ammunition (645.2 billion yen) were snatched up by just four of the largest producers of combat equipment--two companies from the Mitsubishi group, Kawasaki Jukogyo and Ishikawajima-Harima Jukogyo.²⁴

Along with the higher equipment level of the "Self-Defense Forces," another important element of their qualitative improvement is the training of sergeant and junior officer personnel, particularly highly qualified air force and naval specialists. For example, enlisted men represent only 35.3 percent of all ground unit personnel, and the percentage is even lower in the navy and air force--only 31 percent. This personnel structure and a developed military industry will make it possible to quickly deploy an army of up to 1.5 million soldiers and officers if compulsory military service should be instituted.

Japan in the American Strategic System

The process of Japan's militarization is indissolubly connected with American strategic doctrines and the U.S. foreign policy line.

The United States has assigned its military alliance with Japan a primary role in the attainment of its regional and global goals. Japan's significance rose to a particularly high level in 1978-1980, when the Carter Administration was attempting to undermine detente, stimulate a new round of the arms race and create seats of tension on the Soviet Union's eastern borders by consenting to rapprochement with the Beijing leadership and encouraging its aggressive anti-Soviet policy.

When U.S. Secretary of Defense H. Brown visited Tokyo on 15-16 December 1980, he commended the role and significance of Japan as the United States' major ally and called for the further development of Japanese-American cooperation and a considerable increase in Japanese military spending.²⁵

The Japanese-American alliance is based on the "Security Treaty" which was signed in January 1960 and has been automatically renewed each year since 1970. In response to questions in parliament on 28 January 1980, Prime Minister M. Ohira said that the agreement would be in force in its entirety in the 1980's because the "government intends to continue renewing this treaty and basing its policy on it."²⁶

In accordance with the terms of the treaty, the United States is authorized to establish bases and deploy its armed forces on Japanese territory. By the beginning of 1981 the United States had 119 bases of various types, radar stations, repair enterprises, barracks, hospitals, training grounds and other facilities to support the actions of American armed forces in the vast Asian and Pacific zone.

Around 46,400 American soldiers and officers are stationed on bases in Japan; only 2,500 of them work in various subdivisions of the Army, while the overwhelming majority are Marines (22,600) and soldiers and officers of the Air Force (14,300) and Navy (7,000). This composition of military units underscores the nature of these bases as advanced frontiers of the American strategic system, intended to facilitate the transfer of Marines to any part of Asia.

Despite all of the significance attached to the bases, the main guideline for the activization of Japan's role in the Pentagon's plans of the second half of the 1970's was the buildup of Japanese military potential and the establishment of organizational forms of direct participation by the "Self-Defense Forces" in military operations on the advance perimeter of the American strategic system.

An important step in this direction was the ratification of the long document entitled "Basic Principles of American-Japanese Cooperation in the Area of Defense" at the 17th session of the Japanese-American consultative committee on security matters on 27 November 1978. On 28 November this agreement was officially approved by the National Security Council and the cabinet of ministers.

In terms of its content and actual significance, the document can be regarded as a direct continuation, clarification and amplification of the Japanese-American "Security Treaty."

The agreement delineates in detail the functions of the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces" and American armed forces in the event of combat operations. In particular, it stipulates that the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces" will be maintained "in the necessary numbers" and will take on the function of repulsing "limited and small-scale aggression." They will defend Japanese territory and the adjacent waters and air space and "contain, exhaust and counterattack the enemy."

During combat actions on sea, the "Self-Defense Forces" must "guard sea lanes, defend ports and bays, guard straits, conduct antisubmarine operations and guard maritime transportation."²⁷

This actually signifies a considerable expansion of the functions of the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces," which will certainly necessitate their substantial enlargement. The details of the agreement have been kept secret, but political analysts have directed attention, for example, to the absence of any specific limits on the waters and sea lanes that Japan is expected to defend. According to reports in the press, Japan is supposed to patrol the sea all the way to Guam, and to Taiwan in

the south. The performance of these functions will mean that the Japanese navy will be acting thousands of kilometers away from the Japanese coastline.

The Japanese "Self-Defense Forces" have been assigned specific duties in the rendering of comprehensive support and assistance to American armed forces. The agreement states, for example, that, "if necessary, American armed forces will be authorized to request new facilities and territory within the framework of the Japanese-American Security Treaty and related agreements." It also envisages the joint use of military bases and installations.

As for the U.S. Armed Forces, their functions will consist in "supporting nuclear containment forces," maintaining mobile armed forces which can be "moved to advance frontiers," assisting the "Self-Defense Forces" and conducting counteroffensive combat operations.

The agreement lists a number of specific measures aimed at the more intensive integration of Japanese and American armed forces. It proposes that joint exercises and maneuvers be held. In connection with Japan's purchases of new U.S. combat equipment, it specifies that Japanese servicemen must be trained to use it and to make necessary repairs.

A fundamentally new decision was made on joint undertakings, not only directly in military operations, but also "in the event of the threat of an armed attack on Japan" and "in the event that developments outside Japan in the Far East should endanger its security."²⁸ This essentially signifies the revision, or at least a broad interpretation bordering on revision, of the "Security Treaty" because Article V of this treaty obligates each side to "take action to repulse a common danger" only in the event of a direct "armed attack on one side on territory governed by Japan."²⁹

According to the new agreement, Japan is virtually obligated to constantly coordinate its plans with the United States in peacetime because it would be extremely difficult to define the exact meaning of "the threat of an attack" and the time of its occurrence. Besides this, the territorial boundaries of Japanese commitments are considerably expanded because the agreement envisages the establishment of military cooperation even in those cases when the events are occurring far from Japan's borders.

Contrary to the Spirit of Detente

The militarization of Japan and the augmentation of its role in the American strategic system in Asia are seriously inhibiting attempts to improve the international political climate in this part of the world.

The U.S. bases and armed forces on Japanese territory pose a real threat to all countries in the region. According to the terms of the "Security Treaty" (Article VI, the use of the bases was offered to the United States "for the purpose of promoting Japan's security and supporting international peace and security in the Far East"--that is, the possibility of their use is clearly limited to the Far East zone. In the second half of 1979, however, the Carter Administration raised the question of the unrestricted use of bases in Japan for the attainment of its global policy goals and the support of military operations in any part of the world.

In July 1979 the press reported that, within the framework of its strategy of the so-called "retaliatory strike," the United States proposed to quickly transfer its armed forces in Asia and the Pacific to Western Europe whenever necessary. This concept was corroborated by the concentration of U.S. military forces in the Persian Gulf zone in November 1979 as a means of exerting military pressure on Iran and of supporting the military and commercial blockade of this country if the need should arise. American Secretary of Defense H. Brown said that the United States "must be free to transfer its armed forces stationed in Japan" to other regions, including the Indian Ocean zone.³⁰

Under pressure from Washington, the Japanese Government began to arbitrarily expand the geographic boundaries of the "Security Treaty." In November 1969 the Japanese minister of foreign affairs explained that the term "Far East" designated, according to an agreement reached with the United States, Japan, the territory north of the Philippines, the Chinese coastline and the Soviet coastline.³¹ During the years of American aggression in Vietnam, when Japan served as a major U.S. support base, the Japanese Government began to include all of Southeast Asia in the "Far East." Now, in compliance with new U.S. demands, it has gone even further: Muneoki Date, head of the treaty division of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said in parliament on 1 February 1980 that, "theoretically, the Far East can be regarded as the entire region where any kind of extraordinary events threaten the peace and security of the Far East." He said that "when security and peace in the Far East are endangered, the sphere of activity of American troops will not be limited to this region."³²

This new interpretation of the term "Far East," which has nothing in common with the geographic region, was corroborated by Prime Minister Ohira. Responding to questions in the budget committee of the House of Representatives on 1 February 1980, he said that, from the standpoint of the Japanese-American "Security Treaty," there would be no problem in transferring the "rapid deployment force" to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean from facilities and territory in Japan.³³

The Japanese Government's willingness to employ the arbitrary interpretation, straying far from common sense, of the term "Far East" to support the totally unrestricted use of bases on Japanese territory by U.S. armed forces for actions in virtually any part of the world will give Japan a more active role to play in the American strategic system and considerably increase the danger of Japan's involvement in American military ventures.

The full implications of this were illustrated by the Pentagon's plans to use the Japanese navy to mine the La Perouse, Tsugaru, Korea and Tsushima straits, which would endanger Soviet shipping. On 31 January 1980, an American administration spokesman commented on the U.S. secretary of defense's report to Congress and requested Japan to increase its military spending and draw up plans for the "blockage" of straits between the Sea of Japan and the ocean. It was also reported that "the Japanese and U.S. governments were negotiating a blockade of these straits in the event of a state of emergency."³⁴

The cause of peace in Asia is being seriously threatened by the Pentagon's persistent attempts to extend the bilateral Japanese-American alliance to the point of multilateral military cooperation with the NATO countries. When U.S. Secretary of Defense Brown spoke with Prime Minister Ohira on 19 October 1979, he stressed, as the Japanese press reported, "the need for concerted effort by Japan, the United

States and the Western European countries to withstand the potential global threat posed by the growth of Soviet military strength."³⁵ The same demand was included in the secretary of defense's report to the U.S. Congress. It indicated the "need for stronger interaction by the United States, Japan and the Western European countries in the compilation of collective defense plans."³⁶

The Japanese Government has officially announced several times that it cannot agree to take part in multilateral blockades because this would be contrary to the letter and spirit of the Japanese Constitution. In spite of these declarations, however, obvious steps have been taken to satisfy U.S. demands.

Aspects of U.S. global military policy, including policy in Europe, are regularly included in the agenda of the Japanese-American security committee and other bilateral bodies. In June 1978 JDA Director Shin Kanemaru made his first official visit to NATO headquarters in Brussels.

His successor as JDA director, Ganri Yamashita, made another visit to Brussels on his way to Washington in August 1979. He discussed the broad group of international issues with the NATO command, as well as the possible exchange of the latest technology for the production of basic types of weapons.

Among the Western European NATO countries, the FRG is Japan's apparent first choice as a military partner. This is a significant shift in policy because representatives of these two countries made every effort to avoid discussions, at least official ones, of military matters until the end of the 1970's so as not to remind people about the alliance between fascist Germany and militarist Japan that ultimately led to World War II.

The first postwar Japanese-German meetings took place in June 1978 and July 1979 when S. Kanemaru and G. Yamashita met with FRG Secretary of Defense H. Apel. During the course of these meetings an agreement was reached on the maintenance of close contacts in the future and the exchange of scientific and technical information of a military nature.

At the time of H. Apel's reciprocal visit to Tokyo on 23-25 March 1980, the U.S. demands on the NATO countries and Japan regarding the buildup of their military potential and questions connected with further cooperation in the military sphere were discussed on the summit level. At a press conference in Tokyo's Foreign Press Club on 25 March 1980, H. Apel said "we must learn from one another in the military sphere" and called for broader contacts between the military establishments of the two countries.³⁷

At the same time, Japan took certain steps to establish contacts with other U.S. military bloc partners, especially South Korea. A Japanese-South Korean parliamentary council on security affairs, made up of deputies from the highest Japanese and South Korean legislative bodies, was founded in April 1979 to coordinate positions on military issues.

On 25 July 1979 JDA Director G. Yamashita made the first official visit to Seoul of the postwar period. When he spoke with Ro Chae-Hyon, the Seoul regime's minister of national defense, they agreed to "promote contacts between officials in charge of defense affairs."³⁸

In 1979 new measures were taken to establish closer contact between Japan and other military allies of the United States in the Pacific Zone. In February-March 1980 two Japanese destroyers and eight antisubmarine aircraft joined the naval ships and aviation of the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand in the "Rimpac-80" ("Pacific Rim") naval maneuvers.

For the first time in the postwar period, Japanese naval forces simulated combat operations thousands of miles away from the Japanese coastline and far beyond the boundaries of the Far East. Besides this, Japanese naval ships acted in concert with the navies of countries with which Japan has no military agreements. The Japanese press underscored the danger of this precedent from the standpoint of the possibility of future Japanese involvement in hostilities that might be provoked in Asia by the United States itself or even by its military bloc allies.

The increasing emphasis on military actions at the cost of diplomatic efforts to preserve and strengthen international detente became fully apparent when the "Political Program for the Safeguarding of Security in the 1980's" a special report prepared after more than a year of work by a special committee chaired by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs M. Takashima, was published on 27 July 1980.³⁹

This program, which is expected to lie at the basis of the new government's policy, contains an obvious shift in emphasis in the direction of military affairs. Three of its four sections examine questions connected with the construction and use of armed forces and the functioning of the "Security Treaty" with the United States. The fourth section, which deals directly with Japanese diplomatic objectives, says nothing about the contribution Japan could make to the relaxation of international tension in order to achieve the main condition for national security. Instead of this, the authors of the document advise the continued buildup of Japanese military potential and a more active role for Japan in its military alliance with the United States on the basis of agreements on the division of functions. What is more, this is the first time the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has officially discussed the possibility of the inclusion of units of the "Self-Defense Forces" in the United Nations' peace-keeping troops--that is, the possibility of sending them out of Japan to take part in combat operations, which is forbidden by the Japanese Constitution.

Commenting on this report, the Japanese press stressed that "its authors have not made any specific proposals regarding the continuation of dialogue with the Soviet Union and the relaxation of tension" and counseled a return to "peaceful diplomacy without reliance on armed force."⁴⁰

The danger posed by Japan's mounting process of militarization to the cause of peace in Asia is being compounded by increasingly energetic efforts to achieve rapprochement with the Beijing leadership, which is trying to involve Japan in its antisocialist and anti-Soviet strategy. When PRC Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Han Nianlong was interviewed by a KYODO NEWS SERVICE correspondent on 20 August 1980, he openly advocated, for example, the organization of "joint action against the USSR" by the PRC and Japan.⁴¹

Chinese spokesmen have repeatedly declared their complete support for the Japanese-American military alliance and have advocated the quicker militarization of Japan. When PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Wu Xiuyuan spoke with an LDP delegation on 29 April 1980,

he said that Japanese military expenditures should be increased to 2 percent of the GNP, or more than double the present level.⁴²

Although the Japanese Government has officially announced that it will not give China military assistance, the much more active contacts and relations that followed the conclusion of the "Treaty on Peace and Friendship" in August 1978 and, in particular, the extension of huge amounts of credit to China, totaling more than 12 billion dollars, are helping to build up Chinese military potential and advance the plans for the "four modernizations," including the modernization of the armed forces.

Official Japanese spokesmen generally assert that Japan has no intention of agreeing to the creation of any kind of alliance with the PRC and the United States that would be directed against the USSR. However, the Japanese press remarked, after Prime Minister M. Ohira met with PRC State Council Premier Hua Guofeng in Tokyo at the end of May 1980, that "Japan's present diplomatic course largely coincides with China's global strategy aimed at the creation of an anti-Soviet front."⁴³

The accuracy of this statement was confirmed when President Carter spoke with PRC State Council Premier Hua Guofeng in Tokyo when they both arrived in Japan in July 1980 to attend the funeral of Japanese Prime Minister Ohira. Japanese spokesmen actually supported the line of confrontation with the socialist countries by taking, as the KYODO NEWS SERVICES reported on 11 July 1980, a new step toward the "development of cooperation by the United States, Japan and China."

The dangerous aspects of this kind of bloc are all the more serious now that one of the elements of the rapprochement between Japanese ruling circles and the Beijing leadership is the increasingly obvious establishment and development of direct contacts between military agencies.

Soon after the "Treaty on Peace and Friendship" was signed, PLA Deputy Chief of Staff Zhang Caiqian visited Japan from 8 through 13 September 1978, toured some Japanese military equipment enterprises and consented to the organization of regular contacts with the JDA.

This was followed by PRC Deputy Minister of Defense Su Yu's trip to Japan in May 1979, when he made provocative statements regarding the "military threat" to Japan posed by the USSR and counseled the Japanese Government to "display even more caution," build up its military potential and develop contacts with Chinese military circles. On 18 May 1979 he spoke officially with JDA Director G. Yamashita and Chairman T. Takashina of the joint chiefs of staff of the Japanese "Self-Defense Forces."

As one promising field of military cooperation with Japan, Su Yu mentioned China's willingness to purchase technology for the production of certain types of combat weapons. He stressed that, in his opinion, "the quality of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces is quite high" and that the PRC "would like to master progressive Japanese technology" for the purpose of modernizing its armed forces.⁴⁴ Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs S. Sonoda confirmed that "China informed the government of its desire to buy artillery and even tanks from Japan."⁴⁵

The establishment of regular contacts between Japanese and Chinese military agencies, despite their present limited nature, testifies to the desire of both sides to prepare Japanese public opinion for the possibility of closer ties in the future, which will pave the way for the Beijing leadership's plans to build a triple U.S.-PRC-Japanese alliance on an antisocialist and anti-Soviet basis.

Pointing out the negative consequences of the policy line of undermining detente and intensifying confrontation with the Soviet Union, many Japanese political analysts have advised the radical revision of Japanese policy. They believe that under no circumstances should Japan become involved in the anti-Soviet strategy of Washington and Beijing and that a search must be made for ways of ensuring Japan's peace and security in the balanced development of relations with all countries. "In contrast to the United States and China, Japan should not conduct a line of confrontation with the USSR," an ASAHI SHIMBUN editorial stressed. "It is time for Japan to consider conducting an independent policy in relations with the USSR."⁴⁶

The Soviet Union has consistently favored the establishment of the broadest possible friendly relations with Japan. It is willing, as General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium L. I. Brezhnev emphasized in his speech in Alma Ata on 29 August 1980, "to continue developing them." But the Japanese Government must express a common desire. Under present conditions the further development of Soviet-Japanese relations will depend, as L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, on the Japanese side, "on the degree to which the Japanese leadership can retain the independent, realistic line of its policy without giving in to outside pressure urging Japan to take the dangerous course of militarization and actions hostile to the Soviet Union."⁴⁷

The militarization of Japan, which is being accomplished at increasing speed in the most diverse areas, is introducing a serious destabilizing element into the international political atmosphere in Asia. It is undermining the existing balance of strategic power and is thereby creating new difficulties in the improvement of the international climate in the Asian and Pacific zone. The buildup of Japanese military potential could stimulate a new round of the arms race in the Asian countries and deteriorate the already explosive situation in this region. The augmentation of military strength and the gradual expansion of the naval sphere of operations could tempt Japanese ruling circles to use potential military capabilities as a means of exerting pressure on weaker countries and attaining foreign policy goals.

Japan's rapprochement with China and the attempt to organize joint or parallel action with U.S. participation are laying a basis for the gradual formation of a triple military and political alliance, which will further exacerbate confrontation between different groups of states in Asia.

Japan's more active role in the American strategic system in Asia on the basis of the "division of functions" will make U.S. armed forces available for use in other parts of the world and will thereby promote the growth of international tension. These will also be the consequences of Japan's broad economic and political support for various types of American actions, including subversive activity against revolutionary Afghanistan and actions in defense of the Pol Pot regime overthrown by the Kampuchean people.

The re-arming policy cannot, therefore, ensure the peace and security of Japan. It will indisputably deteriorate relations with neighboring states, create the real danger of involvement in military ventures and thereby contradict the national interest and the desire of the broad Japanese masses to develop truly friendly relations with all countries.

FOOTNOTES

1. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 2 May 1980.
2. SANKEI SHIMBUN, 26 April 1980.
3. "Waga gaiko-no kinkyō, 1979," vol 23, Tokyo, 1979, p 320.
4. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 20 August 1980; MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 20 August 1980.
5. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 4 October 1980.
6. "Waga gaiko-no kinkyō," vol 23, p 293.
7. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 13 April 1980.
8. "Sovremennaya Yaponiya" [Present-Day Japan], Moscow, 1973, p 758.
9. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 10 October 1980.
10. NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 19 August 1980.
11. SANKEI SHIMBUN, 18 February 1978.
12. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 19 February 1978.
13. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 24 February 1978.
14. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 19 February 1978.
15. PRAVDA, 2 September 1980.
16. "Boei hakusho, 1980," Tokyo, 1980, p 255.
17. "Military Balance, 1979-1980," London, 1979, pp 94-96.
18. "Boei hakusho, 1980," p 258.
19. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 4 May 1980.
20. "Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to the Congress on the FY 1981 Budget," 29 January 1980, p 51.
21. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 25 July 1980.

22. "Boei handobuku, 1980," Tokyo, 1980, pp 92, 158, 168-169.
23. TOKYO SHIMBUN, 8 January 1978.
24. ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 23 June 1979.
25. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 16 December 1980.
26. Ibid., 29 January 1980.
27. "Waga gaiko-no kinkyō," vol 23, pp 408-411.
28. Ibid., p 412.
29. "Sovremennaya Yaponiya," p 774.
30. "Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown," 29 January 1980, p 51.
31. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 17 November 1969.
32. Ibid., 2 February 1980.
33. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 2 February 1980.
34. Ibid., 9 February 1980.
35. JAPAN TIMES, 21 October 1979.
36. "Report of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown," 29 January 1980, p 51.
37. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 26 March 1980.
38. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 27 July 1979.
39. YOMIURI SHIMBUN, 28 July 1980.
40. MAINICHI SHIMBUN, 29 July 1980.
41. SANKEI SHIMBUN, 21 August 1980.
42. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 29 April 1980.
43. Ibid., 30 May 1980.
44. TOKYO SHIMBUN, 21 May 1979.
45. ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 11 July 1979.
46. ASAHI SHIMBUN, 23 July 1980.
47. PRAVDA, 30 August 1980.

BEIJING'S TREACHEROUS POLICY LINE AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE OF THE SOUTHERN AFRICANS

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 65-74

[Article by A. S. Krasil'nikov, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] When CPSU Central Committee Secretary B. N. Ponomarev, candidate for membership in the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, spoke at the international scientific conference on the "Joint Struggle of the Workers Movement and National Liberation Movement Against Imperialism and for Social Progress," held in Berlin, the capital of the GDR, in October 1980, he said: "Imperialism is relying particularly on Beijing. The Beijing leaders' hegemonistic line and their betrayal of their former beliefs constitute one of the trump cards of imperialist policy in our day. It was precisely Beijing's alliance with imperialism that encouraged aggressive forces dissatisfied with detente. Beijing's pro-imperialist line is evident in every region of struggle for national liberation."¹ This line is quite apparent in Africa as well.

Although the African continent never occupied the leading position in Beijing's great-power plans, it was chosen by the Chinese leadership "as a convenient, in its opinion, bridgehead for struggle for hegemony in the 'Third World.'"² The Beijing leaders' actions in Africa from the early 1960's to the early 1980's had nothing in common with Marxist-Leninist theory and practice and dealt a severe blow to the national liberation movement and the socioeconomic development of independent African states.

During all stages of their hegemonistic course, the Maoists have paid special attention to the creation and intensification of conflicts and crises on the African continent for the purpose of involving the socialist countries and leading imperialist powers in them; this has led to fierce confrontations between the two opposing systems, with all of the ensuing consequences. One of the main aspects of this policy in the 1960's was China's use of conflicts between the forces of the national liberation movement on one side and imperialism and colonialism on the other in its own great-power interests. In the 1970's and early 1980's, Beijing's policy regarding conflicts and crises in Africa, including southern Africa, became even more dangerous.³ The Chinese leadership decided to support the actions of the West, especially the United States, and urge imperialism and the racist colonial regimes to take military action against liberation forces and the countries with a socialist orientation in Africa and to intensify confrontation with the countries of the socialist community for the purpose of undermining the process of detente and destabilizing the system of international relations.

Naturally, the PRC leadership has pursued and is pursuing numerous other goals in Africa, some strategic and some tactical. The Maoists tried to draw the liberated African countries over to their side for the purpose of creating a separate Afro-Asian group and to impose the "Chinese model of development" and the "Thought of Mao Zedong" on some of them in order to establish their own leadership and prove the universal applicability of the Chinese course of development for all Third World states. China has tried to acquire sales markets in Africa for its own products and supply the needs of its industry with African raw materials (cotton, copper and others).

Beijing's betrayal of national and social liberation forces in southern Africa began long before it decided to form an alliance with imperialism. In the 1960's the Chinese leadership tried to impose an extremist line on revolutionary democratic organizations--the African National Congress (ANC), the South-West African People's Organization (SWAPO), the Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) and the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU)--and supported pseudorevolutionaries, demagogues and opponents of the ideological and political unity of these organizations. Pro-Maoist elements in the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC), the South-West Africa National Union (SWANU) and other organizations slandered the true patriots and accused them of opportunism and of associations with American imperialism. They concealed their own counterrevolutionary activity with loud phrases about revolutionary struggle. Many of them are U.S. and South African agents. As National Chairman H. Winston of the Communist Party, USA, remarked, "it was precisely in southern Africa that the alliance of Maoists, the CIA, neo-pan-Africanists and racist splinter groups from the American labor movement moved to overt action in the last decade, objectively furthering the strategy of South African imperialism and its partners in the United States and NATO."⁴

In their policy in southern Africa, the Maoists stressed not only the support of the right wing in revolutionary democratic organizations, but also the offer of concrete assistance to nationalist organizations--PAC and SWANU--adhering to the reactionary line in pan-Africanism and taking the stand of anticommunism and black racism. Imperialism, which could have influenced rightist nationalist organizations, not only made no attempt to prevent the development of ties between these organizations and China, but actually encouraged them. "Maoism," H. Winston wrote, "serves as an ideological arsenal of national betrayal with regard to the liberation movement. It is for this reason that even the most conservative of the bourgeois nationalist supporters of neo-pan-Africanism welcome any type of 'radicalism' that arrives on the scene as a result of the influence of Maoist 'theories.' The reactionary bourgeois nationalists, just as their neocolonialist patrons, realize that Maoism has nothing in common with the anti-imperialist nature of Marxism-Leninism."⁵

Maoism became one of the sources of discord among liberation forces and an ally of racism in southern Africa in the early 1960's. In Western Europe, Africa and Asia, however, the Maoist and bourgeois press has long been pretending that China supports fighters against racism and colonialism. Its treachery and its alliance with Pretoria are concealed, and its contacts with schismatics and anticommunist organizations and groups are interpreted as an alliance of revolutionary forces. In essence, Beijing's policy, just as the anticommunist ideas of the "fighters against white racism," fit in quite well with the general strategy of imperialism and the racist regime in Pretoria. This is clearly attested to by the recommendations of bourgeois scholars and the conclusions they drew as early as the 1960's. For

example, famous American Sinologist R. Scalapino concluded in 1964 that one of the side effects of Chinese policy in Africa "could be a stronger role for the West in the future development of the African continent."⁶ Similar conclusions were drawn by a conference of American experts on China at the beginning of 1967; these experts admitted that the policy of the Maoist PRC leadership was "in the American interest."⁷ And the headquarters of the U.S. Information Agency openly advised its overseas divisions to "make use of every opportunity to strengthen Mao's supporters."⁸

Beijing's policy in Angola in 1974-1976 gave the imperialist powers even more evidence of its willingness to cooperate with them further in the struggle against the USSR, other socialist countries and the national liberation movement. It is quite understandable, and not at all surprising, that the development of contacts with China began to be advised more frequently in the Western press in 1976.⁹

The victory of the people of Angola and Mozambique in 1975 established new and favorable conditions for the liberation of Zimbabwe and Namibia and the liquidation of the apartheid system in southern Africa. Countries with a socialist orientation gained a stronger position on the African continent, and relations between the African countries and the community of socialist states were further developed.

Although imperialism and the racist colonial regimes suffered a defeat in Angola, they, just as China, did not abandon their attempts to stop the progressive development of history and weaken revolutionary forces in Africa. Particularly energetic action was taken by the United States, England and France, which engaged in vigorous diplomatic activity on the continent. This was motivated by their worry that the events in southern Africa would "go out of control" and would bring about undesirable social changes and the further consolidation of forces for national and social liberation. At the end of the 1970's the "struggle reached the point at which the patriots, at least in Zimbabwe, were approaching victory. What is more, Soviet researchers pointed out, the issue here, one could say, is not only and even not so much a question about the outcome of these skirmishes as a question about what kind of forces will rule the liberated countries."¹⁰

Imperialism tried to find a "peaceful solution" to the problem in southern Africa by planting neocolonial regimes in Zimbabwe and Namibia and by isolating and dividing liberation forces and threatening and blackmailing independent African states, especially the "front-line states"--Tanzania, Angola, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana--which were the target of overt aggressive attacks by the racists.

After the Chinese leadership's position in Africa was shaken by its joint actions with South Africa against Angola, it had to verbally dissociate itself from the racists in Pretoria and even intensify its propaganda against the apartheid regime somewhat. On the other hand, it could not and would not oppose imperialism in this region after forming an alliance with it in other parts of the world. Beijing decided to support the views of rightist African regimes (Ivory Coast, Malawi and others) on the problem in southern Africa, which did not differ fundamentally from the policy of imperialism, although they were camouflaged by statements about the need to preserve African unity. They also supported African activists N. Sithole and Muzorewa, who wanted the future "independent" states of Zimbabwe and Namibia to maintain close relations with the West.

Just as the racists in Pretoria and Salisbury, the Chinese leaders tried to depict the Soviet Union and Cuba as the chief enemies of the southern African people. They were not embarrassed by the fact that it was precisely the Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community that gave, and are still giving, the African people every possible type of assistance in their struggle for freedom and independence and against imperialism, colonialism and the racists, and that this assistance has been praised highly by the leaders of national liberation movements and independent African countries. Speaking in Lusaka on 28 March 1977, Zambian President K. Kaunda made the following remark about the policy of the world's first socialist state: "The Soviet Union has consistently played its historic role as a reliable ally of the liberation movements. When we, the leaders of the Zambian independence movement, became disillusioned with the West's two-faced policy, we also turned to the traditional allies of freedom fighters--to the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries."¹¹

Contrary to the views and wishes of independent Africa and all fighters against imperialism and the racists, the Chinese leadership "transformed" the southern part of the continent into a "sphere of struggle between the two superpowers." When the Maoists declared their position on this matter, they said that they had "concluded" that the people of southern Africa realized that they were "threatened not only by racism, but also by the greater danger posed by the Soviet Union and the United States."¹²

Without openly supporting Washington's policy in southern Africa, the Maoists used various arguments to prove that the U.S. line was justified by the "exigencies of struggle" against the USSR. They alleged that the Soviet Union was "engaging in infiltration and expansion in an attempt to take the place of the old brand of colonialism"¹³ and that the people of southern Africa would have to combine their struggle against colonialism and racism with a struggle against...the USSR, so as to "not let the tiger in through the back door while the wolf is being driven out through the front door."¹⁴

The logic of class struggle drew Beijing more and more persistently into the camp of the overt enemies of socialism and the national liberation movement. Just as the racists in Pretoria, by 1976 Beijing was already making unconcealed overtures to imperialism, primarily the United States, and the most reactionary forces in Western Europe. The Chinese press tried to frighten the West with talk about the "Soviet expansion" in southern Africa. For example, on 1 January 1977 RENMIN RIBAO stated that the Soviet Union was supposedly "trying to seize total control over the southern half of Africa with the aid of the same tricks it used in Angola." The slanderous statements about Soviet policy were, according to the Chinese leadership's plans, supposed to motivate the West to conduct a more aggressive policy line in southern Africa and give more assistance to racist regimes.

An analysis of the facts and of the statements of Chinese officials indicates that one of the basic goals of Beijing's policy in the southern half of the African continent was the escalation of tension and the complication of international affairs in general. This is also the goal the Chinese leadership has been pursuing in other parts of the world in the hope of establishing Chinese hegemony by creating "chaos" in the world arena and weakening its opponents. China still does not have enough military strength and it is therefore relying primarily on the use of a basic conflict--the conflict between socialism and imperialism and between their leading forces, the United States and the USSR--in its own hegemonistic interests.

In its policy in southern Africa in the second half of the 1970's and the early 1980's, Beijing proceeded from the belief that the West, especially the United States, would not allow a repetition of the "Angola story"—that is, it would not allow the truly patriotic national forces to take power—but the socialist countries and Independent Africa would not stop supporting these forces. Proceeding from this assumption, the Chinese leadership has tried to exacerbate another aspect of the conflicts between the United States and the USSR. The Beijing officials who advocate more active Western interference in southern African affairs are well aware that this will, on the one hand, prolong the life of the Pretoria regime and, on the other, intensify the armed struggle of the African people. It is the least of the Chinese leadership's worries that this will increase the losses of the freedom fighters and will considerably complicate the Namibian and southern African people's efforts to achieve independence and freedom. By supporting the policy of imperialism and African reactionary forces, Beijing hopes to prevent progressive forces from taking power in these countries and the appearance of new, truly independent states on the map of Africa, which would make the overall position of forces for peace and the countries with a socialist orientation on the African continent even stronger.

In its attempts to attain its hegemonistic goals, China has redoubled its efforts to ally itself with imperialism and support rightist elements in Africa. It has embarked on the open betrayal of the national liberation movement, overt struggle against revolutionary democratic forces and more vigorous schismatic activity. This was vividly demonstrated in its policy toward the national liberation movement in Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa, which it tried to divide and weaken so that imperialism could solve problems in southern Africa according to neocolonial recipes.

Using its connections with the Sithole group in ZANU and giving this organization some material assistance, the Chinese leadership made a maximum effort to exacerbate conflicts within the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe (PFZ), created in 1976 by ZAPU and ZANU. This policy was directly in the interest of the Salisbury racists and their American and English supporters. Beijing performed functions beyond the capability of racists and imperialists. This was reflected in the following actions taken by the Chinese leadership against the Zimbabwe freedom fighters.

On 16 May 1976 in Morogoro, a Zimbabwean training camp in Tanzania, Chinese military instructors provoked a clash between ZAPU and ZANU supporters.¹⁵ This was followed by a more serious incident on 6 June 1976 in Iringa, another camp. Around 50 PFZ recruits were killed in this skirmish. The Zimbabwe patriotic press reported that "Chinese military experts fired light machine guns and submachine guns and set their dogs on the panicky recruits."¹⁶

These provocations, which were organized by Chinese specialists, complicated relations between ZANU and ZAPU. The Chinese leadership made no apologies for these crimes and quickly recalled its specialists before the leaders of the PFZ had time to investigate the matter and punish the murderers.

In summer 1977 Beijing made another attempt to split up the Patriotic Front. For this purpose, the Chinese leadership invited a front delegation, headed by ZANU leader R. Mugabe, to visit the PRC. During the visit the Beijing leaders tried to

impose their own theory of the "three worlds" and anti-Soviet views on the delegation. The NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY and the PEKING REVIEW published "excerpts" from R. Mugabe's speech, in which he allegedly castigated Soviet policy.¹⁷ The Maoist ideological diversion was immediately taken up by the bourgeois press. But Beijing's lie did not live long. When R. Mugabe left China and arrived in Gabon, where the 14th session of the OAU Assembly was being held at that time, he categorically denied that he had made any anti-Soviet statements. "I first learned about my 'statements' against the Soviet Union," Mugabe said, "from English magazines. These lies are intended to undermine the Patriotic Front.... It would be absurd to attack the Soviet Union, which has played an important part in liberating southern Africa from racism. We value the effective and selfless assistance of the USSR and we always speak about it. It was with the Soviet Union's help that the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe won its impressive victories in the struggle against Smith's racist regime."¹⁸ This and other similar statements by R. Mugabe aroused displeasure in Beijing. The Chinese press, which contained fairly extensive coverage of the proceedings and results of the 16th session of the OAU Assembly, said nothing about Africa's recognition of the PFZ as the sole representative of the Zimbabwean people. At the same time, an attempt was made to slander the assistance the freedom fighters had received from the USSR. On 8 June 1977 RENMIN RIBAO published an article which alleged that the Soviet Union offered military assistance to the Patriotic Front "for the purpose of extending its own influence to Zimbabwe in the future. When it speaks of 'struggle,'" the newspaper slanderously remarked, "it means the replacement of racism in Zimbabwe with neocolonialism."

With a view to Beijing's anti-Soviet, counterrevolutionary line, the United States tried to make active use of China to solve the Zimbabwe problem and other problems in southern Africa in its own interest. In 1978, for example, the American President's national security adviser, Z. Brzezinski, requested the Chinese leadership for help in the signing of an agreement on "internal settlement in Rhodesia" and in convincing the African states to "stop supporting national liberation movements."¹⁹ In particular, Brzezinski wanted China to convince Mozambique President F. Machel to "promote internal settlement in Rhodesia."²⁰ In subsequent years, Beijing and Washington expanded their sphere of cooperation and began to coordinate policy regarding the "settlement" of the Rhodesian problem. This is attested to by the results of the 1979 trips made by CCP Central Committee Chairman Hua Guofeng to England, Deng Xiaoping to the United States and American delegations to the PRC. During Deng's U.S. visit, the two sides expressed "anxiety" about the "possible liquidation of racist regimes in the southern half of the African continent because the Soviet Union...would immediately use this opportunity to seize control over sea lanes at the southern tip of Africa, which are vitally important for the shipment of oil to Western Europe."²¹

Complying with the requests of the United States, when Vice Premier Li Xiannian of the PRC State Council visited Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique in 1979 he tried to intimidate the African people with the non-existent "interference" of "external forces"--the socialist states--in the affairs of southern Africa and taught "the Zimbabwe freedom fighters what tactics they should employ."²² In reference to the talks that took place at that time with the Chinese delegation, ANC Vice President E. Dadu remarked that Li Xiannian "declared the wish to normalize relations with our organization. But behind his back, it was later learned, PRC representatives were negotiating with the heads of the racist regime in Pretoria, and vigorous

trade with this barbarous regime was being conducted through imperialist transnational corporations."²³ In Mozambique Li Xiannian made direct references to the importance of the victory of the people of Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, Angola and Ethiopia and said that disagreements between revolutionary forces are of secondary importance when imperialism, the constant enemy of the people, enters the scene.²⁴

Beijing supported the West at the time of the London conference on Rhodesia (1979) and did not object to the ultimatums issued by England and the puppet Muzorewa-Smith regime to the PFZ. It is true that the Chinese leadership was wary of completely undermining its influence in the Patriotic Front and therefore invited a ZANU delegation, headed by ZANU Vice President S. Muzenda, to Beijing in 1979. The Maoists made use of the Zimbabwean delegation's stay in China in their own selfish interest. In spring 1980, when preparations were being made for the parliamentary elections in Zimbabwe, the Chinese press launched a slanderous campaign against the Soviet Union, implying that it intended to "interfere" in the country's internal affairs, but it said nothing about the incidents of racist and imperialist subversive activity. When ZANU and ZAPU won an impressive victory in the elections, China, backed up by Western support, began to fuel disagreements between ZANU and ZAPU and tried to prevent the development of relations between Zimbabwe and the countries of the socialist community.

Beijing's policy toward South Africa, the citadel of racism, is just as odious. When top ANC leader T. Sebina was discussing China's policy on 10 June 1980, he stated that the Chinese leaders refused to support liberation movements that did not fit into their "theoretical scheme" and did not correspond with their interpretation of the course of history and the evolution of international events. Beijing's attempts to pass itself off as a fighter against racism, the African press has noted, have not deceived anyone for a long time. Political contacts between Pretoria and Beijing have been developed vigorously, particularly after a series of secret meetings between PRC spokesmen and South African officials in Zaire, Namibia and Botswana.²⁵

There is no question that Beijing would have openly allied itself with Pretoria long ago, as was the case in Angola in the mid-1970's, if it were not for the reactionary nature of the apartheid regime. Even the imperialist powers prefer not to advertise their connection with this regime. The establishment of direct official contacts between the PRC and South Africa would certainly have undermined Chinese influence in Africa. But the absence of official relations does not mean that there is no contact between the two sides. This contact exists and is constantly being broadened, because Beijing and Pretoria have common interests and are actively fighting against the socialist countries and the national liberation movement and striving to consolidate imperialism's position. When ANC President O. Tambo spoke at an international conference in support of the national liberation movements in southern Africa and solidarity with the "front-line" states in Zambia in April 1979, he declared that the Chinese leadership was essentially "joining the imperialist powers in their attempts to undermine the national liberation movement and strengthen the racist regimes in southern Africa."²⁶

In the mid-1970's, articles about weapon shipments to Pretoria from England, France and the FRG, about the activities of imperialist monopolies in South Africa and about the financial support offered to the apartheid regime by the West disappeared

completely from the Maoist press. The Chinese side never condemned the racists' plans to build nuclear weapons and Pretoria's development of military relations with Israel and the Taiwan regime.

There has been considerable expansion in the PRC's trade relations with South Africa through Hong Kong, which is the leading Asian country among the racists' trade partners, while South Africa has become Hong Kong's largest African market. In the majority of cases, South African trade with Hong Kong is a front for trade with the PRC. As early as 1973, goods from China, as the RAND DAILY MAIL reported on 27 March 1973, were exhibited at the Witwatersrand agricultural fair in Johannesburg. These goods were also shipped through Hong Kong. China participated in this trade fair at a time when the majority of states, including England, Argentina, France and Spain, refused to exhibit their goods.

The development of the PRC's commercial and economic ties with South Africa is based on their mutual interest in expanding sales markets for their products. Besides this, China is interested in acquiring progressive technology for the exploitation of its mineral deposits, especially its gold mines, and in learning about the technology developed in South Africa for the derivation of oil from coal. These and other factors have convinced the racists that their relations with China will develop productively.

The South African press was pleased to report Beijing's "milder tone in relations with South Africa," although Chinese officials still condemn Pretoria's "racist policy" from time to time.²⁷ The racists and Maoists are completely in agreement regarding Africa's "main enemy." Both "accuse" the Soviet Union of "hegemonism," of some kind of attempts to control the Cape of Good Hope, and so forth.

Considering the actual policy of the Chinese leadership in southern Africa, its struggle against the South African Communist Party (SACP), ANC and SWAPO and its support of the PAC, SWANU and various splinter groups, the racists in Pretoria considerably changed their attitude toward China in the second half of the 1970's and began to openly advocate the development of relations with the PRC. There is no question that this change in views was brought about in part by Beijing's policy of alliance with imperialism and the development of relations with anti-people regimes in Chile, Egypt and other countries. As early as the beginning of 1976, Director J. Barret of the South African Institute of International Relations said that "the South African Government should try to cooperate with China in the settlement of the Angola problem. Apparently, we have not learned to distinguish between Russia and China."²⁸ At that same time, a prominent South African financier, Jan Marais, expressed his views even more frankly: "I would raise both hands to vote for good relations with Red China. Both we and they, and the Western countries, have a common enemy--the Soviet Union."²⁹ In 1977, Mulder, who was then South Africa's minister of information and interior, declared in an address in the House of Assembly "the necessity of alliance with China for the deterrence of African revolution." Professor D. Kruger, a famous racist, remarked that if South Africa wanted to fight the USSR, it should immediately consider rapprochement with a third "superpower"--China. These and similar remarks by the racists attest to their recognition of Beijing's counterrevolutionary activity and its contribution to imperialism's struggle against socialism, forces for peace and progress and the national liberation movement.

The racists' candid admissions aroused the interest of independent Africa and all progressive forces and evoked some anxiety in the Chinese leadership. To justify China's assistance of the racists, Chen Chu, the Chinese representative in the UN Security Council, said on 25 May 1977 that the Pretoria regime "is resorting to base political intrigues and shamelessly speaking of its desire to establish contacts with China in order to deceive its own people, make its own unattractive image more appealing to other countries and escape international isolation." The Chinese representative's statement is a characteristic example of the verbal balancing act that is supposed to camouflage the essence of the problem and guard Beijing against criticizing remarks by antiracist forces.

While verbally denying any connections with the racists, the Chinese leadership is actually striving constantly for broader and deeper connections and is giving the racists effective assistance in their struggle against revolutionary democratic forces. In 1977 China increased its support of a nationalist organization in South Africa, the PAC. This was done at a time when the organization was undergoing a crisis. Its chairman, P. Leballo, a friend of Beijing and an agent of the CIA, had a falling out with some leaders in November 1977 and asked the West to help him "fight and get rid of" the communists in the PAC,³⁰ although there had never been any communists in this organization. By emphasizing his anticommunist aim, Leballo hoped to obtain additional help from the West and China and intensify the organization's struggle against the SACP and ANC. But he was not able to consolidate his leadership in the PAC because his opponents in several organizations and the ANC found documentary evidence of his association with the South African police and the CIA in 1978.³¹ But even this fact did not affect Beijing's position. The Chinese leadership gave the PAC financial assistance and took on a commitment to train organization members in the PRC. According to Pretoria's data, 78 PAC functionaries were being trained in China at the end of the 1970's.³² Beijing's efforts were aimed at stimulating PAC activity and breaking up the ranks of the antiracist forces. The Chinese leadership's activity directly assisted the Pretoria regime and imperialism, which were striving to suppress the national liberation movement.

Beijing's direct contacts with the racists were also developed further. In 1979 and 1980 there were several meetings between Chinese and South African officials. In 1979 a Chinese delegation visited the South African-occupied territory of Namibia, where it negotiated the possible resale of modern weapons to China with representatives of the Pretoria administration and the command of the South African occupation army. Furthermore, Beijing sent its military advisers to Namibia, where they are still working "hand in hand with representatives of the Chilean junta... under the actual patronage of the racist South African regime, to train armed gangs for subversive activity against the government of the People's Republic of Angola."³³ At a session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in February 1979, Angolan representative L. d'Almeida noted that the bandit gangs fighting against Angola from Namibian territory "include Chinese military instructors.... This testifies," he stressed, "that the Chinese are simultaneously working with racists and imperialists in their subversive actions."³⁴

To oblige the racists and imperialists, China did not react in any way to the report of a South African nuclear test in 1979 and has not demanded the release of political prisoners from Pretoria jails. It did, however, as the South African

STAR newspaper remarked, perform a great service to "strengthen the security" of the racist regime by giving it 900,000 rands' worth (1,235,000 American dollars) of specially designed locks for the racists' torture chambers where thousands of South African patriots were being tormented.³⁵

China's counterrevolutionary policy aimed at alliance with imperialism and the racist regime and its schismatic activity within the national liberation movement will not escape exposure in Africa, not to mention other continents. The revolutionary democratic forces of southern Africa resolutely condemned the Beijing hegemonists' aggression against Vietnam. A ZAPU statement of 5 March 1979 stressed that this aggression was an act of international piracy and was completely consistent with the Chinese policy of expansionism. The racists in Pretoria, however, heartily approved of it. At that time, South African radio stations joyfully quoted NPC Standing Committee Deputy Chairman Ji Pengfei's statement that the United States should "teach Cuba a lesson," just as "China did" in Vietnam.

The Chinese leadership's interest in the preservation of imperialist and racist influence on the African continent and its hostility toward the national liberation movement are revealed and reflected not in isolated incidents, but in the completely definite counterrevolutionary trends in Beijing's policy in southern Africa and its specific actions. "The Beijing leadership," a Soviet Government announcement of 23 June 1978 notes, "is actively collaborating with NATO and South Africa in the escalation of tension in Africa. It has allied itself with imperialism, with aggressive and reactionary forces and with neocolonialism and racism and has thereby found itself a place among the opponents of the socialist countries and of the entire national liberation movement, the unity of the African people and the struggle of the Africans for their independence and freedom and against imperialist domination."

FOOTNOTES

1. PRAVDA, 21 October 1980.
2. KOMMUNIST, 1977, No 14, p 104.
3. This article is not concerned with China's policy toward all countries in southern Africa, but only toward the Republic of South Africa, Namibia and Zimbabwe (Rhodesia).
4. H. Winston, "Strategy for a Black Agenda," Moscow, 1975, p 175.
5. Ibid., p 99.
6. R. A. Scalapino, "The Chinese-Soviet Competition in Africa. The Russian-Chinese Rift. Its Impact on World Affairs," N.Y., 1966, p 139.
7. NEW YORK TIMES, 12 February 1967.
8. ZA RUBEZHOM, 1968, No 23, p 23.
9. NEW YORK TIMES, 9 May 1976.

10. K. N. Brutents, "Osvobodivshiesya strany v 70-ye gody" [The Liberated Countries in the 1970's], Moscow, 1979, p 9.
11. PRAVDA, 29 March 1977.
12. PEKING REVIEW, 1977, No 5, p 27.
13. RENMIN RIBAO, 12, 14, 15 January 1977.
14. PEKING REVIEW, 1977, No 14, p 28.
15. THE ZIMBABWE REVIEW, September-October 1976, No 5, p 6.
16. Ibid., pp 6-7.
17. PEKING REVIEW, 1977, No 27, p 25.
18. PRAVDA, 6 July 1977.
19. IZVESTIYA, 1 May 1979.
20. A. Gromyko, "Konflikt na Yuge Afriki" [Conflict in Southern Africa], Moscow, 1979, p 73.
21. IZVESTIYA, 29 August 1979.
22. Ibid.
23. PRAVDA, 9 March 1979.
24. NARODY AZII I AFRIKI, Moscow, 1979, No 4, pp 14-15.
25. NIGERIAN HERALD (Lagos), 10 August 1980.
26. PRAVDA, 12 April 1979.
27. STAR, 18 February 1980.
28. RAND DAILY MAIL, 8 January 1976.
29. KOMMUNIST, 1977, No 14, p 114.
30. T. M. Ntantala, "The Crisis in PAC," 4 April 1978.
31. "The Profiles of Leballo's Gang," Doc. PAC, Dar es Salam, 5 May 1978; "Statement of the African National Congress of South Africa on the Question of Unity with the Pan-Africanist Congress, 31st Meeting of the Organization of African Unity," Dar es Salam, June 1978.
32. IZVESTIYA, 29 August 1979.

33. KOMMUNIST, 1978, No 17, p 110.
34. KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 15 February 1979.
35. IZVESTIYA, 3 March 1979.

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TAIWAN IN U.S. AND CHINESE POLICY

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[Article by V. I. Petukhov, candidate of historical sciences]

[Text] The Sino-American rapprochement which has been eagerly promoted by the great-power social-chauvinists in Beijing and aggressive circles in Washington on an openly anti-Soviet basis has not settled the Taiwan problem.

The compromise reached by Beijing and Washington for the purpose of establishing full diplomatic relations and special cooperation between the PRC and the United States only hushed the prolonged dispute over Taiwan temporarily and postponed the resolution of this problem indefinitely. Although the Taiwan problem does not seem to be a particularly pressing issue in Sino-American relations at present, the two sides are still fighting for control over the island, striving to broaden their own influence within the context of their long-range global strategies and simultaneously using the problem, paradoxically enough, to influence one another in the interest of rapprochement. For the pro-Maoist nationalist elite in China, Taiwan was and is small change in its bargaining with American imperialism, which Mao Zedong and his followers had thought of as a potential partner long before the victory of the people's revolution and the founding of the PRC. The secret calculations and political maneuvers connected with Taiwan have seriously complicated the situation in the Far East more than once, and there is no question that they will continue to influence relations between countries in this region and certain great powers.

Taiwan's role in international relations is dictated primarily by the geographic location of the island and its strategic significance. Occupying a dominant position in the sea lanes connecting the countries of the Pacific and Indian Oceans, Taiwan controls the approaches to China from the east, to Japan from the southwest and to the Philippines from the north. As for the United States, it is interested in Taiwan as one of the major support bases of the American military and political strategy aimed against the socialist countries and the anti-imperialist movements in East Asia. General MacArthur once called Taiwan the center of the American Pacific front, "an unsinkable aircraft carrier" which could guarantee American aviation's domination of all Asian ports, "from Vladivostok to Singapore."¹

For 50 years Taiwan was under the colonial domination of Japan. This period came to an end when the Japanese militarists were defeated in World War II. During the

war the question of the island's future status started many arguments. American political and military circles had plans to annex Taiwan. Influential people demanded that these plans be carried out either through the establishment of some form of protectorate or through the simple attachment of Taiwan to America's possessions in the capacity of a U.S. strategic base.²

These plans, however, did not agree with the political strategy of President Roosevelt, who had decided to give the Chiang Kai-shek regime maximum support for the purpose of creating a "unified and strong China," which would be influenced exclusively by the United States, could take a leading position in East Asia and could become a basis of support for American policy in this region and in the world in general. To this end, Roosevelt made several concessions to Chiang Kai-shek when the heads of government of the United States, Great Britain and China met in Cairo in November 1943. This resulted in the subsequent decision to return Taiwan to Chinese sovereignty after Japan's surrender.

The victory of the people's revolution in China frustrated the plans of U.S. ruling circles to strengthen their position in this country: The regime of America's proteges fell, and Chiang Kai-shek and the remnants of his army left the mainland and took refuge on Taiwan. The PRC Government declared that the liberation of Taiwan was the most immediate national objective. Washington had to quickly revise its bankrupt policy toward China. At first Washington officials made several announcements which suggested that the United States would respect China's territorial integrity, recognized its right to Taiwan and had no intention of keeping it from exercising this right.

Soon, however, the United States canceled its own official statements about non-intervention in China's internal affairs, increased its economic and military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek and his fellow refugees on Taiwan, and included this island in the U.S. line of "defense" in the Pacific. Washington absolutely refused to recognize the PRC Government and announced that it regarded the Chiang Kai-shek regime on Taiwan as the only legitimate government of China. This U.S. support gave the Chiang Kai-shek clique a chance to strengthen its economic, military and political influence on the island.

The new American policy line was intended to cut Taiwan off from China. The start of the hostilities in Korea was used to further this line. On 27 June 1950 President Truman issued an announcement in which he reported that American troops had been sent to Korea and simultaneously said that he had ordered the Seventh Fleet to "prevent any attack on Formosa"--that is, to actually establish U.S. military control over the island.

Taiwan became the main object of the lengthy military and political confrontation between the PRC and the United States and one of the most volatile seats of international tension in the Far East. In December 1954 the United States and Taiwan signed a treaty on "mutual defense," which legalized American control of the island and provided reliable military, political and economic guarantees of the existence of the Kuomintang Regime--the "second China," opposing the People's Republic of China. President Eisenhower categorically announced that if the People's Republic of China should try to take Taiwan, it would have to "overcome the resistance" of the American Seventh Fleet.³

It should be noted that prior to the outbreak of this conflict, during the initial stage of Mao's and his followers' flirtation with Washington, their stand on the Taiwan issue was set forth with a view to U.S. interests and the prospect of U.S. expansion in this region. It is known, for example, that before the PRC was founded Mao Zedong spoke in general as if Taiwan was not one of the territories to which the sovereignty of the revolutionary Chinese state should extend. When he was interviewed by Edgar Snow on 16 July 1936, for example, Mao Zedong underscored his desire to reunite, under Chinese rule, all of the territories taken from China by Japan, but he said that this did not apply to Korea and Taiwan, which, he remarked, would be given "energetic assistance in their struggle for independence." This pre-war statement by Mao Zedong, made at a time when he was trying to win U.S. support in his struggle for authority in China against Chiang Kai-shek and Japanese agents, was essentially the precursor of Beijing's present compliant policy on this matter in connection with the onset of Sino-American rapprochement.

When Mao Zedong was again interviewed by E. Snow after the establishment of the PRC, he asserted that his goal was "the peaceful assimilation of Taiwan."⁴ It is true that the Beijing authorities at first made numerous attempts to establish confidential contacts with Taipei and convince Chiang Kai-shek to consent to Taiwan's reunification with the PRC. Although Maoist propaganda continued to damn Chiang Kai-shek as a traitor, a major criminal and the enemy of the Chinese people, the PRC leaders, according to E. Snow's testimony, assured him through their secret emissaries that if an agreement could be reached in regard to Taiwan, they were prepared to "guarantee Chiang Kai-shek some degree of autonomy if he should wish to remain the island's ruler for life." This modification of Beijing's stand essentially did not go against Washington's interests either, as Chiang Kai-shek was always its minion.

When the Korean War broke out and relations between the PRC and the United States were sharply exacerbated, the Maoists had to temporarily abandon their plans for rapprochement with Washington. The Chinese leadership searched in the international arena for support from friendly countries, including support in the Taiwan matter. The USSR, loyally adhering to its treaty on friendship, alliance and mutual assistance with the PRC, and backed up by the wartime international ally agreements, which envisaged the return of Taiwan to China, invariably supported the Chinese people in this matter. Later, however, it became apparent that the Maoists were trying to use this support in their own selfish interest: They wanted to undermine the policy of struggle for peaceful coexistence and collective security, as conducted by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, deliberately exacerbate Soviet-American relations and thereby motivate the United States to negotiate with China on terms beneficial to China. It was in the disputes over the Taiwan question that this peculiar line, aimed at undermining peaceful coexistence, first acquired distinct outlines. Later it served as the basis of Maoist China's policy in international affairs.

The PRC Government deliberately exacerbated developments in the Taiwan region, trying to use military force against Chiang Kai-shek and his followers without any prospect of success due to the opposition of the U.S. Seventh Fleet. In 1954-1955 and, in particular, in 1953 the Maoists conducted several unsuccessful military operations for the purpose of taking some offshore islands controlled by the Kuomintang and thereby artificially created a state of impending war. These actions, which aroused a new wave of military hysteria in the United States each time, were

used by Washington to intensify its intervention in Chinese affairs and expand U.S. aid to Taiwan. The PRC Government continued its endeavors to create tension in the Taiwan Strait, which seemed useful to Beijing as leverage in the projected Sino-American talks and as justification for its adventuristic domestic policy. But this line was also connected with more dangerous, far-reaching plans: The Chinese leaders took these military actions without consulting the Soviet Union, contrary to the terms of the Soviet-Chinese treaty, because they wanted to employ the mechanism of this treaty to draw the Soviet Union into an armed conflict with the United States.⁵ In spite of the Maoist leadership's treacherous treatment of the USSR, as soon as Beijing's adventuristic policy resulted in U.S. threats to PRC security the Soviet Union resolutely came to China's defense and frustrated the attempts of aggressive imperialist circles to take advantage of the Chinese leaders' actions.⁶

Later the Beijing leaders went even further in their treachery: They displayed a willingness to cancel the Potsdam declaration and other wartime decisions of the allied powers, which clearly specified the states that would take charge, after the war, of territories seized by Japan, including Taiwan. It would seem that Beijing should have been interested primarily in defending the inviolability of these decisions, but it took another position and indulged in provocative attempts to complicate relations between other states. This could only benefit the United States and its allies, which were trying to ensure that the PRC would not have sufficient legal grounds for the settlement of the Taiwan question in its favor.

It is indicative that when the Chinese leadership moved to the position of open hostility toward the Soviet Union and started to seek rapprochement with the capitalist world, the military tension in the Taiwan Strait began to die down, the Taiwan issue lost its urgency and the struggle for Taiwan was continued only in the spheres of diplomacy and propaganda. The Chinese leadership made no move to liberate the island, and it began to depart further and further from its "tough line" in this matter.

Until the mid-1960's, whenever the PRC Government negotiated reciprocal diplomatic recognition, it invariably demanded that its partners break off relations with the Taiwan regime and recognize the PRC's sovereignty over Taiwan as an essential condition for the establishment of diplomatic relations. When this complicated the rapprochement with the United States and its allies, Maoist diplomacy gradually gave up these demands. Beijing would not respond when leaders of capitalist countries would remark that the question of China's ownership of Taiwan had not been completely settled. In talks with American leaders, the PRC implied that it was in no hurry to settle the Taiwan problem and that, within the context of Sino-American rapprochement, it was less interested in the prospect of acquiring Taiwan than in other aspects of interrelations, connected primarily with the struggle against international detente and confrontation with the Soviet Union. Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping and their supporters repeatedly indicated that they were willing to be patient and accept the fact that China might not be able to annex Taiwan within the lifespan of a single generation, or even within the next century.

These changes in the Chinese leadership's approach to the Taiwan problem gave Washington cause to expect, as early as the first Sino-American contacts on the summit level (at the beginning of the 1970's), that it could reach an agreement with Beijing on terms that would ensure the preservation of actual U.S. control

over Taiwan. The mounting anti-Sovietism of the Maoist leaders convinced Washington that the PRC desired rapprochement with the United States so much that it would not exert serious pressure in this matter and, in any case, would not demand that the matter be settled within the near future.

In February 1972, during President Nixon's visit to the PRC, the so-called Shanghai Communique was published, and it later served as the basis for the compromise reached by the two sides in regard to Taiwan. In the communique the Chinese side conceded to the United States by giving up some of its traditional demands regarding Taiwan. In the first place, it did not say a word about the actual status of the island, which was the result of U.S. aggression, and did not demand that the aggression cease. In the second place, Beijing did not specifically request the recognition of Taiwan as a territory belonging to the PRC (up to this time it had demanded that other states recognize that Taiwan was an "integral part" of the PRC, and not of China in general, because the Chiang Kai-shek clique also called itself the Chinese Government). In the third place, the Chinese side did not insist on the abrogation of the U.S. military treaty with the Taiwan regime and did not repeat its usual demand for the curtailment of relations and cooperation with this regime. Finally, in spite of its own statement in the same communique, alleging that "the question of Taiwan is the key question preventing the normalization of relations between China and the United States," Beijing agreed with the American side that the non-settlement of this question should not interfere with the improvement of relations between the PRC and the United States in other areas. In other words, the Maoist leadership agreed to rapprochement with the United States under the conditions of continued U.S. support of a regime hostile to the PRC on Taiwan and the actual U.S. occupation of this territory, which the PRC had previously always regarded as armed intervention in its internal affairs.

The American side found a formula which concealed Washington's actual role in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan matter and preventing its settlement. "The United States," the Shanghai Communique stated, "acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain that there is but one China and that Taiwan is part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves."

If we take a close look at this formula, it is easy to see that the United States sidestepped the question of the PRC's ownership of Taiwan in this communique. The United States did not recognize the existence of only one China, but simply agreed that this was the belief of "all Chinese." And although the United States did not challenge the belief of "all Chinese," it did not have to agree with them and thereby preclude the possibility of implementing the concept of the "two Chinas." This was corroborated by the fact that the United States actually continued to maintain close political and other relations with both Chinese governments, without paying any attention to the remarks that "there is but one China."

This formula also gave the United States another loophole for promoting the idea of the "two Chinas": Reference was made to the belief of "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait," but U.S. politicians and the U.S. press had always made note of the fact that the belief in question was only the belief of the Chinese who had escaped to Taiwan from the mainland along with Chiang Kai-shek and dreamed of

extending the authority of the Kuomintang to all of China,⁷ while the native Taiwanese might have a completely different opinion regarding the future of their territory, and this opinion would have to be clarified.

Although the Taiwan question was raised every time the Sino-American talks were resumed, it became increasingly evident that it represented only small change to the Maoists: If they could attain their principal goal of U.S. renunciation of the policy of detente in relations with the Soviet Union, they would consent to remove the Taiwan question from the agenda or, in any case, shelve it until a more propitious time. Washington saw no need to "bear gifts" to Beijing and pay for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC by rejecting Taiwan, which U.S. ruling circles want to keep under their control as a military and political U.S. bridgehead in the Far East and leverage in dealings with China and other countries in this region. The prevailing view in American circles was that time was on the United States' side in this matter. "The longer the island stays separate," prominent American Sinologist A. Whiting said, "the more chance 12 million Taiwanese will have to gain power and, eventually, independence."⁸

Nonetheless, the U.S. Government had to gradually modify its position on the Taiwan question. Since American imperialism's political strategy in Asia attached increasing significance to the use of Maoist China as a counterbalance to the socialist system and the national liberation movement, the U.S. Government endeavored to complete the formal normalization of Sino-American relations and was therefore more inclined to make some concessions to Beijing in regard to the Taiwan problem.

Beijing also wanted to reach an agreement as quickly as possible, particularly in connection with its hope of relying on the United States and its allies for help with the ambitious program for the modernization of the PRC economy and armed forces, as well as with plans for aggression in Indochina (Washington leaders felt it was in the U.S. interest to assist Beijing in this matter by creating more favorable conditions for the transfer of most of the PRC forces trained on Taiwan from the southern Chinese coastline to the borders of the USSR and Vietnam).

Both sides were therefore inclined to postpone further disputes over Taiwan to quickly reach an agreement on mutual recognition and the establishment of close cooperation. For this purpose, the Beijing leadership had to quickly disclaim all of yesterday's principles and slogans that are inconsistent with this line.

In February 1978, at an NPC session, the Beijing leaders ordered the army and people to "prepare for the liberation of Taiwan."⁹ The new Constitution of the PRC, adopted on 5 March 1978, still said: "We will liberate Taiwan without fail." But soon all such appeals were discarded and the terms "reunification" and "peaceful reunification," which had no militant implications, were substituted for the term "liberation" in official statements and propaganda. Beijing did its best to play up to Washington and take its views into account.

After the notorious Washington session of the NATO Council in May 1978, which marked the beginning of an abrupt shift in Washington's policy in the direction of the unrestrained escalation of the arms race and the subversion of international detente, the Sino-American talks were intensified. The American President personally offered the Chinese side specific terms in the Taiwan matter. They were

essentially the following: Even after the establishment of diplomatic relations with the PRC, the United States would maintain trade with Taiwan and give it aid, including military; a trade mission or other unofficial U.S. agency would be opened in Taiwan as soon as the American Embassy closed; China would have to give the United States some kind of assurance that it would not resort to force for the annexation of Taiwan. The main purpose of these terms, as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs R. Holbrooke frankly admitted later, was to find a settlement formula that "would postpone the actual merger of the two parts (of China--V. P.) for one or more generations."¹⁰

These American terms were basically acceptable to Beijing. The Chinese Government was less interested in changing their essence than in giving the agreement a more convenient, "cosmetic" form to save face. In November Deng Xiaoping became personally involved in the talks and this hastened the conclusion of the final Sino-American agreement on mutual diplomatic recognition of 1 January 1979.

Officially, the agreement was concluded on the basis of mutual concessions, but Beijing's concessions were actually much greater and were of a fundamental nature. China essentially waived the right to annex Taiwan in the near future and reconciled itself to the preservation of the status quo--that is, the existence of the Taiwan regime independent of the PRC.

The Chinese leadership assured the United States that the PRC would strive for a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan problem with a view to the U.S. interest, and that if Taiwan should be reunited with the PRC at some time in the future, its socio-economic (capitalist) structure would not be changed and the positions of American capital on the island would remain inviolable. To demonstrate its peaceful intentions regarding Taiwan, Beijing announced the cessation of the shelling of offshore islands controlled by the Taiwan authorities and "unequivocally declared that it would respect the status quo" in this region.¹¹

At first the Chinese side wanted the United States to annul all of its 59 agreements, excluding the military treaty, with Taiwan, but it later retreated from this position. It withdrew all of its objections to the United States' maintenance of its previous (but now unofficial) trade, economic, scientific, technical and other contacts with Taiwan in their entirety.

What is more, Beijing had to reconcile itself to the United States' intention to continue supplying the Taiwanese armed forces with weapons and military equipment. It is true that Beijing objected to this at first, but it later stopped regarding an agreement on this matter--which is extremely important from the standpoint of Taiwan's future--as an essential condition for the establishment of diplomatic relations.¹²

On orders from Washington, the U.S. Seventh Fleet will continue patrolling the Taiwan Strait to keep the PRC from attacking Taiwan. A large U.S. radar station, which is part of the early warning system trained on the PRC and the Soviet Union, will remain on the island.¹³

Beijing propaganda has made every effort to create the semblance of a "history-making victory" in the Taiwan question because the United States satisfied three

of the Chinese side's conditions: It broke off diplomatic relations with the Taiwan regime, consented to complete the withdrawal of its troops from the island and announced its intention to annul the U.S.-Taiwan military treaty. In reality, however, Taiwan's status has not changed: It is still essentially a U.S. protectorate. By freeing itself from formal commitments to its long-time ally, the United States, according to many experts, has received even more freedom of movement in this area and can conduct a more flexible policy to keep Taiwan within the orbit of its military and political strategy. If we disregard details and secondary factors, we can see that the current settlement of the Sino-American dispute over Taiwan is actually based on the same American conditions that the Chinese side resolutely rejected at the bilateral talks in Geneva and Warsaw at the end of the 1950's and the beginning of the 1960's--namely, the preservation of the status quo, the consolidation of the situation of the "two Chinas"--or, under present conditions, it would be more correct to say "one China and one Taiwan."

In spite of its desire to play the "China card," the United States did not want to give up any of its imperialist interests in this matter of such importance to China's prestige, although it did make a number of formal concessions regarding Taiwan to Beijing. The United States has not actually recognized China's sovereignty over Taiwan. This was frankly admitted by Assistant Secretary of State R. Sullivan in a statement he made in Taipei in December 1978. It is indicative that the Taiwan Government was recognized de facto as a foreign government in a memorandum distributed to all U.S. Government agencies by President Carter at the end of December 1978. A week later, another memorandum issued by the President stipulated that the adjective "Chinese" should not be used to modify the government or institutions on Taiwan, and that under no circumstances should the concept "China" or "People's Republic of China" include "Taiwan."

Nonetheless, the Carter Administration's decision to break off diplomatic relations with Taiwan and, in particular, its decision to annul the military treaty of 1954 aroused fairly broad opposition in Congress and in the U.S. public. Many officials, both Republicans and Democrats, made statements disputing the wisdom of the concessions made to China by the Carter Administration and insisting on more solid guarantees of Taiwan's security. Twelve Republican senators (J. Danforth and others) submitted a draft resolution to the Congress, stating that if Beijing should attack Taiwan at some time in the future, the United States would break off diplomatic relations with the PRC and "immediately give military assistance to Taiwan." Senator B. Goldwater and 23 other members of Congress took the matter to court to try to countermand the administration's decision to renounce the military treaty with Taiwan. Republican Party leader R. Reagan used the Taiwan question in his campaign for the presidency. He criticized Carter's actions and advocated the restoration of official relations with Taipei.

Some of the United States' Asian allies had a negative reaction to the Carter Administration's decision, particularly Japan, whose government had officially informed Washington several times of its interest in the preservation of the American-Taiwanese military treaty and American support of Taiwan's separate existence. One statement indicative in this respect was made at a press conference in Taipei by former Director S. Kanemaru of the Japan Defense Agency, who headed the parliamentary delegation that visited Taiwan in January 1979. "The unexpected normalization of American-Chinese relations," he said, "dealt a severe blow to

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. The fact that the United States has abandoned an ally is not just Taiwan's problem. This move will have a considerable effect on the maintenance of stability in Asia and on peace throughout the world. Japan will also have to consider this problem."¹⁴ Similar statements were made by Seoul officials. Washington had to deflect the displeasure of its Asian allies and assure them that the United States had provided Taiwan with everything necessary for its security.

In April 1979 a U.S. law was passed on the new forms of relations with Taiwan. At the insistence of Congress, the law contained a special warning that the United States would regard any attempt to determine Taiwan's future "with the aid of non-peaceful means, including boycotts or embargos, as a threat to the peace and security of the western half of the Pacific zone, seriously endangering the United States."¹⁵ This warning was interpreted as an announcement of possible retaliatory U.S. steps, up to the point of armed intervention. At the same time, the Congress confirmed the "indestructibility" of American-Taiwanese relations, even though they are now of an "unofficial" nature. The future maintenance of these relations was not connected in any way with U.S.-PRC relations but was regarded as a separate area of foreign policy activity, the object of which was declared to be another state structure, completely independent of the PRC.

In accordance with the law on the new forms of relations, a special American Institute on Taiwan was founded and was given many of the functions that were previously performed by the U.S. Embassy on the island. Formally, this new establishment is not a government body, but its staffing, funding and day-to-day management will be conducted by the U.S. administration. Prominent diplomat and expert on Asian affairs Charles Cross, who has served as the U.S. ambassador to Indonesia, Malaysia, Cyprus, Egypt and Singapore, was appointed the institute's first director. A similar "non-governmental" institution, the Coordinating Council on North American Affairs, was founded on Taiwan for the maintenance of relations with the United States. On 2 October 1980 an American-Taiwanese agreement was signed, in accordance with which, as the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY reported, "the unofficial representatives of the United States on Taiwan and Taiwan's representatives in the United States will have all the attributes of official diplomatic representatives but the title." The Chinese side called this agreement a flagrant violation of the terms of the normalization of Sino-American relations but refrained from taking any retaliatory steps.

Available information about the situation on Taiwan after the conclusion of the Sino-American agreement on "normalization" testifies that the changes in the form of U.S.-Taiwanese contacts have not undermined the domestic political influence of the local regime and have not led to the economic upheavals that Beijing had expected. The Taiwan leaders were deeply shocked when Washington broke off official relations with them, but they have adapted quickly to the new situation, particularly since they can still rely on the support and assistance of the United States.

On the domestic front, Chiang Kai-shek's followers took certain steps to consolidate the regime's base, without relinquishing their hold on the island, by means of the broader inclusion of Taiwanese members of the national bourgeoisie and large landowners in local government. They were offered many important positions in

provincial government bodies (including some provincial governorships and municipal mayoralties) and even a number of ministerial portfolios in the central administration. After Chiang Kai-shek died and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, was elected president of Taiwan, the office of vice president was filled by a native of the island for the first time--Hsieh Tung-min. Formally, most of these individuals are serving as new functionaries of the old Kuomintang party that moved here from the mainland. Behind the facade of this cooperation between mainland and island party members, however, the veterans of the Chiang Kai-shek clique have been gradually ousted by the increasingly strong and influential Taiwanese nationalists.

American-Taiwanese contacts following the severance of diplomatic relations have been continuously developed and expanded. Whereas the volume of bilateral trade amounted to 5.479 billion dollars in 1977 and 7.5 billion in 1978, it exceeded 10 billion dollars in 1979, increasing by 33 percent within just a year. Taiwan now ranks 12th among the United States' foreign trade partners (the PRC ranks 23d). In contrast to the PRC, Taiwan has a sizeable positive balance in its trade with the United States (1.6 billion dollars in 1977 and 2.8 billion in 1978).

American corporate capital investments in the Taiwan economy are growing with amazing speed, and this is the best indicator of the U.S. business community's confidence in the stability of the island's capitalist order and the security guarantees supplied by the U.S. Government. Total American capital investments amounted to 500 million dollars by the end of 1978.¹⁶ In the first 6 months of 1979 the figure rose another 68.7 million dollars.

The United States is still supplying Taiwan with weapons and military equipment. According to the data of the U.S. Department of Defense, weapons worth 510 million dollars were delivered to Taiwan in 1979. In summer 1978, at the time of the Sino-American talks on "normalization," Washington announced an embargo on some weapon shipments, but in November 1979 it decided to lift the embargo. With the aid of U.S. armed forces, Taiwan is being filled with new and improved planes, antiaircraft, antitank and other missiles, antisubmarine weapons and electronic fire control and reconnaissance systems. Talks are now being conducted on the sale of not only defensive weapons, but also certain offensive equipment, such as, for example, the F-4 Phantom all-weather fighter plane, capable of penetrating far into the air space of the PRC. The United States is also helping Taiwan arm itself by selling it licenses for the production of modern military technology and equipment.

The Chinese-American rapprochement has not affected Taiwan's relations with many other capitalist states either. It has maintained commercial relations with 146 countries, ranking 21st in world trade. Taiwan's foreign trade volume grows with each year. By 1980 it had reached 24 billion dollars (20.6 billion in 1978).¹⁷ The PRC, which considerably surpasses Taiwan in terms of dimensions and capabilities, has approximately the same trade volume.

The United States is Taiwan's main trade partner, and Japan ranks second. In recent years Japan has also constantly increased the volume of bilateral trade (1,513,000,000 dollars in 1972, 2,534,000,000 in 1973 and 5,270,000,000 in 1979). Japanese capital investments in the Taiwan economy are also growing. Increasing activity in Taiwan has also been displayed by the Western European countries, which have long refused to grant it diplomatic recognition (in 1978 Taiwan's volume of

trade with the FRG totaled 991 million dollars, its trade with France totaled 268 million, and its trade with Belgium totaled 165 million).¹⁸

Therefore, Taiwan has continued to exist and grow strong even after the Chinese-American "normalization." This is why Beijing officials are alarmed by developments on the island and are keeping a wary eye on the mood and actions of its leaders. One of the Chinese side's hidden motives for the establishment of close relations with the United States was the hope that Washington would promote contacts between Beijing and Taipei for the purpose of reaching an agreement on reunification. As yet, however, there is no indication that Washington is taking any kind of steps in this direction. The opposite is more likely: Its position could objectively inhibit such contacts. Sensing the support of the United States, the Taiwan regime would resolutely refuse to take part in any talks with the Beijing government.

Of course, the Maoist leadership cannot remove the question of reunification from the agenda because it has constantly been declared a major national objective since the time of the PRC's birth. The political, historical, emotional and psychological aspects of the problem are interwoven with practical interests stemming from Beijing's great-power, hegemonistic plans: Taiwan is exceptionally important to Beijing for several reasons (its great military-industrial potential, its well-armed army of 500,000, and the strategic location of this island, which controls sea lanes in the region). The Maoist leaders are still saying that they will strive to settle the matter peacefully, but they might resort to force if these efforts should fail. For now, however, they must realize that China is not capable of the military subjugation of Taiwan: It does not have the necessary military means for this. What is more, armed actions against Taiwan could give rise to a conflict with the United States, which would be contrary to Beijing's current policy line.

A unique type of propagandistic camouflage for Beijing's policy of capitulation to the United States in the dialogue on the Taiwan question was demonstrated in statements by Hua Guofeng and other PRC officials at the last NPC session, expressing phony indignation with the leader of the American Republican Party, R. Reagan, who dared to announce his intention to restore official relations with Taiwan after taking office. The Chinese leaders were only objecting to the plans to change the form, and not the essence, of Washington's relations with Taiwan, which have continued to develop, to the detriment of the interests of reunification, without any opposition from Beijing.

Nevertheless, statements signaling the views of some members of the new U.S. administration, who want to promote the further development of American-Taiwanese relations in line with the concept of "one China and one Taiwan," have irritated the Beijing leaders. After all, it is becoming increasingly evident that they fell right into the trap set by Washington: It periodically sidesteps the agreements it reached with the PRC Government, while the latter has to accept this, limiting itself to verbal demarches that do not worry anyone. There was a great commotion in Beijing, in particular, over a statement by one of R. Reagan's advisers--Director R. Cline of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies, who went to Taipei in November, met with the local ruler Chiang Ching-kuo and then advocated the expansion of ties with the Taiwan regime, the appointment of an official high-level U.S. representative to the regime and the institution of measures to "compel China to refrain from using force against Taiwan."¹⁹

At present, the Beijing leadership's policy toward Taiwan consists in the planning and implementation of measures to promote contacts with the Taiwan regime for the purpose of convincing it to negotiate mutually acceptable forms of reunification. These measures include the proposals, widely publicized by Beijing and addressed to the Taiwan Government, regarding the organization of commodity exchange between the mainland and the island, postal and transport communications, the exchange of delegations, cultural and sports contacts, mutual assistance to fishermen in the sea, and so forth. Taiwan has not responded to any of these proposals. Beijing is also taking unilateral steps to gain the affection of the Taiwanese and stress the unity of the two Chinese government structures.

Obviously, the modification of Beijing's position in regard to forms of reunification is much more significant from the standpoint of the prospect of a solution to the Taiwan problem. Beijing no longer expects to mechanically include Taiwan among the PRC's provinces: This would be definitely unacceptable to the Taiwan regime. This is why the Beijing leadership is now concealing its final goals with proposals that might seem more acceptable to the "fellow-countrymen on Taiwan." According to reports in the foreign press, it has expressed its willingness to grant Taiwan a unique brand of autonomy and guarantee the Taiwan authorities the same powers they now enjoy: control over the army, the police, security forces, the courts, the procuracy and so forth.²⁰ When Deng Xiaoping spoke with a delegation of American senators on 9 January 1979, he said that Taiwan's economic and social system could remain inviolable (as in the case of Hong Kong and Macao)²¹--that is, it could remain an "island of capitalism," although it would be nominally part of a "country of socialism." What is more, Deng asserted that Taiwan could enjoy this autonomy "for as long as its population wishes." This formula signifies that the concept of "reunification" in its new interpretation by the Beijing leadership essentially means that Taiwan will verbally recognize the sovereignty of the PRC and adopt its flag, but in all other areas it would be a state within a state, despite the contradictory nature of their socioeconomic orders. The Chinese leaders' new approach to the Taiwan problem fits in with the plans of U.S. ruling circles to urge the PRC to gradually transform its socioeconomic order to fit the capitalist mold through the development of a "mixed" economy. In connection with this, they are earnestly advertising the Taiwan order as the most promising "model" for China's modernization.

Because the interruption of the Taiwan settlement by Sino-American rapprochement aroused displeasure in various circles in the PRC, the Maoist leaders have had to maneuver from one side to the other and pass themselves off as fighters for the quickest possible "return of Taiwan to the bosom of the motherland." A speech presented by Deng Xiaoping at a conference of PRC cadres on 16 January 1980 is indicative in this respect. One of China's three major objectives in the coming decade, Deng said, is the settlement of the Taiwan problem. This time he did not even try to directly advocate the postponement of this settlement to some time in the distant future--"for a hundred or even a thousand years." "We must," he said, "make an effort to attain this goal in the 1980's." But right away, after predicting "various shifts and reversals," Deng Xiaoping proposed, instead of the settlement of the question, simply that "this important objective be constantly on the agenda"--that is, he actually reaffirmed that the Taiwan settlement would be delayed indefinitely. This time he substantiated his position by saying that the successful resolution of the problem would first require the ability to "manage our own affairs well" and "achieve a certain degree of superiority to Taiwan in terms of economic

development." "Without this," Deng Xiaoping said, "nothing will work." In other words, the Beijing leader admitted that Taiwan is far ahead of the PRC in the economic sphere and that this, among other reasons, will nullify the impact of Beijing's appeals that the island population "return to the bosom of the motherland."

There is no question that the Taiwan problem will continue to be used by the Chinese nationalist leadership as an instrument of its great-power, hegemonistic policy. It is also obvious that this problem is one of the stumbling-blocks in the path of the Sino-American alliance. It is the source of contradictions that will be difficult to resolve and could, under certain conditions, have a serious effect on the future development of relations between China and the United States.

FOOTNOTES

1. Taken from MacArthur's message to the Veterans of Foreign Wars congress of 15 August 1950, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 1 September 1950, p 32.
2. L. Gordon, "American Planning for Taiwan, 1942-1945," PACIFIC HISTORICAL REVIEW, 1968, vol 37, No 2, p 201.
3. TIME, 30 August 1950.
4. LIFE, 30 July 1971.
5. O. B. Borisov and B. T. Koloskov, "Sovetsko-kitayskiye otnosheniya" [Soviet-Chinese Relations], Moscow, 1971, pp 172-173.
6. "A Message from the Head of the Soviet Government to the U.S. President, 7 September 1958," IZVESTIYA, 9 September 1958.
7. The Chinese refugees from mainland China and members of their families represent only 4.5 million of the 17.5 million inhabitants of Taiwan.
8. Taken from A. Whiting's testimony in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 28 June 1972.
9. Taken from Hua Guofeng's report at the NPC session of 26 February 1978, RENMIN WENAO, 7 March 1978.
10. U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, 21 December 1974.
11. JAPAN TIMES, 7 January 1979.
12. In December 1978, after the agreement on the establishment of Sino-American diplomatic relations had been concluded, the U.S. Government approved a 5-year program of arms shipments for a total sum of 675 million dollars. In the beginning of February 1979, Secretary of Defense H. Brown announced that Taiwan would receive all the weapons and military equipment it had been promised, for a total sum of 850 million dollars (IZVESTIYA, 7 February 1979).

13. WASHINGTON STAR, 19 April 1979.
14. SANKEI SHIMBUN, 16 January 1979.
15. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 1 May 1979.
16. TIME, 6 November 1978.
17. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 1 May 1979; LA VIE FRANCAISE, 20 August 1979.
18. LA VIE FRANCAISE, 20 August 1979.
19. CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 3 December 1980.
20. STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), 2 October 1979.
21. PRAVDA, 21 January 1979.

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JAPANESE LEFTIST FORCES IN THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACEFUL AND NEUTRAL NATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 88-100

[Article by A. I. Ivanov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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DOMESTIC POLICY CRISIS IN SOUTH KOREA AND ITS SOURCES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 101-111

[Article by Yu. I. Ognev, candidate of historical sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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BEIJING'S POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA: RAPPROCHEMENT WITH IMPERIALIST AND REACTIONARY FORCES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 112-120

[Article by Estrella Rey, doctor of historical sciences (Cuba)]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE CCP IN THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF THE 1920's (COMMEMORATING THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE CCP)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 121-138

[Article by V. I. Glunin, doctor of historical sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE TESTAMENT OF FANG ZHIMIN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 139-144

[Article by A. S. Titov]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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A GREAT HUMANITARIAN: COMMEMORATING THE 120TH ANNIVERSARY OF RABINDRANATH TAGORE'S
BIRTH AND THE 50TH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS VISIT TO THE SOVIET UNION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 145-150

[Article by A. P. Gnatyuk-Danil'chuk, candidate of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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UNFORGETTABLE EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL SOLIDARITY; THE INTERNATIONAL CONTACTS OF
THE CHINESE LEAGUE OF LEFTIST WRITERS (1930-1936)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 151-158

[Article by M. Ye. Shneyder, doctor of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE ORIGINAL AND UNIVERSAL WORKS OF QU YUAN

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 159-172

[Article by N. T. Fedorenko, corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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A LIFE DEVOTED TO SCIENCE (COMMEMORATING THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF ACADEMICIAN
V. M. ALEKSEYEV'S BIRTH)

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 173-177

[Article by V. F. Sorokin, doctor of philological sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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APPEAL FOR FRIENDSHIP AND COOPERATION

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 178-182

[Report by M. V. Demchenko and A. M. Lazarev on the Second Round Table Conference of Soviet and Japanese Public Spokesmen in Moscow's Kosmos Hotel, 18-20 November, and text of conference communique]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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THE RESULTS OF THE TRIAL IN BEIJING

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 183-190

[Article by V. V. Arunov and K. A. Yegorov, candidate of juridical sciences]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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FROM THE SPEECHES OF NPC DEPUTIES

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 191-192

[Statements by deputies at the Third Session of the NPC and by members of the CPPCC]

[Not translated by JPRS]

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BOOK REVIEWS

A TOPICAL AND USEFUL STUDY

MOSCOW PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 193-195

[Review by V. N. Baryshnikov, candidate of historical sciences, of book "KNR i razvivayushchiyesya strany: velikoderzhavnyy biznes" [The PRC and the Developing Countries: Great-Power Business] by M. Andreyev, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1980, 193 pages]

[Text] China's foreign policy ties with the developing countries have been given an important place in the Beijing leadership's great-power, hegemonistic policy, and one of the goals of this policy is the inclusion of this group of states in the sphere of Chinese political influence and economic interests.

At the end of the 1970's, when the Chinese leadership had made a radical shift in the direction of all-round rapprochement with imperialism and had reoriented its foreign economic relations toward the capitalist market, it continued to take vigorous action to attain its geopolitical goals in the developing world. The main aspect of this activity at present is an attempt to use the developing countries as small change for the consolidation of Beijing's contacts with the imperialist powers. In addition, one of the main priorities of Chinese policy in Asia, Africa and Latin America is the use of the foreign currency and raw material potential of states on these three continents to strengthen China's own military economy.

The very title of M. Andreyev's study, "KNR i razvivayushchiyesya strany: velikoderzhavnyy biznes," accurately defines the essence of Chinese foreign economic ties with the developing countries.

The reader of this book will find interesting and extensive information about Beijing's great-power goals, the principles of its economic policy toward the developing countries and the ways in which these principles are put in action. The author quite correctly states that foreign economic relations with the developing countries were one of the first areas in which the reorientation of Chinese foreign policy became apparent. This later evolved into anti-Sovietism, interaction with imperialism and attempts to establish China as the leader of the national liberation movement. "The Maoists," the author writes, "would like to put together a restricted bloc of liberated countries under China's aegis and use the material and human resources and the revolutionary potential of the national liberation movement of people in these countries in their own great-power interest" (p 4).

For this purpose, Beijing is supplementing its economic maneuvers with intensive ideological and propaganda activity to camouflage its hegemonistic policy and complicate economic exchange between the African, Asian and Latin American countries and the socialist states.

The author's comprehensive analysis of the PRC's economic ties with the developing countries includes a discussion of the deep-seated peculiarities of the main traditional channels of these contacts -- foreign trade and assistance--and the clear tendency toward the overt exploitation of the people in these states by China in recent years.

The chapter entitled "China's Trade with the Developing Countries" contains logically presented information about the unequal, great-power foundation on which the Chinese leadership is building its trade relations with these states. Andreyev correctly points out the strong political overtones of Chinese commercial policy, stressing that it is not only aimed at supplying the PRC economy with scarce raw materials and mobilizing huge amounts of currency to pay for modern technology and equipment, grain, fertilizer and weapons imported from the West, but also at the infiltration of the developing countries and the disruption of their economic ties with the socialist states. "Beijing," the author remarks, "is offering these countries a dubious alliance, asserting that it 'will promote the economic and commercial development and increase the economic strength of the developing countries and bring about the economic ruin of imperialist monopolies, particularly those belonging to the superpowers'" (p 5). As a result of this self-seeking approach, the liberated states, where the problem of economic development is one of the most pressing and urgent issues of the present day, have become an object of trade expansion and a source of foreign currency revenues to China. In other words, Beijing's publicized "selflessness" and even "altruism" in relations with the developing countries are actually inflicting noticeable damage on the economies of the Asian, African and Latin American states. In recent years, Chinese foreign trade organizations have persistently tried to make these countries the destination of maximum shipments of products which cannot compete in other markets. According to American data, these countries are now the recipients of approximately half of all Chinese exports of machinery and transport equipment, more than a third of China's grain exports, a fourth of its exports of clothing, yarn and leather, and so forth. This is increasing the deficit in the developing countries' balance of trade with the PRC. According to the author's calculations, Chinese imports from the developing countries increased 3.4-fold between 1952 and 1977, but Chinese exports to these countries increased more than 13-fold in the same period! (p 16). The easily convertible currency received from these countries is then transmitted to the West by the Chinese Government in payment for Chinese purchases of modern industrial equipment and weapons. This is how the PRC pays for more than half of all its imports from the developed capitalist powers (in 1971-1975, for example, the PRC's deficit in trade with the West exceeded 8 billion dollars, while its positive balance in trade with the developing countries during the same period totaled 4.6 billion dollars).

The author illustrates the "utilitarian," temporary nature of Chinese foreign trade policy in the developing world with the extremely significant and convincing fact that the reorientation of Chinese foreign economic ties toward the world capitalist market, especially the market of the imperialist states, was accomplished at the

end of the 1970's by cutting off or considerably limiting trade with the developing countries as well as the socialist states. The line of intensive development of trade with the imperialist powers, the author states, "presupposes a secondary, auxiliary position for the developing states in China's trade, although Beijing propaganda is trying to convince these countries of the opposite" (p 10).

The author's analysis of the structure of Chinese exports to the developing countries is quite significant. It indicates that the PRC is virtually unable to satisfy the growing needs of the people liberated from colonial domination for modern complex equipment and scarce raw materials. The author corroborates this assumption with the admissions of the Chinese press. The gap between China's export potential and the developing countries' import requirements, the author stresses, testifies that the scales of this exchange are tipped in China's favor (p 20). What is more, Beijing has demonstrated its disregard for the needs of its trade partners in the Asian, African and Latin American countries by limiting the assortment of Chinese imports from these countries. In essence, China is importing only rubber and tin from Southeast Asia, only cotton from the Arab countries and some African countries, and so forth. The limited assortment and the raw material structure of Chinese imports from the developing countries are making it more difficult for them to overcome their centuries-old economic problems and reinforce their system of resource specialization.

The author, who is a prominent researcher of the activities of overseas Chinese capital, analyzes the role of the Chinese bourgeoisie in Southeast Asia as Beijing's tool, utilized for its trade expansion in the markets of this region. "The members of the Chinese commercial bourgeoisie," M. Andreyev points out, "some of whom are actively collaborating with Beijing, represent a diversified network in Southeast Asia for the sale of Chinese goods in neighboring countries. No other country has this kind of network in the region." "Virtually all trade with China in this region is conducted through local Chinese commercial firms," which receive high commissions from Beijing (p 33).

In a description of other channels for the growth of Chinese exports to the developing countries, the author discusses dumping prices, credit extended within the framework of Chinese economic aid to these countries and the actual smuggling of Chinese consumer goods, which seriously injures the national economy in the liberated states.

The book contains information about Beijing organized crime, connected with the smuggling of Chinese narcotics through the territory of neighboring countries. From time to time, the author stresses, the Chinese leaders admit that this is occurring. Of course, they painstakingly conceal the actual scales of these operations, but it is known that this is being done on a colossal scale and that PRC revenues from the drug trade amount to around 500 million dollars (p 41).

In the chapter entitled "The Maoist Program of Aid to the Developing Countries," the author presents a vast quantity of information to illustrate the place and role of the machinery of economic leverage in Beijing's struggle to establish its influence in the zone of the national liberation movement. Andreyev describes Beijing's motives for turning to this form of cooperation and correctly concludes that it was forced to make this step. Among other reasons, he mentions the limited scales of Chinese trade with the developing countries, the presence of numerous elements of

inequality in this trade in China's favor, the weak competitive potential of its export goods in the Asian, African and Latin American markets and the promotion of the economic development of the liberated states by economic aid from the USSR and other socialist countries (p 49). The main reason for the compilation of aid programs in Beijing, however, is the hegemonistic motive underlying all Chinese policy toward the developing countries.

The political conditions of Chinese aid programs are indicative. This aid is mainly concentrated on China's Asian periphery, or in the region where the Beijing leadership's great-power, hegemonistic goals are most evident. These programs are expected to guarantee the attainment of Chinese expansionist objectives. For example, China obviously has its eye on the future when it pays increased attention to road construction in border regions, which will give it access to the Indian Ocean. The Beijing strategists' evident obsession with building highways on the approaches to India is also indicative. This applies, for example, to the fairly dense network of highways built in Nepal with Chinese assistance, as well as the strategic Karakorum Highway in Pakistan, which is already being used by the Chinese leadership to supply the rebel gangs conducting subversive activity against the revolutionary regime in Afghanistan. The roads built with Chinese "aid" in Indochina also served as an important instrument of Beijing's hegemonistic policy against Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos. The same role is played by Chinese military assistance, which is part of the Chinese leadership's aggressive great-power policy. It is true that this book, unfortunately, says almost nothing about PRC military aid.

The author's analysis of Chinese foreign economic policy toward the developing countries also includes some other aspects which will give the reader a better understanding of the underlying motives and implementation of this policy in its entirety.

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A SHORT SURVEY OF PRC HISTORY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 195-199

[Review by V. A. Arkhipov of book "KNR: kratkiy istoricheskiy ocherk (1949-1979 gg.)" Moscow, Izdatel'stvo politicheskoy literatury, 1980, 206 pages, editorial board: D. Mitev (Bulgaria), B. Talas (Hungary), H. Peters (GDR), E. Rey (Cuba), S. Bira (Mongolia), W. Nametkiewicz (Poland), M. Sladkovskiy--editor-in-chief (USSR), K. Kukushkin (USSR), J. Skvarzhil (CSSR)]

[Text] On 1 October 1949 the establishment of the People's Republic of China was declared at a festive meeting in Beijing, and on the next day the republic was recognized by the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union, the socialist countries and all progressive mankind fervently welcomed the victory of the people's revolution in China. The Chinese people's struggle for freedom and independence was close to the hearts of Soviet people, who had done a great deal to help the industrious Chinese people finally gain an opportunity to build a better life for themselves.

The formation of the People's Republic of China was of great international significance. It strengthened the world socialist system and dealt a blow to imperialism's colonial system. The victory of the Chinese revolution marked the beginning of a new era in the Chinese people's centuries-old history. It established prerequisites for national independence, for China's transition to a socialist course of development, for the radical improvement of the status of the working masses, and for the transformation of a backward agrarian country into an economically developed state with modern industry, agriculture and culture.

In the 30 years of the PRC's existence, its foreign and domestic policy have undergone several major shifts, as a result of which the PRC, which first acted in concert with the countries of the socialist community and all forces for peace and progress but has now allied itself with imperialist reactionary circles on an anti-Soviet platform hostile to the socialist countries, is taking the line of confrontation with socialist forces to the point of committing overtly aggressive acts against socialist Vietnam. The significant and fundamental political and socioeconomic changes in the development of the PRC, from marked social progress in the first decade after its founding to stagnation and social regression in the next 20 years, as well as the evolution of Chinese foreign policy from anti-imperialism to alliance with imperialist reaction, are examined in a recently

published general work on Chinese history, prepared by a group of scientific researchers from the Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences, in conjunction with Sinologists from scientific institutes in a number of socialist countries. The book is based on numerous studies by Sinologists in the socialist countries. It includes a bibliography of the main works on Chinese history published in Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Cuba, Mongolia, Poland, the USSR and the CSSR.

The book examines the reversals and metamorphoses of Chinese foreign and domestic policy over a period of 30 years, thoroughly analyzes the course of the multitude of events in which this policy was reflected, and demonstrates how the strategic line of the Sinocentric, nationalistic and chauvinistic policy of the Chinese leaders, aimed at turning China into a major world power with pretensions to hegemony on the global scale, was formed and developed.

Now that the traffic in anti-Soviet lies and falsifications is growing from day to day in Beijing while nothing is being said about the actual relationship between the Soviet Union and China in the first years after the revolutionary victory, a thorough analysis of this relationship is of great value to the Soviet reader and, in particular, to foreign readers. In the first chapter, "The Triumph of the People's Revolution in China; the Formation of the People's Republic of China," the authors direct the reader's attention to the fact that our country has invariably conducted a Leninist foreign policy toward China and its people and has given the Chinese people internationalist assistance in their struggle for national independence and social liberation. They present a great deal of factual information about these matters with an emphasis on the period directly following the victory of the people's revolution in China and the first years of the PRC's existence.

The Chinese people were greatly assisted by the Soviet Union in the war against the Japanese invaders. Large Japanese armed forces were stationed at the borders of the USSR and Mongolia for a long time. When the Japanese army was defeated by Soviet and Mongolian troops near Halhyn-Gol River in 1939, this represented genuine support of the Chinese people's liberation struggle (pp 15-16).

Manchuria (Northeast China), which was liberated by the Soviet Army in conjunction with Mongolian troops, was the most developed part of China in the industrial sense. More than 60 percent of Chinese heavy industry was concentrated here. The Soviet Union helped to establish democratic rule in most of Manchuria, which was then entered by PLA units. Military and administrative personnel were trained in this part of China with Soviet assistance, and they later took over the administrative work in rural and urban areas when other parts of China were liberated. During this process, the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic served the Chinese revolutionary forces as a reliable rear, and the Port Arthur naval base, where Soviet troops were stationed, covered the Manchurian liberated region from the south, from the sea.

The Soviet Union, the authors stress, defended the Chinese public interest in the international arena. Soviet diplomacy and the Soviet press exposed the imperialist policy of the United States, which was hostile to the Chinese revolution. The USSR insisted that the Chinese people be given an opportunity to solve their domestic problems independently (p 17).

In the most difficult days of the young republic's establishment our country gave the Chinese people all-round assistance and support in guarding the revolution's conquests against encroachment by imperialism and Chinese reactionary forces, and in restoring the economy and instituting broad-scale construction, as a result of which several modern industries, previously unknown in the nation, were established in China within a short time. The Soviet Union also assisted in transport construction, in the training of national scientific, technical and engineering personnel and in the education of large groups of workers in the mass professions.

It would be difficult to force the Chinese people to forget that it was precisely at this time that the Soviet Union signed a treaty on friendship, alliance and mutual assistance with the PRC, and that this treaty played a tremendous role in strengthening the international positions of the republic and its security.

The Chinese leaders admitted this at the time. Mao Zedong, for example, stressed: The Soviet-Chinese treaty of 14 February 1950 "guarantees us an opportunity to boldly carry out construction in our nation at a more rapid rate" (p 26).

The resolute support the PRC received from the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, which made open imperialist intervention against China difficult, helped the young republic attain several important general democratic objectives within a comparatively short period of time. One of them, as the authors correctly point out, was agrarian reform, which was accompanied by a fierce class struggle in rural areas. It was a radical antifeudal revolution, organized by the people's state from above, with the support of the multimillion-strong masses of laboring peasants. As a result of this, around 300 million peasants with little or no land were issued 47 million hectares of estate land for free and were no longer required to pay rent, which had amounted to a total of more than 30 million tons of grain a year.

Another of the basic democratic objectives was the liquidation of big state-monopoly capital and foreign capital investments. This was accomplished by confiscating the property of monopolies and nationalizing (by buying out individuals) or driving out foreign capital. A state sector arose on this basis, became China's principal material base and assisted in the birth of new, socialist production relations.

Soviet economic assistance and the PRC's commercial ties with the European socialist countries helped to strengthen the state sector.

By the end of 1952, more than 50 large enterprises and facilities in China's heavy industry had been restored, remodeled or built with the aid of the Soviet Union. Our country did much to restore the railroads and ensure the efficient functioning of railway transport. The Soviet Union transferred its rights of joint management of the China-Chanchun Railroad, with a property value of around 600 million dollars, to the PRC in full and gratis.

The Soviet Union and other socialist countries waged a systematic struggle to restore the PRC's rights in the United Nations and other international organizations.

At the end of the 1940's and the beginning of the 1950's, American imperialism dramatically intensified its aggressive preparations near the PRC's borders. Under these conditions and, in particular, in connection with the imperialist aggression in Korea, which began at the end of June 1950, and the actual occupation of Taiwan by American troops, which marked the beginning of an undeclared U.S. war on the PRC, stronger defense capabilities became an urgent objective of the people's government in China (p 34). In line with its international duty and the spirit of the 1950 treaty, our country immediately gave China maximum assistance in the development of a defense industry, offered China credit on preferential terms and set up training courses for large groups of Chinese military instructors and advisers.

In July 1951 the PLA had 1,050 Soviet-produced combat planes, but at the end of 1955 it had more than 2,000. As early as March 1950, a large air force unit, supplied with the latest combat equipment, arrived from the USSR to defend Shanghai and adjacent regions against Kuomintang air raids. The Soviet pilots and technical specialists who defended the Chinese skies were simultaneously engaged in the intensive training of PRC air force personnel (pp 34-35). The Soviet Union considerably increased its shipments of weapons, combat equipment and ammunition to the PRC. Within a year after the beginning of the war in Korea, the aggressor had to agree to peace talks. This frustrated the imperialist plan to extend the military operations to the territory of China.

"If we had allowed the war to spread to China," American President H. Truman admitted in his memoirs, "we could have expected retaliation. Peiping and Moscow were allies, both in the ideological sense and by the terms of their treaty. If we had attacked Communist China, we could have expected Russian intervention" (p 35). China's close cooperation with the socialist countries was a factor that not only strengthened China's international position, but also helped a great deal in the consolidation of people's rule and the transition to planned socialist construction.

The CCP general line was based on the assumption that the construction of socialism in China would be impossible without a close alliance with the USSR and comprehensive Soviet assistance. "We must teach the people of our country," a policy-planning document of the CCP Central Committee said, "to realize that the assistance our country has received from the Soviet Union and the nations of people's democracy, the powerful unity of the camp of peace, democracy and socialism and peace-loving people throughout the world and the successful development of the struggle in defense of world peace are essential conditions for the successful construction of socialism in our country" (p 39).

Inspired by the grand prospects of socialism, revealed by the party's general line, the Chinese people enthusiastically waged a struggle to fulfill the First Five-Year Plan, which was regarded as the initial stage in the construction of socialist foundations. On the surface, it appeared that this line was then also supported by Mao Zedong and his followers. It later became apparent, however, that Mao's statements about friendship with the Soviet Union and the socialist countries were two-faced and hypocritical. At that time he still had to consider the views of the particular circles within the CCP Central Committee that favored the development of friendly relations with the USSR. Even then, however, Mao Zedong was already making plans to impose his own hegemonistic platform on the socialist countries and start realizing, on this basis, his great-power, chauvinistic and Sinocentric ambitions.

In the mid-1950's, the authors stress, the atmosphere within the CCP was seriously aggravated. Mao's group became much more active in the party leadership. By this time Mao had essentially mapped out the unique course which, in his opinion, Chinese development should follow. The final goal of this unique course was the creation of a "great China," as a leading and strong power, "the first power in the world," according to Mao's own definition (pp 45-46). This actually signified an attempt by Mao Zedong and his followers to turn the nation's policy line away from scientific socialism, which lay at the basis of the CCP general line during the transition period, and toward the reactionary, petty bourgeois utopianism of the great-power and chauvinistic brand that constituted the essence of Maoist doctrine.

Concealing his plans to turn China into a militaristic power, Mao Zedong discarded the general line worked out by the party and ratified by the Eighth CCP Congress, ignoring objective economic laws and the experience of socialist construction in the fraternal countries, and announced the adventurist policy of the "Great Leap Forward."

By the end of 1958, the book stresses, there were already numerous indications that the policy of the "Great Leap Forward" and "communization" had reached an impasse. Sharp criticism of the "Great Leap Forward" policy and its chief engineer, Mao Zedong, was voiced in a letter to Mao from Minister of Defense Peng Dehuai, member of the Politburo, dated 14 July 1959, in which he said that the main errors stemmed from the "individual style of leadership" and that "problems in economic construction cannot be solved as quickly as political problems, like the shelling of Jinmen, the suppression of the rebellion in Tibet, and so forth" (p 75).

The "Great Leap Forward" policy led China into a severe economic and political crisis. It did not solve problems and, on the contrary, it sharply exacerbated all of the "sore spots" in PRC development, economic and social: the problem of industrialization and the eradication of disparities in industry; the problem of agricultural modernization and the elimination of the threat of starvation and hunger, the enhancement of the well-being of the broad laboring masses; the problem of finding ways and means of accomplishing a genuine cultural revolution. The implementation of this line, its failure and the related mounting struggle within the Chinese leadership led to the Maoist "Cultural Revolution," which destroyed the political system of people's democracy and established a military-bureaucratic dictatorship in the PRC.

Now the Chinese are even admitting that the "Great Leap Forward" created chaos in the Chinese economy and brought China to the verge of economic collapse, while the Maoist "Cultural Revolution" led to a "feudal-fascist dictatorship." Therefore, the authors emphasize, the failure of the "Great Leap Forward" was followed by a qualitative reversal in the policy of the Chinese leadership, signifying a break with Marxism-Leninism and the rejection of the experience of the socialist countries and of China's own experience in the preceding 10 years (p 87). All of this was accompanied by the further progression of PRC foreign policy along the path of chauvinism and adventurism.

All of Beijing's foreign policy actions in the 1960's testified that Maoism had objectively defined itself as a new reactionary force, opening a "second front" of struggle against real socialism and the international communist movement and, consequently, acting in the interest of imperialist and reactionary forces.

The book contains a thorough analysis of the Maoist "Cultural Revolution," which was a political coup, carried out by Mao Zedong's petty bourgeois nationalist group, with the support of army units loyal to this group, public security agencies and shock detachments of politically immature youth (Red Guards), aimed at establishing a military-bureaucratic dictatorship and conducting a militaristic, great-power policy.

It was during the "Cultural Revolution" that contemporary Chinese militarism took its final form. It is a reactionary system which, by means of military coercion and force, is supposed to secure the ruling clique's political authority in the country and create favorable internal conditions for the attainment of great-power objectives in the international arena (p 131).

The two last chapters of the book are of particular interest. They summarize and analyze factual information about Chinese foreign policy in the last decade and thoroughly examine the foreign policy doctrines and concepts of the Chinese leadership. In this decade Beijing made a sharp turn to the right, toward rapprochement and direct alliance with imperialist and reactionary forces, further deteriorating relations with the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community.

The last chapter contains a great deal of impressive factual material, which will help the reader understand the political situation in the PRC and the essence of Beijing's current policy.

The authors describe the complex political struggle being waged in the PRC over Mao Zedong's legacy. Recent events have proved that this struggle is becoming more intense. Today in China, L. I. Brezhnev said in his speech in Alma Ata on 6 September 1980, serious internal processes are taking place, the actual nature of which will not be fully revealed for some time. It is already obvious, however, that some Maoist foreign policy concepts, which have nothing in common with socialism, are the target of overt and covert criticism in the nation. In particular, the notorious "Cultural Revolution" is already being openly described as the greatest catastrophe ever to befall the Chinese people.¹

The book also lists and thoroughly analyzes the basic aspects of the Beijing leaders' present line in the international arena and proves that this line has not undergone any significant changes since the departure of Mao Zedong and the dismissal of his closest associates, the so-called "gang of four."

The Beijing leadership's policy, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, "is just as hostile to the Soviet Union, Vietnam, Mongolia and the other socialist countries, just as hostile to the cause of peace and detente as before."²

The subject of this review logically reveals, from a Marxist-Leninist standpoint, the relationship between the domestic and foreign policies of the Chinese leaders, consisting in the fact that the preservation of the military-bureaucratic dictatorship and the continuous militarization of the country are being accompanied by more pronounced reactionary and aggressive tendencies in PRC foreign policy. This collective work by Sinologists from a number of socialist countries can rightfully be regarded as their international contribution to the struggle against the great-power, hegemonistic policy line of the current Chinese leadership.

1. PRAVDA, 30 August 1980.

2. Ibid.

AMERICAN 'PARTNERSHIP' IN EAST ASIA

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 199-200

[Review by V. V. Semenov of book "Amerikanskaya politika 'partnerstva' v vostochnoaziatskom regione" [The American Policy of "Partnership" in the East Asian Region] by A. V. Krutskikh, Moscow, Mezhdunarodnyye otnosheniya, 1980, 200 pages]

[Text] One of the characteristics of the development of international relations in the 1970's was the shift from "cold war," from explosive confrontation between the two social systems, to the relaxation of international tension under the influence of deep-seated objective processes and the peaceful foreign policy of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. The struggle for international detente and the interests of the struggle for disarmament and peace presuppose the need for extensive scientific research into key problems in world development and international relations.

There is no doubt that one of the main fields of this research is the study of U.S. policy--the policy of the strongest imperialist power of our day.

Soviet writers have done much to reveal the true nature of the imperialist policy of war and aggression, which is hostile to the cause of peace and freedom, and to expose the plans of reactionary forces in U.S. ruling circles. A. V. Krutskikh's book "Amerikanskaya politika 'partnerstva' v vostochnoaziatskom regione" will make a useful contribution to this work.

A. V. Krutskikh's book is a study of the U.S. policy of "partnership" with its allies in the Far East and Southeast Asia and with Australia and New Zealand. It contains a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical and practical aspects of a major area of U.S. foreign policy activity in Asia after World War II. There is no question that the author's chosen subject is extremely topical and is of scientific and practical interest. The eastern half of the Pacific basin is essentially one of the main spheres of American expansion. In the postwar years the struggle between the two social systems was reflected in paradigm in the Korean conflict. It is in this region that the United States fought its longest war, unprecedented in terms of casualties and probably the most disgraceful of all wars from the moral standpoint--the war against the people of Indochina. It is here that the most diverse instruments of imperialist opposition to socialist forces and the national liberation movement have been tested in practice.

One of the appealing features of this book is the author's attempt to not limit himself merely to factual material, but to also illustrate the theoretical foundation of U.S. coalition policy. The reader thereby gains an understanding of the origination and functioning of blocs and of such important currents in American political thinking as "political realism" and, above all, the "balance of power" and "multilateral diplomacy" theories, which lay at the basis of the variety of military and political alliances organized by the United States, as well as all of Washington's foreign policy activity (particularly under present conditions).

Soon after the end of World War II, American politicians, who had armed themselves with the theory that the "world balance of power" consisted of "local balances of power," concentrated on "containing" the Soviet Union by creating a system of blocs and alliances in the West and the East. After partially solving this problem in Europe, where the North Atlantic bloc (NATO) was formed in 1949, the United States began to pursue the same goals in East Asia and the Pacific region in the early 1950's.

In the first half of the 1950's it was able to build several bilateral and multilateral blocs and alliances on an anti-Soviet basis, as a result of which the creation of an East Asian version of NATO, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), was made possible. In this way, as the author points out, the line of American "interests" in this region "stretched thousands of kilometers from the north to the south, taking in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands, moving across Korea, Japan, Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines, passing through Indochina and ending in Singapore. Later it stretched all the way to Australia and New Zealand" (p 41).

But this was not enough. In the 1960's the United States tried to establish complete control over regional organizations, such as ASA (later ASEAN) and ASPAC, by directing them to fight against the socialist states and the national liberation movement.

In the 1960's the United States began to associate some of its hopes for the success of its strategic plans with the policy of the Chinese leadership, which was openly hostile to the USSR and other socialist countries. "In the atmosphere of Beijing's anti-Sovietism," A. V. Krutskikh underscores, "there was a revival of the American illusion that the United States could stop the development of progressive tendencies in Asia by means of intensive military intervention in Asian affairs. Washington relied once again on the exertion of military pressure and began to implement the Johnson doctrine, envisaging active and direct participation by American armed forces in the struggle against communism" (p 45).

The American adventure in Vietnam, the tremendous difficulties created by this war in the United States itself, and the sharp decline of U.S. prestige in the eyes of its allies clearly attested to the impracticability of the military-political system created by American strategists in East Asia during the period of cold war and redesigned in the first half of the 1960's.

In the late 1960's and early 1970's the United States had to face the problem of finding a more "reasonable" foreign policy line in East Asia. The second chapter of the book describes the Nixon and Ford administrations' attempts to correct the "partnership" policy.

After thoroughly analyzing the so-called "Nixon Guam doctrine" and "Ford's Hawaii declaration," the author concludes that the United States had to abandon, to some degree, the policy of direct military intervention in the affairs of the East Asian countries when these two presidents were in office. At this time an attempt was made to transfer the burden of the direct suppression of progressive forces in East Asia to the shoulders of local regimes. The United States declared its willingness to "help" its Asian allies without extensive and direct participation by U.S. troops. Steps were also taken at this time toward the further economic enslavement of America's East Asian partners and their firmer attachment to the U.S. economy.

Neither Nixon nor Ford, however, advocated the renunciation of American military and political partnership ties in Asia. "People in Washington believed that the premature dismantling of the military and political 'regional security structures' established by the United States in the Pacific basin would create chaos and undermine the partners' confidence in American 'assistance'...and thereby reduce their opposition to 'communist infiltration'" (pp 103-104).

The last chapter, which examines the American "partnership" policy today, is of particular interest. The author presents abundant factual information to prove that the Carter Administration did not depart to any degree from the principles governing the military and political alliances built in earlier years and embarked on the further escalation of tension in the region and the exaggeration of the myth about the "Soviet threat." In this section the author presents interesting data about such fields of U.S. activity, carried out in line with military and political commitments, as shipments of military equipment, weapons and ammunition, the assistance of allies in the establishment of their own military production, the training of their armed forces, the offer of economic aid for military purposes, and so forth.

When we speak of the U.S. "partnership" policy today, we must make special mention of the role played by the Chinese factor in carrying out American imperialism's strategic plans in East Asia. Now that the Beijing leaders have chosen the path of confrontation with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries and have gradually moved toward direct alliance with the most reactionary circles in the West, they are using China as a major destabilizing factor in Asia and the rest of the world. By the end of the 1970's Beijing had actually turned into another partner of the United States and was supporting it in its conflicts with the USSR, in its appeals for the revival of militarism in Japan and in its offer of aid to reactionary regimes. But the acquisition of even this new partner is not likely to help American strategists solve their problems. As A. V. Krutskikh correctly points out, "the chronic crisis in the American policy of alliances attests to the defective nature of its theoretical basis and the flaws in the imperialist practice of subordinating this policy to the 'balance of power' laws" (p 190).

The "balance of power" policy does not take changes in international relations into account. Guaranteed peace and genuine security in Asia can only be attained on a non-bloc basis, through the establishment of the principles of peaceful coexistence. These principles have been consistently supported by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries.

In summation, it must be said that this book will attract the attention of experts on international affairs and of a broad group of readers interested in international issues.

MAOISM'S SELF-EXPOSURE

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 201-204

[Review by Professor L. M. Gudoshnikov of book "Maoizm bez prikras" [Maoism Unadorned], edited by O. Ye. Vladimirov, compiled and prefaced by M. L. Altayskiy, annotated by V. S. Kulikov, Moscow, Progress, 1980, 283 pages]

[Text] The book "Maoizm bez prikras" occupies a special place in recent political literature about the combat mission of Marxist-Leninists in all countries: struggle against Maoism. This book is an anthology of statements by Mao Zedong, primarily excerpts from his previously unpublished speeches at CCP Central Committee working conferences, addresses to secretaries of party provincial committees, reports at conferences of ideological personnel, speeches at the Second Session of the Eighth CCP Congress and CCP Central Committee plenums, his letters and so forth. Some of the statements were taken from Chinese publications of the documents of the 9th, 10th and 11th CCP Congresses and CCP Central Committee plenums of the 1966-1977 period, materials of the "Cultural Revolution," the Red Guard and regular PRC press and the fifth volume of the "Selected Works of Mao Zedong," published in Beijing in 1977.

In an introductory preface, M. L. Altayskiy analyzes Mao Zedong's views on questions of philosophy, socialism, foreign policy issues, war and peace. The introduction contains conclusive proof that the focal point of the philosophical "Thought" of Mao Zedong is vulgar materialism combined with subjective idealism and pragmatism. Mao's statements on questions of ideology testify that he had an extremely oversimplified, utilitarian understanding of Marxism and mechanically combined it "with various anti-Marxist views, borrowed from the arsenal of traditional Confucian ideology, the petty bourgeois opinions of anarchists and Trotskyists and the bourgeois ideology of pragmatism" (p 34). The very ideals of socialism were of value to Maoism because they could serve as a banner capable of attracting the masses for later use in the struggle for nationalistic goals. As a result of its evolution in the last 20 years, Maoism is now one of the most dangerous enemies of Marxism-Leninism, scientific socialism and the cause of world peace. Pointing out the fact that anti-Sovietism is the reverse side of Beijing's great-power chauvinistic course and its hegemonism, the author of the preface stresses that the Maoists are using anti-Sovietism, on the one hand, to substantiate their hegemonistic aims and find allies among socialism's enemies and, on the other, "to divert public attention away from internal problems and difficulties, to stir up military hysteria and to promote the militarization of the country" (p 29). Anti-Sovietism has become a

screen for Beijing's hegemonism and therefore poses a threat to the cause of peace and to all mankind.

At the end of his analysis of Mao Zedong's views, M. L. Altayskiy writes: "On the whole, Maoism is a petty bourgeois chauvinist current which grew strong by exploiting the difficulties of the period of transition to socialism under the conditions of socioeconomic retardation and the conservatism of Chinese society, at a time when the working class had been split up and disunited and had lost its leading political role, at a time when a chauvinist clique manipulated the downtrodden majority" (pp 31-32).

The statements cited in the work reveal the fundamental principles of Maoist ideology and policy and demonstrate their extremely contradictory and eclectic nature. The statements not only reveal the true essence of the views of Mao Zedong and his associates, but also demonstrate the impotence and futility of Maoist theory.

The anthology consists of four major sections: "Mao Zedong Speaks About Himself and His Views" (the sources of Maoism and its philosophical "ideals," statements about militaristic style and against socialist democracy), "Maoist Socialism" (Mao's theory of petty bourgeois barracks "socialism"), "Sinocentrism and Hegemonism" (Maoism's foreign policy theories and views on questions of war and peace) and, finally, "Mao vs. Mao," where Mao's statements against anti-Sovietism, hegemonism and alliance with imperialism, with which he disguised the actual essence of his policy and ideology, are grouped.

This last section contains particularly convincing evidence of the political double-dealing to which Mao Zedong frequently resorted to attain his goals. A comparison of Mao Zedong's confidential remarks with his public statements during the same historical period (for example, in the 1950's and early 1960's) reveals the depth of his hypocrisy and phariseism. In his public statements he vowed loyalty to the Soviet Union, extolled the value of the Soviet experience and underscored his respect for the CPSU. For example, he made the following remark in public: "Out of all the diverse experience of other countries, we can take one as an example. In comparison to the experience of other countries, the Soviet Union's experience suits us the best" (1957, p 265). At almost the same time, he expressed the following view at conferences: "But we are doing exactly the opposite of what is being done in the Soviet Union" (1958, p 227). In confidential statements to the party aktiv, Mao Zedong slandered the Soviet Union, groaned about its achievements and its aid to the PRC and described the state of affairs in our country in a distorting light, going so far as to allege that "the Soviet Union has a bourgeois dictatorship, a dictatorship of the grand bourgeoisie, a German fascist dictatorship" (1964, p 235).

Mao Zedong's real self-exposure can be found in the statements in the section entitled "Mao Zedong Speaks About Himself and His Views." Mao's contempt for education and the intelligentsia is particularly striking. The roots of this contempt, as the notes on this section correctly point out, should be sought in his biography: the son of a rich peasant, a young boy who was acutely aware of his inferior status, a person who did not receive a good education and, in his opinion, was therefore accorded a status below what he deserved. This contempt stayed with Mao throughout his lifetime and became one of the principles of his ideology. Mao said: "I have

always said that intellectuals know less than anyone else" (1957, p 54) and "intellectuals are the most uncivilized people.... The most civilized people are the semiliterate" (1968, p 55). At the same time, he propagandized the following "ideas," which lay at the basis of Kampuchean (in Pol Pot's time) as well as Chinese political practices: "We must drive all artists, poets, dramatists and novelists out of the cities and into the countryside.... If they will not go, they will not be fed. Only those who go will be fed" (1964, p 154).

As the statements cited in this work testify, the theoretical bases of Marxism remained a mystery to Mao. Acutely aware of his lack of education, Mao evidently tried to convince his listeners and readers that "Sinized Marxism" could be established even without a thorough understanding of Marxism. Mao never became a real Marxist because he fell prey to the petty bourgeois philosophy and nationalistic and anarchistic ideas. The latter, for example, were clearly reflected in his popularization of the famous anarchist postulate "the destructive spirit is the constructive spirit." In the last years of his life, Mao said: "Without destruction there can be no construction. Destruction is criticism, it is revolution.... First comes destruction, and this very destruction contains the seeds of construction" (p 75).

But Mao did not always speak this openly from the idealistic standpoint. He usually tried to dress his statements in Marxist clothing. He used Marxist terminology mainly to conceal his petty bourgeois ideas. If we discard the verbal trappings, however, we see an idealistic ideology. The most famous Maoist postulate, that "policy is the commanding force," was not a passing remark. The supremacy of policy was always interpreted by Mao as the subordination of the objective laws of society to arbitrary decisions or, in other words, as "the transformation of the ideal into the material," the implementation of Mao's "Thought." Another characteristic of Maoism is the equation of theory with practice and the mechanical application of general premises to specific cases, which was warned against by the founders of Marxism-Leninism. Mao absolutized the subjective factor and denigrated the role of material factors in societal development. This is the main tenet of Maoist "philosophy."

Maoist "socialism," as a variety of petty bourgeois socialism, has tried to interpret Marxism and scientific socialism in its own way, to make them over to fit nationalist requirements and to use their prestige as a front for Maoist "ideas." The basis here is another slogan about the omnipotence of ideas and policy. Mao Zedong wrote: "Policy is always the commander-in-chief, policy is always the head, policy is always in command of military affairs, economics, production and technology" (1965, p 141). In matters connected with the construction of socialism (the Maoist variety), he absolutized the class struggle, declaring: "In our day it is precisely the class struggle that moves society ahead" (1960, p 156) and "We must wage a class struggle for 10,000 years" (1962, p 161). In his statements, Mao is an apologist for poverty, calling it an advantage for social progress. In 1958 he said: "We are poor in the economic sense and retarded in the cultural sense. I think this is good" (p 119); "We must make the transition (to communism) while we are still poor, because this will work out better; otherwise, it will be difficult to make the transition" (ibid.). Two years later, Mao, who had learned nothing from the failure of the "Great Leap Forward," said: "The more backward our economy is, the easier, and not harder, it will be to make the transition...to socialism" (1960, p 121).

These statements reveal the real Mao, the petty bourgeois activist who tried to "speed up" the course of history and skip entire stages of development. And like all other political figures of this species, he was inclined to overemphasize the military factor, not only during the period of revolutionary war, but also in times of peaceful construction, constantly reiterating: "All of our people are soldiers" (p 139).

The Maoist "Cultural Revolution" is given a great deal of space in the work, and this is understandable because this unprecedented campaign synthesized, as it were, the basic postulates of Maoism and represented its quintessence. Mao himself explained how he lit the "fire of cultural revolution," how he inspired, through Jiang Qing, the article by Yao Wenyuan, which, in his words, served as the "signal for the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" (p 199). The work contains Mao's complimentary remark about the *dazibao* [large-character poster] of the now-condemned leader of the Beijing University Red Guards, Nie Yuanzi: "Nie Yuanzi's *dazibao* of 25 May represents the Manifesto of the Paris Commune of China in the 1960's. The significance of this event surpasses that of the Paris Commune" (p 205). Mao tells how he called Kang Shengwu and Chen Boda and ordered them to broadcast this *dazibao* over the radio. The work contains the text of Mao Zedong's letter of 23 January 1967 to Lin Biao, in which he ordered that the PLA be instructed to support "left-ists"--that is, Red Guards (p 206). In his statements of the "Cultural Revolution" period, Mao advocates the use of the army in the struggle against his opponents. Here, for example, we find the following pearls of wisdom: "Those who stubbornly refuse to be corrected must be arrested. This will be the procedure in minor cases; in serious cases, on the other hand, punitive expeditions will have to be conducted. We are now trying to control events, but I feel that this is useless; it will not matter if a small civil war breaks out"; "There are two advantages to armed struggle: The first is that combat experience is acquired; the second is that bad people expose themselves" (1968, p 210); "They say that there is no civil war in China. In my opinion, this is a civil war.... It is an armed struggle, and not an ideological one" (1967, p 208). Mao wanted to turn the bloodbath of the "Cultural Revolution" into a unique, periodically repeated type of political campaign. He wrote the following to Jiang Qing: "Complete disorder on earth leads to universal order. This would be repeated every 7 or 8 years.... As soon as 7 or 8 years go by, we will start another movement to get rid of the scum" (1966, p 212). The next year, Mao said the following in a talk with an Albanian military delegation: "The question of struggle between two classes, two paths or two lines cannot be settled by one cultural revolution, or even two or three. After the current cultural revolution, we will rally our strength for at least 10 years. At least two or three cultural revolutions must be conducted each century" (1967, p 213). This "revelation" served as the basis of the "theory of continued revolution under the dictatorship of the proletariat," which was a repetition of Trotskyist ideas and turned violence into an end in itself.

Maoism's self-exposure is particularly apparent in foreign policy matters, where the motivating ideals are Sinocentrism and hegemonism. In 1960 Mao Zedong reported: "In the middle of the 20th century the center of the world revolution moved to China." Even before this, he had drawn the following picture of the modern world: "Now Marx has much to do in the East and has no time for the West.... Now it is the East that is progressive and the West that is backward" (1957, p 219). He was already speaking of Chinese world and regional supremacy as a goal in the 1950's.

In 1959, for example, Mao said: "We must conquer the world. Our target is the entire world...where we will establish a mighty nation" (p 223). A year earlier, when he spoke at a meeting of the CCP Central Committee Military Council, which had met to discuss Pacific problems, he said: "The Pacific Ocean is actually not all that pacific at present. In the future, when it is under our control, it will be pacific" (p 224). Slandering the socialist countries and trying to divide them, Mao Zedong spent the last years of his life advising "the establishment of a united international front with a friendly imperialist country to fight against revisionists" (1975, p 234)--that is, he actually laid the bases for the reactionary alliance with imperialism, which is the focal point of the current Chinese leadership's foreign policy.

Mao Zedong's statements about war are also significant. At the Second Session of the Eighth CCP Congress in 1958, he said: "We must not be afraid of war. There will be a war, and this means that people will die. The comrades seated here have seen death. Death is not frightening. If half of 600 million people die, there will be 300 million left.... If half of mankind dies during the war, this will not make any difference. It will not be frightening even if only a third remains" (p 239). Mao interpreted tension in international relations as something good. He said: "When someone escalates tension, do you think that this is of no benefit? Not necessarily" and "Tension ultimately benefits us" (1958). He even posed the following rhetorical question in 1967: "Would it really be possible to solve problems in the absence of tension?" (p 243).

The need for preparations for war is implied in many of Mao's statements. In the 1950's he threatened the overseas neighbor that has now become the PRC's closest partner: "We will certainly build large ships and will be prepared to land in Japan, in the Philippines and in San Francisco" (p 250). He constantly reiterated: "We are ready to fight for 25 years again" (1964), "We must also realize that a major war will break out on our territory soon" (1967), "We must be prepared to fight in any year" (1969), and so forth. In the 1960's he reaffirmed his intention to sacrifice millions of human lives in a war. In a talk with representatives of the Japan Socialist Party in 1964, he said: "War will cost many people their lives, during these years many millions, tens of millions of our soldiers and Chinese people will probably die. But would this mean that there would be less and less Chinese as the war went on? No! After all, just look--we now have a population of over 600 million, a population that is too big" (p 249). Mao believed that China, with its huge population, would suffer less than others in a war, particularly if it entered the war late, after pushing the United States and USSR into a large-scale military conflict. After Mao's death, the Chinese leaders' views on this matter did not change, and their recent definite statements about the possibility of postponing and preventing world war are not fooling anyone.

It should be noted that the work "Maoizm bez prikras" is quite easy to use as a reference. Each of the large sections listed above is divided into thematic subsections (for example, the section on "Sinocentrism and Hegemonism" is divided into "Great-Power Chauvinism," "Mao Speaks About China's Foreign Policy Line" and "Mao Speaks About War and Peace") and these are divided into even smaller groups: for example, "The PRC and the United States," "Mao Praises Japanese Militarism," "Mao's Malicious Slander of the Soviet Union" and so forth. Each section includes a commentary and the text is annotated with the necessary explanations.

If this extremely useful book is republished, the new edition should be longer and certain sections should be rearranged. For example, it would be more logical to move the subsection on "Mao vs. Socialist Democracy" from the first section to the second, while his statements about the intelligentsia and the educational system, which are now located in different sections, could be combined. The sources could be supplemented with RENMIN RIBAO articles written in response to the CPSU Central Committee's open letter to the party organizations and all communists of the Soviet Union (1963), other articles in the Chinese press and statements by other Chinese officials.

Soviet researchers of Chinese affairs and events in other countries of the Far East, as well as researchers of general political and ideological topics and propagandists, have been given an excellent aid for struggle against a hostile ideology and policy.

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POLITICAL TRADITIONS OF THE PRC

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 p 205

[Report on First Sectorial Conference on "The Political Traditions of the PRC" in the Institute of the Far East, USSR Academy of Sciences, on 22 and 24 December 1979]

[Not translated by JPRS]

CSO: 1805/3

A TRIBUTE TO CORRESPONDING MEMBER OF THE USSR ACADEMY OF SCIENCES A. I. KRUSHANOV
ON HIS 60TH BIRTHDAY

Moscow PROBLEMY DAL'NEGO VOSTOKA in Russian No 1, 1981 pp 206-207

[Not translated by JPRS]

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